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Abstract 
The main issue that this research deals with is the evaluation of the structural 
adjustment policies adopted in 1980. Their impact on the Turkish economy is 
assessed, and comparisons are made with the 1970s. Econometric methods are 
used to assist the evaluation and two models, based on the Klein model I , are 
developed and compared. This study also includes an analysis of the changes that 
occurred at the sectoral level (agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism) as a result 
of the 1980 structural adjustment programme. In addition, the thesis contains a 
review of the literature on structural adjustment. An overview of the Turkish econ-
omy is provided including the economic policies implemented by different Turkish 
governments in 1978 and 1979. 
The research findings show the need to stabilise the exchange rate. Inflation 
has been exacerbated by continuing depreciation. Domestic supply, in particular 
industriaJ production, is the key determinant of exports, not the exchange rate. 
In addition, floating interest rates, which rose substantially in the 1980s, appear 
to have a moderate positive impact on savings and credits. Also, the evidence 
suggests that structural adjustment has improved income distribution in Turkey. 
At the sectoral level, there is a need to increase investment in manufacturing, 
Uberalise agricultural prices, and increase the role of tourism as a source of foreign 
exchange. 
This thesis is dedicated to my beloved parents, brothers, and sister for their 
encouragement and invaluable support. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the Problem: An Overview 
Structural adjustment became a controversial issue in the last decade due to 
two reasons. First, as a result of the debt crisis in 1982; and second, due to the 
demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. However, although the defeat of 
the planned economy theory paved the way for economic Uberalisation, the latter 
has not been going smoothly. On the one hand, the Uberalisation process created 
problems of its own such as increasing income disparities leading to social and 
political instability. On the other hand, structural adjustment programmes failed, 
in some cases, to achieve their objectives. Meanwhile, the Turkish government 
adopted a structural adjustment programme in 1980 after a long history of central 
planning. The results were considered encouraging leading both the International 
Monetary Fund and the Turkish government to claim that the programme was 
successful. 
The Turkish economy provides an interesting case study of a developing econ-
omy given the low level of per capita income, rehance on a big agricultural sector 
and light industries for exports and growth, a large and dominating pubhc sec-
tor, and the dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods for industrial 
production. 
The RepubHc of Turkey was established in 1923, after the war of independence 
1 
following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War in 1918. 
The leaders of the country headed by Mustafa Kama! (Ataturk) turned to the 
victorious west for inspiration to reconstruct their country's economy, politics, 
and even society and education. Thus, Turkey's history during that period was 
characterised by deep social, cultural, and economic reforms which mainly included 
the adoption of secular principles in the political life of the country. 
As to the economy, the national leaders had a difficult task rebuilding the war-
torn and long neglected economy left by the Ottoman Empire. After renegotiating 
their external debts and abolishing the so-called capitulations, the government 
adopted an official ideology called etatism or statism in the early 1930s after the 
world economic depression. This can be described as a domestic mixture of Soviet-
style central planning and a Western-style free market economy. Etatism, untU 
1980, was committed to industrialise Turkey by means of import-substitution. It 
assigned a large role for the pubHc sector to stimulate economic growth, investment, 
and industrial development. To meet these objectives, the government established 
its state economic enterprises (SEEs) with tax, tariff", and non-tariff incentives 
to private producers of import substitutes. The reliance of the government on 
Central Bank financing of its five-year plans and the deficits of the SEEs meant 
that money supply was increasing at alarming rates which intensified inflationary 
pressures. Moreover, after the Second World War Turkey took advantage of the 
Marshall Plan and easy credit markets at the time which allowed the authorities 
to launch a relatively liberal trade regime. However, by 1952, the overvalued 
Turkish lira and an increasing trade deficit prompted the Turkish government to 
resort to protective measures once again. The increasing rehance on short-term 
2 
foreign borrowing in the 1950s and the import-substitution poUcy, that reUed less 
on export promotion, led to increasing pressures on the foreign exchange reserves 
culminating in high inflation and an IMF designed stabiUsation and devaluation 
programme in 1958. 
The Turkish government was committed to modernisation through three chan-
nels within the etatism principles. The first was direct public investment in infras-
tructure: transportation, power, education, housing and other areas. The second 
was indirect investment through the SEEs which had a large share in manufac-
turing and agricultural output, price determination, and employment. The third 
aspect of etatism was the government's system of incentives to the private sec-
tor through diflFerential taxation and trade tariffs in favour of import-substitution 
industries and against traditional agricultural and industrial exports. 
Although Turkey before 1980 followed an inward-oriented pohcy, it had rehed 
on the international economy for capital inflows, imported productive inputs, and 
jobs for Turkish immigrants. In addition, Turkey's membership of international 
organisations, such as the OECD and NATO, helped secure foreign aid and conces-
sional loans. The above two factors were important to stimulate economic growth 
and weather economic crises. 
Starting from 1963, Turkey steered in a new direction with economic planning 
through five-year plans and annual programmes which were the responsibiUty of the 
newly established State Planning Organisation (SPO). The guidelines and plans 
were compulsory for the public sector while helping in the decision making of the 
private sector. This new era of planning allowed the Turkish government more 
control over the economy and meant that the development policy could be more 
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potentially effective. However, the economic planning of the SPO did not change 
the restrictive policies of the regime characterised by an overvalued exchange rate, 
fixed interest rates, import-substitution, discrimination against exports, and high 
trade barriers. 
The establishment of the SPO did not immune Turkey from economic hardships 
as in 1970 Turkey was once again facing a shortage of foreign exchange needed to 
finance its debt service and imports. The crisis led Turkey to another IMF designed 
stabilisation programme with a devaluation on August 10, 1970, which attracted 
remittances from Turkish workers abroad whose immigration accelerated in the late 
1960s. Thus a new phase in the economy started where over the following two years, 
quantitative and price controls were reduced, and reliance on the market system 
and incentives for attracting foreign investment were increased. The inflow of hard 
currency encouraged the government to embark on an ambitious five-year plan 
(1973-1977) with import-substituting industrialisation in capital-intensive sectors 
as its main objectives. This plan was important for Turkey's economic development 
which was seen as crucial for its economic integration with the EC. However, this 
demand-led growth did not last long with renewed inflation and increasing pressure 
on the balance of payments. Moreover, with the first oil shock in 1973 Turkey's oil 
import bUl and its five-year industrialisation plan exerted a considerable pressure 
on the foreign exchange reserves which were depleted by 1977. 
In April 1978 and July 1979, Turkey launched two austerity programmes un-
dertaken in conjunction with two seperate stand-by arrangements with the IMF. 
These included measures such as devaluation of the Ura, promoting exports by 
increasing exports incentives, increasing bureaucratic measures on imports (Hcenc-
4 
ing), and raising interest rates to attract savings. These measures had a minor 
effect on the economic situation due to poUtical instability and violence at home 
and adverse conditions in the world economy such as the rise in oil prices and the 
increase in world interest rates in 1979. This with a reduction in remittances from 
Turkish workers abroad and a decline in exports due to the recession in the indus-
trialised countries left Turkey with a foreign exchange crisis, record high inflation, 
and negative growth by 1979. In addition, international creditors lost their confi-
dence in the Turkish economy and refused to lend it any money before substantial 
structural adjustment measures had taken place. 
Turkey entered the 1980s in difficult economic circumstances. Inflation was 
accelerating, unemployment was rising, shortages were common, and social unrest 
reached high proportions. In addition, political violence was spreading throughout 
Turkey with an average of ten people killed every day. This situation followed the 
external shocks of the 1970s, macroeconomic mismanagement that extended for 
years, and severe political and economic instability. 
The main problem was that successive Turkish governments wanted to achieve 
high economic growth rates (average of about 6-7% annually) disregarding the 
business cycles that the world economy was passing through. This isolationist eco-
nomic policy was maintained by inflationary policies (increasing the money sup-
ply), foreign borrowing, and postponement of structural adjustments or adopting 
half-hearted measures when the need arose. 
Confronted with these problems, Turkey needed to take immediate and sub-
stantial measures to reform its economy, and a new strategy of economic manage-
ment was clearly necessary. In this respect, the Turkish government was convinced 
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that fundamental changes were required due to the domestic economic situation. 
On the other hand, there was international pressure from foreign lenders who 
stressed that no further loans would be granted to Turkey before it embarked on 
policies that would reduce its balance of payments deficit and improve the alloca-
tion of its resources. 
Thus, in January 1980 the government launched its structural adjustment pro-
gramme, under the auspices of the IMF, which aimed at the stabilisation and hber-
alisation of the Turkish economy. The short-term objectives of the programme were 
to reduce the inflation rate which reached more than 100% at the time, improve the 
balance of payment deficit, and stimulate export growth. The achievement of these 
objectives was expected to regain the international creditworthiness of Turkey. In 
the long-run, the programme aimed at adopting outward-oriented trade and more 
market-oriented policies in order to achieve a better allocation of resources. Thus, 
the economic direction of Turkey was transformed from import-substitution growth 
to export-oriented development. 
When the adjustment programme was launched, no time table was announced 
with respect to the difi"erent measures that were going to be implemented which is 
usually the case with most IMF structural adjustment programmes. Nonetheless, 
subsequent actions revealed the basic elements of the policy measures. These 
included: the adoption of a flexible exchange rate with an immediate devaluation 
of the lira, export promotion to reduce the trade deficit and promote export-
led growth, the Uberalisation of trade by dismantling the quantitative restrictions 
and tarifi" structure on imports, tight monetary controls to reduce inflation and 
consumption, the deregulation of interest rates to stimulate savings, privatisation 
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of the state economic enterprises to encourage a greater role for the private sector, 
rationalisation of the cost structure in the SEEs, and the Hberalisation of prices to 
improve efficiency and reduce the budget deficit. 
In fact, most of these measures were implemented with devaluation as the most 
prominant due to its economic and social impact. The Turkish lira was devalued 
from about TL 31 per one US dollar to about TL 76. As a consequence, exports 
increased substantially after 1980 with an annual average growth of about 25% 
during the 1980-1985 period. Another feature was the sharp increase in the share 
of manufactured exports which rose from 36% in 1980 to more than 70% in 1985. 
This allowed for a reduction in the trade deficit from about US$ 4.6 billion in 
1980 to US$ 2.9 billion in 1985. This was mainly due to the growth of imports 
(16%) at a slower rate than exports. The inflation rate declined substantially from 
about 110% in 1980 to about 36% in 1981 while the GNP resumed its growth at 
about 4% in 1981 after a negative growth of 1.1% in 1980. Moreover, fixed capital 
investment grew at more than 1% in 1981 after a 7% contraction in 1980. This 
occurred despite the increase in lending interest rates from 25% in 1980 to about 
35% in 1981 (see chapter 3). These results were considered successful and pointed 
to the need to pursue more liberalisation. 
Given the changes that occurred, certain questions need to be answered in 
this research: What was the role of the exchange rate in promoting exports? Was 
the import-substitution policy before 1980 of any importance for the success of the 
programme in increasing exports? What is the relationship between money supply, 
inflation and the exchange rate in the 1970s and the 1980s? What was the impact 
of trade liberaUsation on exports and imports? What were the consequences of 
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interest rate liberalisation on deposits and credits? Does the depreciation in the 
exchange rate in Turkey have any side effects? What was the impact of structural 
adjustment on the three main sectors, namely agriculture, industry, and tourism? 
Al l these questions should be dealt with empirically and in comparison with the 
theoretical analysis of structural adjustment. It should be stressed that the core of 
this research will be to elaborate on the macroeconomic aspects of the structural 
adjustment programme and their impact, in comparison with the 1970s, and to 
reflect that in the context of development of the three main sectors in the econ-
omy. Finally, although the poHtical developments in Turkey and internationally 
sometimes had an impact on the country's economic performance (military coups, 
Iraq-Iran war, ...etc.) these will not be discussed except in the case when these 
developments are directly related to the adjustment process. 
1.2 Motivation for the Study 
The motives for carrying out this research arose mainly from two reasons: the 
first one is personal while the other is objective. As to the first reason, the fact 
that I lived in a region (the Middle East) composed of countries adopting mainly 
inward-oriented policies and the failure of these regimes, so far, highlighted the 
need for a different approach to solving the economic problems facing the Middle 
East. Accordingly, the issue of liberalisation and structural adjustment became of 
great interest. As to the second reason, the vast and sometimes conflicting views 
in the literature on economic stabilisation and structural adjustment suggested the 
need to test these arguments in a country like Turkey; especially given the claimed 
success of the experience expressed by both the Turkish government and the IMF. 
Other factors that also contributed to the interest in this study included: 
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• The increasing role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 
international economic affairs and their growing influence in the Middle East. 
• The problems that structural adjustment has faced in Africa and Latin America 
in the last two decades and the claimed success of the Turkish experience. 
• The demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc with the related defeat 
of their planned economy approach. 
• The growing importance of Turkey as a regional economic, military, and poUti-
cal power and its growing influence in the poUtics and economics of the Turkish 
speaking southern republics of the Soviet Union. 
• The lack of an up-to-date comprehensive and an overall econometric study of 
the Turkish economy seperating the periods before and after structural adjust-
ment. 
• The rise of Japan and other south east Asian countries as economic powers 
with their protective economic policies and export-led growth. 
However, as far as this study is concerned, this research will be strictly hm-
ited to an investigation of the structural adjustment experience in Turkey and no 
attempt will be made to answer or analyse the above mentioned factors. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The importance of the study emerges from a number of reasons. Firstly, it 
: is the only one, to the author's knowledge, that deals with the Turkish structural 
adjustment experience in terms of two seperate periods (before and after 1980) and 
9 
analyses the Turkish economy during that period sectorally and econometrically. 
Secondly, one of the purposes of this study is to raise issues and questions in a 
critical way related to the weaknesses of the 1980 structural adjustment programme 
and to indicate topics for future research of particular interest in the area. Thirdly, 
it is hoped that both policy-makers and academics will benefit from this study 
since many of the strengths and weaknesses of the present economic system in 
Turkey that have been analysed may be carefully taken into consideration in future 
attempts at liberalisation. Fourthly, the research may provide new insights and 
contribute to the development of this area of economics. 
1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The research was carried out to fulfill the following objectives: 
• To assess, in an objective way, the effects of the structural adjustment pro-
gramme in Turkey after 1980. 
• To assess the validity of the theoretical aspects and assumptions of structural 
adjustment empirically. 
• To compare the economic developments that occurred before and after struc-
tural adjustment and to assess the significance of economic reforms. 
• To review the theoretical literature on structural adjustment. 
• To raise issues of interest with respect to the strengths and weaknesses of 
structural adjustment in general. 
• To prepare recommendations for policy-making and future lines of research. 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, it was necessary to consider 
three aspects: ( l ) the theory of structural adjustment and the related Uterature, 
(2) an assessment of the impact of Hberalisation on the sectoral level (agriculture, 
industry, and tourism) in comparison with the 1970s, and (3) a quantitative anal-
ysis for both the 1970s and 1980s aimed at testing the effects of the changes in the 
macroeconomic variables on the overall economic performance, comparing these 
results with the economic theory. I t was thought that studying the above three 
issues was relevant in order to come to a comprehensive and rehable assessment of 
the impact of the 1980 structural adjustment programme on the Turkish economy 
as a whole given the inter-relationships between the changes in macroeconomic 
variables and the performance of the sectors. Unfortunately, all the studies, so 
far, ignore the latter part and stress the former; thus ignoring an important rela-
tionship that would give a better view of what is going on. The main sources of 
information that were used for the collection of data and the preparation of this 
study included: 
1. Books, journals, papers, reports, surveys, newspapers, theses, and official pub-
lications, both Turkish and international. All these sources, were consulted 
regarding structural adjustment in theory, country studies hberalisation expe-
riences in general and in Turkey specifically. They proved indispensible for the 
study. 
2. Meetings and conferences: the opportunity to attend talks (organised by the 
Turkish Studies Centre) at Durham University and conferences proved invalu-
able. The most important included a conference at SOAS, University of Lon-
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don, from 4th-5th April, 1991. These gatherings helped in clarifying issues 
related to the research and methodology followed. The above occassions were 
good opportunities to meet Turkish and non-Turkish academics and officials 
informally who suggested, explained, or approved certain lines of research fol-
lowed in this study. 
3. Meeting Turkish people in Durham and London who had frequent visits to 
their country was an important link between the author and Turkey. This link 
facilitated the updating of data and clarified some crucial points as the research 
progressed. 
4. Contacting Turkish sources such as the Turkish trade attache in London and 
the Turkish Promotion Centre in Ankara which helped by providing the author 
with some unpublished material. 
5. Econometric analysis: this source was of immense importance to this study as 
it paved the way for the conclusions and recommendations arrived at in the 
last chapter. The econometric techniques followed are explained in chapter 4. 
The statistical package used was Microfit, which was available at the Computer 
Centre of Durham University. 
1.6 Limitation to the Study 
This study, is essentially an evaluation of the structural adjustment programmes 
in general in the fight of the recent Turkish experience after 1980. The study, how-
ever, is not intended to present a final solution to all the deficiencies and defects 
of structural adjustment or the Turkish economy. However, it is hoped that the 
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results arrived at in the research would be helpful for both Turkish policy makers 
and those working on structural adjustment. It must be stressed that due to the 
limited time, material, and data available and the wide scope of both the Hterature 
on the Turkish economy and structural adjustment, it was very difficult to carry 
the research any further. Unfortunately, the author did not have the opportunity 
to visit Turkey due to visa problems. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate 
on as many related issues as possible, which were important for the objectives of 
this study, within the structural adjustment perspective. Finally, it must be em-
phasised that this research is neither about structural adjustment nor about the 
Turkish economy but both; hence, all the views and analyses carried out are in 
that fight. Any issue that was related to one aspect but not the other was excluded 
from the work. 
1.7 Structure of the Study 
This study was written up in eight chapters and a selected bibhography with 
the references used listed at the end of each chapter. While the first and last 
chapters were devoted to the introduction and conclusion respectively, the chapters 
from the second to the seventh cover the main body of the research. The contents 
of each chapter are summarised below: 
Chapter one: states the problem, objectives, limitations, and methodology of the 
study. 
Chapter two: illustrates the different arguments in the Uterature of structural 
adjustment programmes with an historical background on the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionaUty. Special emphasis was given to 
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the role of devaluation in structural adjustment due to its importance as a major 
policy followed in most programmes. 
Chapter three: this includes the historical background and contemporary structure 
of the Turkish economy in the last two decades (1970-1988). It also includes the 
main features of the 1978, 1979, and 1980 structural adjustment programmes, a 
detailed analysis of the developments leading to the adoption of those programmes, 
a section on income distribution in Turkey, a section on Turkey's relations with 
the EC, and a section on Turkey and the Black sea region. 
Chapter four: includes the econometric analysis of the Turkish economy in the 
1970s and the 1980s seperately. This helped determine the impact of the pohcies 
followed and the results achieved and whether they were in line with the theoretical 
expectations. 
Chapter five: analysed the Turkish manufacturing sector with an emphasis on the 
textiles industry since it is the spearhead of Turkish exports. It also refers to the 
different export incentives used to help Turkish exporters, problems facing Turkish 
industry, capacity utilisation, wages, and other issues. 
Chapter six: illustrates the developments and the structure of the Turkish agricul-
tural sector before and after structural adjustment. There is a substantial amount 
of data regarding agricultural products, yields, area cultivated, machinery used, ... 
etc. Moreover, a section on the South AnatoUa (GAP) project is included. 
Chapter seven: contains an analysis of the tourism industry in Turkey. The chapter 
includes an analysis of the costs and benefits of tourism in Turkey, and considers 
the structure and problems confronting the sector. 
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Chapter Eight: includes the general conclusions, research findings and recommen-
dations of the study. 
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Chapter II 
Theoretical Background of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes 
In this chapter there will be a review of the theoretical literature on structural 
adjustment programmes which the IMF adopts and is the subject of investiga-
tion empirically in the following chapters. Most of the arguments presented are 
concerned with the Fund's view of economic liberalisation. The discussion which 
follows has been divided into five sections: firstly, a brief historical background of 
the IMF's and the World Bank's conditionality will be presented; secondly, a defi-
nition of structural adjustment will be presented; thirdly, the various instruments 
used in structural adjustment programmes will be illustrated; fourthly, the poUtics 
of structural adjustment will be discussed; and finally, the last section will include 
the general conclusion of the chapter. 
2.1 History of Structural Adjustment Lending 
2.1.1 I M F ConditionaUty 
The conditionality issue with respect to the IMF lending terms started with 
the establishment of the Fund. However, these conditions have been changing with 
time. Although the Fund has both conditional and unconditional resources, the 
increasing pressure on its funds, due to the increasing imbalances in the economies 
of the developing countries prevented the Fund from increasing the proportion of 
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resources made available unconditionally. For example, on the basis of historical 
data until 1978, the size of the Fund's conditional resources compared to the sum of 
the current account imbalances of some 111 countries of which data are available, 
fell from 50 per cent on average during 1966-1970 to about 20 per cent in 1977-78 
(WilUamson, J., 1983). 
In the early stages of IMF conditionality, the Fund was concerned about setting 
conditions for the terms of its lending such as the conditions a member must satisfy 
in order to be eligible for a drawing on the Fund's resources. The main concern 
of the Fund was to protect its resources. As mentioned above, the deteriorating 
balance of payments' position of the developing countries, because of the large 
increase in imports and their uncompetitive, or cheap (agricultural) exports, and 
the limited resources of the Fund, obUged it to reduce its unconditional financial 
assistance. On the other hand, the decUne in the Fund's lending capacity obUged 
it to tighten its conditions and to start prescribing certain poUcies for adjustment. 
The conditionality with adjustment was clear in 1974-75 when the IMF established 
an oil facility to provide balance of payments support after the increase in oil prices 
which left many developing countries with a deficit. Under the facility, the Fund 
member was allowed to borrow at low conditionality but required to cooperate 
with the Fund to find appropriate solutions for its balance of payments problem 
(Dell, S., 1981). 
After the oU facility was in operation, the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was 
established to deal with two main types of balance of payments problems: those as-
sociated with structural maladjustments in production and trade due to persistent 
cost and price distortions, and those involving a combination of slow growth and 
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an inherently weak external sector. Under the EFF assistance, a member country 
was required to present a one-year programme of measures to correct structural 
imbalance to be followed by corresponding programmes for the second and third 
years. However, the increasing lag between the capacity of the Fund to lend and 
the rise in payments imbalances necessitated the estabUshment of another facil-
ity, the Supplementary Financing Facility (SFF) which became operative in 1979. 
The resources of this facility were borrowed from oil-exporting and major indus-
trial countries for a total amount of SDR 7.8 billion, where SDR 1 was worth about 
US$ 1.3 at the time (International Financial Statistics, July-September 1980, p. 
10). In 1980, the Seventh General Review of Quotas became effective and led to a 
50% increase in quotas, which is considered relatively large. In addition to the re-
sources available under the SFF, the Fund engaged in new borrowings to maintain 
an enlarged lending capacity. Moreover, an agreement was concluded in 1982 with 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency that enabled the Fund to borrow up to SDR 
4 bilHon a year for two years, with the possibility of additional amounts in the 
third year. In addition, an agreement was also reached under which the monetary 
institutions of 13 industrial countries agreed to lend SDR 1.3 bilHon to the Fund 
either bilaterally or through the Bank of International Settlements (Williamson, 
J., 1983). 
As a result of these initiatives, the Fund's capacity to provide finance to support 
adjustment programmes was increased dramatically at the end of 1978 by nearly 
90 percent. However, the relative capacity of the Fund to lend was only restored to 
the levels of 1975, far below that of any earlier period in the history of the Fund. 
When the IMF raised the necessary funds needed for supporting member coun-
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tries suffering from balance of payments deficits, it established guidelines in March 
1979 on conditionality which stated that members should be encouraged to adopt 
corrective measures, which could be supported by use of the Fund's general re-
sources in accordance with the Fund's policies, at an early stage of their balance 
of payments difficulties (Williamson, J., 1983). Moreover, the Fund revised its 
lending terms in the late 1970s and early 1980s in order to encourage members to 
undertake adjustment programmes which were set in a medium-term time frame 
and aimed at reallocating resources and demand management. These programmes 
were supposed to bring balance to the current account or at least a manageable 
deficit which could be easily financed in addition to economic growth and reduc-
ing inflation. To help achieve those objectives the Fund emphasises in its pro-
grammes the need to increase domestic savings, encourage net capital inflows, and 
reorder incentives and priorities to ensure that investment is directed particularly 
to projects and uses that would benefit the balance of payments. These measures 
were supported by the maintenance of aggregate demand within the constraints 
set by available financing. 
2.1.2 The World Bank 
Structural adjustment lending was introduced by the World Bank in early 
1980 as one of several responses by the Bank to alleviate the pressure of growing 
payments difficulties facing many developing countries. 
The World Bank outlined its first proposals for structural adjustment lending 
in its Annual Meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in October 1979. The objective was 
to provide support for member countries already in serious balance of payments 
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difficulties, or to be faced in the years ahead with the prospect of unmanageable 
deficits arising from external factors. According to the Bank's sources (Wright, P., 
September 1980), to qualify for such lending, a country must be wUling to adopt 
appropriate changes in its policies and programmes to enable its economy to adapt 
over a reasonable period to the changes in the international environment without 
sacrificing its long-term growth objectives. This meant reducing the current ac-
count deficit to a level commensurate with the amount of external capital which 
the country could expect to have access to on a regular basis, without straining its 
debt servicing capacity. Circumstances would vary widely from country to country 
and no two programmes of structural adjustment were supposed to be the same. 
The Bank's adjustment programmes emphasised the need to increase the coun-
try's supply capacity to reduce the deficit in the balance of payments whereas 
the Fund's programmes concentrated on demand management. According to the 
Bank's sources, the objectives of the Bank's adjustment programmes sought to 
improve agricultural and industrial efficiency, to promote the expansion and diver-
sification of exports on the basis of comparative advantage, to develop domestic 
energy resources more vigorously and improve the efficiency of their use, to re-
strain consumption, and to raise domestic savings rates. The composition of the 
public investment programme might have to be altered to give more emphasis to 
quick yielding investments and to encourage more effective use of existing capac-
ity. Sometimes changes are required in agricultural pricing to stimulate domestic 
production. Tariffs might need to be restructured and imports controls dismantled 
as part of a long-term programme for making industries more competitive. Special 
incentives or the removal of existing disincentives might be needed to stimulate 
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exports or substitute for imports. Pubhc enterprises might have to be reorgan-
ised and their management strengthened to reduce waste and inefficiency. These 
objectives can be categorised into four areas: (1) pricing policies, related to tariff 
reforms, fiscal incentives, budget subsidies, and interest rate policy; (2) revised 
public investment priorities in the light of the changed international price struc-
ture and resource availabilities, (3) improved budget and debt management; and 
(4) strengthening institutions particularly public enterprises (Wright, P., Septem-
ber 1980). 
2.2 What are Structural Adjustment Programmes? 
These are programmes composed of structural adjustment policies which are 
defined by Balassa (1982) as policy responses to external or internal shocks, carried 
out with the objective of regaining the pre-shock growth path of the national 
economy. External shocks may be caused by changes or shocks in the international 
economy such as the sudden increase in oil prices in 1973-74. Internal shocks may 
find their origin in inappropriate policies pursued in a country, such as excessive 
expansionary fiscal measures. Both kinds of shock adversely affect economic growth 
and the balance of payments. 
The expression "structural" in the definition reflects the need for discrete, as 
compared to marginal, changes in policies in response to discrete shocks. Re-
sponding to these shocks will also necessitate a reordering of priorities as well as a 
reconsideration of policy instruments. 
In general, the principle elements of a structural adjustment programme in-
clude production incentives, incentives to save and to invest, public investments 
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(particularly in energy and agriculture), budgetary and monetary poHcies as weU 
as foreign borrowing, trade fiberalisation, market determination of exchange and 
interest rates, privatisation, and some fiscal measures. These poUcies will be dis-
cussed in detail in the next section. 
Balassa (1982) believes that in structural adjustment policies income distri-
bution is considered a minor objective because the economic reforms needed to 
alleviate the impact of shocks impose limitations on the ability of governments to 
pursue several objectives simultaneously. Moreover, the IMF beheves that eco-
nomic growth should alleviate poverty through raising the standard of living to a 
level which may be regarded as the appropriate income distributional objective. 
Such growth poHcies are adopted with the intention of increasing productivity 
rather than increasing consumption. Hence, investment is given priority over con-
sumption because when the investment share increases in the GNP, it wiU take 
less time to regain the growth path. Therefore, the apphcation of an adjustment 
programme is usually accompanied by foreign borrowing to facUitate the grad-
ual change in the economy where these foreign loans are expected to be used in 
productive projects. 
Moreover, freeing price controls may contribute to improvements in resource 
allocation which may enhance the economic growth process, although with the 
possibility of an inflationary side effect. In general, price controls result in higher 
consumption and lower production, because these controls reduce incentives to 
increase existing productive capacity in the private sector; hence, necessitating 
formal or informal rationing and/or higher imports, probably with lower exports, 
to meet the resulting excess demand. Al l this places strain on the foreign reserves. 
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In the public sector, price controls lead to increased demand for the goods and 
services produced by that sector where the production needed to provide for this 
demand may be undertaken at a loss, for specific purposes mainly poHtical; hence, 
increasing the pressure on the government's budget and possibly foreign reserves 
depending on the nature of these goods and services. 
One of the major policies of an adjustment programme is currency devaluation 
which would increase incentives to exporters through the increase in demand for 
their products, and when accompanied with a lifting of tariffs on imports (which 
were imposed as a part of an import-substitution policy) domestic producers will 
still be protected as far as the tariffs that were imposed are higher, or equal to, 
the rate of devaluation (Cooper, R., 1971). However, if tariffs were less than 
the devaluation rate, this would increase the price of imported goods reducing 
the demand for them and; hence, alleviating the pressure on foreign reserves. 
Therefore, it is argued that a combination of currency devaluation and a reduction 
in tariffs may help in approaching an import-substitution and an export-promotion 
policy, simultaneously (the devaluation concept will be discussed in detail in the 
next section). Moreover, it is worth noting that the amount of change in exports 
is determined by the price elasticity of supply of exports in the home country 
and the demand elasticity of the country's exports abroad. The change in the 
amount imported is determined by the price elasticity of demand for imports and 
the income elasticity in the home country. 
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2.3 Main Tools of a Structural Adjustment Programme 
2.3.1 Trade Liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation is defined as any change which makes the country's trade 
system more neutral (it is necessary to define "neutrality" more sharply). A trade 
system is completely neutral if it operates as it would in the absence of govern-
ment interference (Michaely, M. , Choksi, A. and Papageorgiou, D., 1989). It is 
believed that trade Hberalisation allows countries to reaUse gains by subjecting 
domestic production to foreign competition and by providing access to a wider 
market to achieve economies of scale and increase the skill of labour. However, 
some countries refrain from Hberalising their trade and prefer to follow an import-
substitution protectionist policy because they believe that this policy will ensure 
better economic growth and development while trade liberalisation would entail 
high costs and produce limited benefits. 
Trade policy reforms emphasise the need to move from quantitative restrictions 
to economic tariffs, or in the case of high tariffs to reduce the value of these 
tariffs which are imposed on imported goods for the purpose of protecting domestic 
industries i.e., to change them into economic tariffs. This finks domestic prices to 
foreign prices and allows greater access to foreign markets and inputs and increases 
competition. Another aspect of trade reform is the direct promotion of exports to 
oflFset the effects of the reduction in imports tariffs i.e., to compensate the reduction 
in the government revenues due to the cut in tariffs. Specific measures to promote 
exports such as export incentives risk acquiring a permanent status and lead to 
the postponement of more fundamental changes relating to industrial development 
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and trade. In addition, they create domestic lobbies that will oppose their removal, 
and risk countervailing duties from trading partners (Rajapatirana, S., 1987). 
Trade liberalisation thus manifests itself in two ways. First, it emerges through 
a change in the price system that alters relative prices in the economy. The prices 
which matter here are those that serve as signals for production and consumption. 
The second manifestation is the change in the form of intervention, that is a 
move from rationing through direct government regulation, to the use of the price 
mechanism. 
Experience indicates (Michaely, M., Choksi, A. and Papageorgiou, D., 1989) 
that a Uberalisation policy introduced with a strong measure, rather than by mi-
nor and marginal policy steps, is likely to survive in the long-run. However, the 
country's history of trade restrictions is very relevant in this context. For the 
longer these restrictions have been in force and the greater their intensity, the 
more difficult liberalisation becomes. Therefore, Uberalisation should, in general, 
be implemented in a short period of time and start with a major act that would 
make the policy more credible. Moreover, it is beheved that the exchange rate is 
closely related to liberalisation, when the real rate increased (i.e., when currency 
depreciated), or remained stable, the liberalisation policy was mostly sustained; 
while when the real exchange rate fell substantially (i.e., when currency appreci-
ated), the liberalisation experiment was most often doomed (Dornbusch, R. and 
Helmers, F., 1988). 
As to the effect of Uberalisation on the balance of payments, in most cases, 
Uberalisation was accompanied by an expansion in the external sector (exports and 
imports). However, although both components of the sector increased, the growth 
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in exports was, in many cases, larger than the growth in imports. This increase 
in exports led to an increase in the foreign exchange reserves leaving the trade 
balance of the country in a better position. Nevertheless, there are cases where 
exports fail to respond to liberalisation while imports increase leaving the balance 
of payments in a deteriorating position (Corbo, V., De Melo, J. and Tybout, J., 
1986). 
2.3.2 Interest Rates 
Interest rates ceilings on lending and deposit rates exist in many developing 
countries. Such ceilings are often justified on the grounds that unfettered interest 
rates would tend to be abused by the oUgopolistic owners of domestic financial 
institutions. These ceilings have in some countries resulted in highly negative 
real interest rates; especially in countries with rapid inflation and a wide spread 
between loan and deposit rates. Such rates tend to be adjusted slowly to changing 
economic conditions (Dooley, M. and Mathieson, D., 1987). 
Low or negative real interest rates tend to discourage savings and; hence, in-
duce consumption or self-investment which is characterised by low returns usually 
(Balassa, B., 1982). Therefore, funds will be diverted from higher-yielding projects 
and incentives to invest or save abroad are encouraged leading to capital flight de-
priving the economy from investable funds and negatively affecting the exchange 
rate. In addition to that, low or negative real interest rates increase the demand 
for funds, which might be for unprofitable projects in a market determined interest 
rate; hence, giving rise to credit rationing and encouraging dissatisfied borrowers 
to turn to unofficial or illegal financial markets (Fry, M., 1982). Moreover, in 
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many cases, credit rationing by the banking system favours the inefficient import-
substituting investments because of the lower risk they face due to the lack of 
foreign competition. At the same time, low or negative real interest rates pro-
vide the incentive for the expansion of capital-intensive industries and production 
methods; sometimes inefficiently. 
On the other hand, market determined interest rates or "realistic" interest rates 
would increase savings and might reduce the demand for fixed assets that some 
savers would otherwise purchase. Also floating interest rates reduce the consump-
tion of goods which include imported products and induce capital inflow instead of 
capital flight. In addition to that, only profitable high-yielding projects would be 
encouraged leading to economies of scale and better allocation of resources; hence, 
increasing productivity and economic growth. 
Having said that, and after recognising the virtues of a free financial system, 
the question that comes to mind immediately is why developing countries refrain 
from liberalising their financial systems? In fact, there are many factors that deter 
them from reforming. These factors include the residual role the authorities want 
to retain in allocating resources and the unwilUngness of the authorities to allow 
foreign institutions and markets to supply the financial intermediary services that 
are needed by the economy, despite the efficiency arguments in favor of such moves 
(Allen, M. , 1982). Such restrictions have poUtical reasons in addition to concerns 
about allowing the banking industry to be controUed by external owners. Moreover, 
recent studies of the financial reforms in Latin America (Corbo, V., De Melo, J. 
and Tybout, J., 1986) concluded that i t is better to delay the full integration of 
domestic and external financial markets until inflation is brought under control 
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and the domestic financial system has been made more competitive. 
2.3.3 Controlling Capital Outflow 
There are several factors that lead to capital flight, some of these factors can be 
attributed to government policies while others are outside official control (Khan, 
M. and Ul-Haque, N., 1987). Some of these factors include: 
i) Overvaluation of the exchange rate: it is believed that one of the major causes 
of capital flight is the fluctuation in the exchange rate. Other things being equal, 
an expected depreciation of the domestic currency would drive people to switch 
their assets from domestic to foreign ones. If the current real exchange rate is 
viewed as overvalued, then residents will expect that a devaluation will occur at 
any time; hence, i t is reasonable for them to convert their domestic wealth into 
foreign claims in order to avoid the potential capital loss. 
ii) Financial Sector Constraint: in a number of developing countries financial re-
pression prevails where extensive controls on interest rates exist represented by ceil-
ings on interest rates, high reserve requirement, and selective lending to projects. 
In most cases these restrictions lead to negative real interest rates or rates which 
are below the market clearing rate. This usually leads to less savings and an in-
crease in the demand for credit. Therefore, in such situations it is rational for the 
domestic saver or investor who can not find domestic funds, to seek foreign assets 
that would yield higher returns. In addition, the usually dominating pubUc sectors 
in developing countries and price controls reduce the opportunities for investing in 
the domestic market. Moreover, the lack of credible deposit insurance on assets 
held in the banking system is another factor that encourages domestic residents to 
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invest abroad and; hence, causing capital flight. 
iii) Fiscal Deficits: in many countries, a fiscal deficit is usually financed by expand-
ing the money supply through printing money and creating inflationary pressures. 
This provides incentives for residents to purchase foreign assets in order to avoid 
the erosion in the value of their deposits. Even when the deficit is financed through 
domestic or foreign borrowing, residents stiU expect that the government will re-
sort to printing money in the end or raise taxes, which is also an incentive for 
them to move to foreign assets in order to reduce the potential tax liabiUties or to 
protect themselves from inflation. On the other hand, deficits give the impression 
that the economy is not doing well; especially if they are permanent. This raises 
fears among domestic investors and drives them to seek investment opportunities 
abroad. 
iv) Risk Factor: it is beUeved that there is a larger investment risk in the devel-
oping countries compared to developed countries. This relative risk stems from 
the political and economic instability of developing countries where the risk of 
expropriation and the imposition of exchange controls is possible at any time. In 
addition, there are inadequate legal and institutional regulations for the protection 
of private property in some developing countries. 
v) External Incentives: the development of financial markets in developed countries 
and the better conditions they offer to nonresident investors are considered incen-
tives for those investors in the developing countries, thus increasing the intensity 
of capital flight. 
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2.3.3.1 Consequences of Capital Flight 
Capital flight has both short-run and long-run effects. In the short-run, an 
increase in the outflow of capital can have destabihsing effects on domestic inter-
est rates, exchange rates, and the country's international reserves position. The 
outflow creates a shortage of liquidity in the system which pushes interest rates 
higher. The capital outflow would also depreciate the domestic currency under a 
floating exchange rate regime. On the other hand, if the government is commited 
to defending a particular exchange rate, it depletes its reserves. In either case, 
capital flight causes short-run adjustment problems. Furthermore, when a country 
is facing a balance of payments crisis, residents would expect increasing inflation, 
devaluation, imposition of exchange controls and other restrictions which might 
intensify the capital flight. Thus, at the time the country badly needs capital 
inflows, capital is going out, and thereby exacerbating the crisis. 
In the long-run, capital flight reduces the resources available to finance domes-
tic investment leading to a decline in the rate of capital formation; hence, adversely 
affecting the country's economic growth. Also, capital flight reduces government 
revenues due to the inability of the government to tax all the income of its residents; 
hence, reducing the government ability to serve its debts. Finally, capital flight 
increases foreign debts because of falling government revenues and its inabUity to 
finance its expenditure (Khan, M. and Ul-Haque, N., 1987). 
To cure the situation, adjustment programmes try to introduce macroeconomic 
policies with the appropriate exchange and interest rates because these tools are 
considered a key element in reducing resource transfers abroad and their conse-
quences. In addition, i t might be useful for countries to create a wider menu 
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of domestic financial assets for local investors, provide guarantees to investors to 
protect them from expropriating their assets, and introducing new policies to at-
tract foreign investors such as reducing the tax on interest income of non-residents. 
Therefore, through changing the ejcisting incentives in the economy, the authorities 
can minimise the amount of capital flight as well as attract capital from abroad. 
2.3.4 Privatisation 
I t has been argued that pubUc ownership is favourable because of the failure 
of markets to secure economic and social objectives and the inevitable tendency 
of certain markets towards monopoly; especially when technological factors or 
the market size imply that only one producer - a natural monopoly - can fully 
exploit available economies of scale. Examples of this are electricity and railways. 
Moreover, public ownwership also gives governments social equity in employment 
and access to essential goods and services at an affordable price (Hemming, R. and 
Mansoor, A., 1988). 
However, dissatisfaction with the public sector and pubUc enterprises in partic-
ular is wide spread where the source of this dissatisfaction is not solely ideological. 
There are now great doubts as to whether the benefits of pubUc ownership are 
worth the costs. For although government intervention might achieve some ob-
jectives, other problems emerge such as the interference of poUticians in pubUc 
enterprises' decision-making and pricing policies. In addition, managers in pubUc 
enterprises are poorly motivated, badly paid, and inadequately monitored. These 
factors have combined to reduce the productive efficiency of pubUc production 
leading to losses and heavy dependence on the government's budget support. 
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On the other hand, a private firm can be characterised as one in which the 
market of the product guides prices and output while the capital market constrains 
costs. A firm that cannot sell its products will not make profits; unprofitable firms 
will go bankrupt or be taken over. The market, therefore, regulates firms providing 
the incentive to achieve both productive and allocative eflBciency. 
One should bear in mind that the privatisation of pubfic enterprises will not 
make them more efficient unless privatisation is followed by economic and finan-
cial liberalisation so that market forces are allowed to influence the activity of 
enterprises. In this context, it has been argued that it is inappropriate to disman-
tle protective barriers except in conjunction with privatisation, since continued 
financial backing by governments will permit public enterprises to exclude private 
competitors in a newly Uberalised market. 
Any government that intends to adopt a privatisation scheme must prepare 
itself for the social and economic costs i t has to pay such as unemployment, closure 
of plants, higher prices and cutbacks in services which can be severe in the short-
run. This is because the benefits of privatisation, such as increases in employment 
and investment, do not appear until the medium-term. During this period, the 
success of privatisation should be judged not in terms of the scale or contract 
itself, or the price paid to the government, or even the survival or expansion of 
the enterprise sold; but in terms of the net benefits that the economy gained as a 
whole (Shirley, M. , 1988). 
In summary, privatisation helps to strengthen the market forces, decentrahse 
decision-making, strengthen managerial capabilities and incentives and improve 
the allocation of resources. On the other hand, governments must be capable of 
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providing a suitable environment for private sector development, promoting compe-
tition, regulating monopoUes, providing the necessary infrastructure and deUvering 
efficient services, and in general managing the enterprises and activities that remain 
in the public domain. In addition, it is beUeved that social objectives are better 
left to the public sector to achieve; because it can support loss-making activities of 
social value through cross subsidisation by profit making pubUc enterprises. This 
is because in a liberalised market, the private sector wUl only undertake profitable 
activities and leave social needs to be met by other means. 
2.3.5 Fiscal Measures in Structural Adjustment Programmes 
These measures adopted in many Fund-supported programmes have frequently 
been chosen to meet a fiscal deficit target. Sometimes such measures have not been 
consistent with longer-term efforts of reform of the tax system or restructuring of 
expenditure policies to ensure durable adjustment with growth (Tanzi, V., 1982). 
Tax reform (Gray, C. and Linn, J., 1988) can help remove distortions in in-
centives and resource allocation (thereby improving productivity) and enhances 
the revenue elasticity of the tax system by making it broader-based and more effi-
cient. Taxes influence relative prices through their differing impact on supply and 
demand for different products or factors of production. Thus, over time, tax mea-
sures under a Fund-supported adjustment programme affect resource allocation 
and growth. In the short-run, given the different supply elasticities of the pro-
duction factors, an increase in the rate of different taxes, though they may raise 
the amount of revenue, can have different effects on the supply and the balance 
of payments. In addition, harmonising taxes with the prevaiUng levels in other 
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countries may contribute to the elimination of disincentives to investment or of 
incentives to capital flight. 
Improving the administration of taxes is a vital component of any adjustment 
process (IMF Staff, 1988). Some fiscal measures directly affect the external bal-
ance while others operate indirectly to affect the size and composition of aggregate 
demand, savings and investment, or the operational efficiency of some particular 
markets (e.g., road maintenance facilitates the marketing of exports). Measures 
also differ as to the size of their fiscal impact or the period over which they may 
achieve the desired effects. Some structural revenue measures might be time con-
suming to implement such as value-added tax; but their impact on revenue and its 
elasticity as weU as on the efficiency of resource allocation, can be considerable. 
One of the important aspects of any fiscal measure is durability, therefore only 
measures that have a sustainable effect must be chosen. Moreover, any decision to 
reduce expenditure can be reversed when the adjustment programme achieves its 
objectives. Hence, in addition to durable measures, there should be commitment 
from the government's side. On the other hand, measures that reduce the number 
of government employees, or that remove price controls or subsidies, may prove 
more durable on the expenditure side. Measures that enlarge the tax base, or 
that shift particular taxes from a specific to an ad-valorem basis may also be more 
durable and less susceptible to change or to being nullified by inflation (Tanzi, V., 
1987). 
Some tax measures might have a negative effect in the short-run, but this wiU 
change in the long-run. For example, the elimination of an export tax may reduce 
government revenues and increase the fiscal deficit in the short-run. However, in the 
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long-run, such a policy should generate an expansion in output and export earnings 
and add to fiscal revenues from other tax sources. In addition, fiscal pohcies in 
an adjustment programme should not have any negative macroeconomic eff"ects 
such as higher inflation, rundown of international reserves, or a crowding out of 
private investment; because such effects would weaken the chances of success of 
the adjustment programme (IMF Staff, 1988). 
In summary, structural fiscal measures cause concern on three areas: 
1. They may have direct budgetary impUcations which may not be affordable in 
the short-run. 
2. The medium-term efl5ciency gains to be derived from such measures are some-
times of uncertain magnitude or are Hkely to arise with a time lag. 
3. Many structural measures may promote economic growth while worsening the 
external account in the short-run (e.g., increased growth may lead to increased 
imports). 
2.3.6 Devaluation 
Devaluation is considered the major tool in many structural adjustment pro-
grammes, this is because devaluation, presumably, tends to reduce the foreign 
prices of a country's exports in proportion to the devaluation. At these reduced 
prices, foreign demand for the country's exports will increase depending on the 
elasticity of foreign demand for the country's exports and the elasticity of domes-
tic supply of export products. Similarly, on the import side, the initial effect of 
the devaluation is to raise the domestic price of imports, presumably leading to 
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some reduction in the country's demand for imported products. The size of this 
reduction depends mainly upon the elasticity of domestic demand for imports or 
the marginal propensity to consume (see the different approaches to the balance 
of payments below). However, it is worth noting that some economists (Krugman, 
P. and Taylor, L., 1978) do not expect devaluation to have a substantial negative 
effect on imports because the elasticity of demand for imports is likely to be low, in 
developing countries; especially when imports are concentrated on raw materials, 
semi-fabricated products, and capital goods which are needed for the country's 
industrial development. 
As to whether devaluation leads to economic growth or not it is unclear. Deval-
uation might enhance economic growth or might have contractionary effects (Krug-
man, P. and Taylor, L., 1978). As to the view that devaluation enhances growth, 
it is believed that the principal effect of a devaluation on income is associated 
with the increased exports of the devaluing country and the induced stimulation 
of domestic demand through the multiplier effect, provided there are unemployed 
resources. In addition to the multiplier itself, however, there are limiting factors 
on the process of inducing output. These limits are: (1) the degree to which an in-
creased output of goods and services is forthcoming without an extensive price rise 
in the devaluing country i.e., the capability of the country to exploit its unutiUsed 
capacity, and (2) the elasticity of demand for the country's exports. On the other 
hand, the reduction in real wages due to devaluation may reduce domestic de-
mand (consumption) leading to a contraction in economic growth. Meanwhile, 
the impact of a devaluation on the balance of payments differs depending on the 
approach used in the analysis. There are three approaches for the balance of pay-
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ments theory: ( l ) the absorption approach, (2) the elasticity approach, and (3) 
the monetary approach. 
2.3.6.1 The Absorption Approach 
I t is emphasised that the net effect of the recovery in income and production on 
the foreign balance is not the total amount of additional production induced, but 
merely the difference between that amount and the induced increase in domestic 
absorption (sum of consumption and investment). This difference between the real 
production or income and real expenditure is called "Real Hoarding". The foreign 
balance is equal to the aggregate real hoarding of the economy as a whole according 
to the identity: 
b = (l-c)y + d (1) 
where b represents trade balance, c is marginal propensity to absorb equal to 
the marginal propensity to consume plus the marginal propensity to invest, y is 
income and d is the effect of devaluation on absorption. The income induced 
change in the balance (b), is accordingly equal to the income-induced change in 
real hoarding, i.e., the change in income, y, multiphed by the propensity to hoard 
(1-c). The existence of the business cycle makes it plausible that c may be greater 
than unity, that an increase in income may stimulate an even greater increment 
in the absorption of goods and services into consumption and investment. If c is 
equal to or greater than unity, the foreign balance will not improve as a result of 
the increase in output. Under such circumstances, devaluation might be effective 
in stimulating recovery but not improving the foreign balance. Hence, at any 
rate, under conditions of unemployment, devaluation may be expected to exert a 
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favorable effect on production and employment (Alexander, S., 1952). 
Therefore, the effect of devaluation on income, as well as the favorable effect on 
the balance of payments, i f c is less than unity, must constitute the most attractive 
potentiality of a devaluation. If the country is at full employment, this potentiaUty 
does not exist, and the effects of a devaluation must depend on the more tenuous 
and less attractive direct effects of absorption and prices (Alexander, S., 1952). 
The main criticism to the absorption approach is that it gives less importance 
to elasticities and changes in relative prices occurring after devaluation. Moreover, 
this approach does not explain the effect of changes in the terms of trade and 
unutilised capacity on income. 
2.3.6.2 The Elasticity Approach: Marshall-Lerner Condition 
This approach emphasises that for an improvement in the trade balance, fol-
lowing a devaluation, to take place, the price elasticity of demand for imports 
plus the foreign price elasticity of demand for the country's exports must be high 
enough (greater than one). This condition is necessary so that the change in the 
quantity of imports and exports demanded together is sufficiently great to offset 
the loss in foreign earnings consequent upon lowering the price of exports in foreign 
currency and to boost economic growth (Thirlwall, A., 1982). 
However, the main criticism to the elasticity approach is that it used partial 
elasticities rather than total elasticities, thus ignoring the changes in costs, supply, 
income, and expenditure as a result of the devaluation. 
38 
2.3.6.3 The Monetary Approach 
The essence of this approach is that a balance of payments disequilibrium 
must be considered as stock disequilibrium between the supply and the demand 
for money. Hence, the disequilibrium is seen as equivalent to changes in the level 
of international reserves. Therefore, any balance of payments adjustment pohcy 
can not be successful unless it equilibrates the money market. Thus, tariffs, deval-
uation, and expenditure-reducing policies can only rectify a deficit if they reduce 
the supply of money relative to the demand, or raise the demand for money rela-
tive to the supply. According to this approach, devaluation can not improve the 
balance of payments permanently because any increase in the demand for money 
as a result of devaluation will be matched by an equal rise in the supply of money; 
hence, prices and the stock of money rise in proportion, leaving the balance of 
payments position unchanged. 
The main criticism to this approach is that it is misleading for the understand-
ing of the causes of the balance of payments difficulties. These may exist, even if 
money markets at home are in equilibrium, due to real exogenous changes at home 
and abroad (Thirlwall, A., 1982). 
2.3.6.4 Devaluation and Growth 
A devaluation should in many cases be accompanied by expansionary measures 
to increase demand. In the same context, the supply-side effects of a devaluation 
will in most cases be negative. The price of imported inputs will rise by the fuU 
amount of the devaluation; although some argue that price increases of imports 
are usually less than the devaluation due to competition between importers, while 
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nominal wages and nominal interest rates are also likely to increase. Hence, an 
expansion of output is to be expected only in the event of an increase in demand 
sufficiently strong to offset the adverse supply shift. 
However, devaluation might lead neither to a contraction nor to an expansion 
but to both of them. This view is built on the basis that with devaluation, the 
pubUc wiU reduce its spending in order to restore the real value of its holdings 
of money and other financial assets. This reduction in expenditure will produce 
the required improvement in the balance of payments. Hence, for a country in 
initial deficit, the right devaluation will achieve just the right reduction in the 
real value of the money supply, and the deficit will cease. But once the pubhc has 
retained its desired financial holdings, expenditure will rise again. Therefore, a key 
implication of this approach is that if the monetary authorities expand domestic 
credit following a devaluation to satisfy the new demand for money, the effects of 
the devaluation on international payments will be undermined (Cooper, R., 1971). 
Other economists (Alexander, S., 1952) argue that since the main purpose of 
devaluation is to reduce demand; especially on imports, this objective could be 
achieved through alternatives to devaluation. Reducing demand may be attained 
through monetary policy by discouraging investment and consumption through 
tightening credit for example. I t may be achieved by direct controls, such as in-
vestment licencing or rationing of consumers' goods. I t may be apphed over the 
whole economy, as in the form of a sales tax or income tax, or in selected spheres 
as in the form of imports controls. The means to reduce consumption are many 
and varied, but they may all be characterised as domestic measures calculated 
to change the relationship of consumption to income; hence, to affect the foreign 
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balance. However, it is generally recognised that under conditions of widespread 
unemployment a domestic expansion policy is appropriate and any adverse effects 
on the foreign balance can, except in extreme cases of inelasticity of foreign de-
mand and supply be appropriatedly handled by devaluation rather than by poUcies 
reducing consumption. Reducing consumption becomes an attractive poHcy only 
as ful l employment is approached. If such poHcies lead to unemployment, they are 
undesirable and other policies such as import restriction or devaluation would be 
preferable. 
One of the side effects of devaluation is that it redistributes income in two 
directions: first, from wages to profit earners because of lags in the adjustment 
of wages to higher prices; second, from the private sector to the pubfic sector 
because of the existing structure of taxation. Hence, i f profit recipients have a 
lower marginal propensity to spend than wage earners, or if the pubhc sector has a 
lower propensity to spend than the private sector, absorption or consumption will 
decline for a given level of real income and; hence, contraction occurs in economic 
activity (Dornbusch, R. and Helmers, F., 1988). 
Whether devaluation leads to a contraction or an expansion in economic ac-
tivity there is no final answer. Empirical studies (Cooper, R., 1971) conclude that 
devaluation may, in general, improve the trade balance and the payments position 
within the first year, it does lead sometimes to a deterioration in the terms of 
trade and inflation, but not by amounts great enough to undermine the devalua-
tion. Real wages do fall in most cases, however sometimes they rise again due to 
the growth in the economy and the pressure from labour unions. 
In the end, what is of interest is a comparison of the path of some measure of 
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real output, real income, employment, and inflation in the absence of devaluation, 
with the same path apphed after a devaluation. The hterature has not yet produced 
such a comparison, and it remains an important topic for future research. 
2.3.6.5 The Exchange Rate Policy after Devjiluation 
An important question is which poUcy should be followed after devaluation 
with respect to the exchange rate determination? Many countries devalue their 
currencies hoping that this will solve, or at least help alleviate the impact of their 
economic problems; but what is of interest is which pohcy should these countries 
follow after devaluation? Do they have to adopt a flexible exchange rate or continue 
in their fixed exchange rate policy? Of course, adjustment programmes support 
flexible exchange rates; but is it the right policy? In what follows I will try to put 
the different arguments for and against flexible exchange rates. 
Much of the earlier support for flexible rates was based on the weakness of the 
pegged and fixed rate systems. Flexible rates were expected to isolate a country 
from monetary disturbances originating abroad and to help control domestic mon-
etary growth. I t was also expected that flexible rates would lead to an external 
adjustment without exchange crisis or the need for controls on trade and capital 
flows. Those who supported flexible rates believed that there was a long-term 
trade-off" between inflation and employment, and saw exchange rate flexibility as 
the appropriate policy for countries that want to adopt price-employment objec-
tives. I t was also widely believed that flexible rates would help to achieve stable 
growth, in particular by providing a significant measure of insulation from external 
shocks, real, as well as monetary. 
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As to the relation between flexible exchange rates and the inflation-employment 
trade-off, it was believed that countries can not maintain the same inflation rate 
in the long-run. Hence, differential rates of inflation will lead to exchange rate 
adjustments, and flexible exchange rates were seen to provide the least inconvenient 
form of adjustment. 
Since, as some economists claim, there is a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment (Phillip's curve), countries are free to choose their inflation rates. 
The choice of the inflation rate came to be seen as an important prerogative of 
government, and flexible exchange rates were going to make it possible for each 
country to maintain its optimal inflation rate. The notion that countries were faced 
with a trade-off between inflation and unemployment enjoyed considerable vogue 
during the 1960s, following PhiUip's article in 1958. A notion can be made here that 
there was no significant long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
according to studies made on economic behavior by Friedman (1966) who beHeves 
that the true trade-off is between unemployment today and unemployment at a 
later date. It is not between unemployment and inflation. There is no long-run, 
stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment. 
Supporters of the flexible exchange rate system (Dornbusch, R. and Helmers, 
F., 1988) believed that in the long-run, flexible rates would ensure that at any 
level of economic activity, the supply and demand for foreign exchange originating 
from current account transactions would be consistent with the foreign investment 
flows that reflect longer-run differences in propensities to save and in investment 
opportunities among countries. In the short-run, they would ensure that financing 
flows would be available to offset any short-run excess demand for, or supply 
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of, foreign exchange originating from current account transactions and longer-run 
foreign investment flows without large variations in the exchange rate. Demand-
management policies would thus be free from external constraints. 
Many of the advocates of flexible rates were careful to clear the point that 
flexible rates were not an instant cure for all external adjustment problems. They 
recognised that, in particular, imbalances inherited from the fixed rate period could 
not be eliminated overnight. More generally, they realised that trade flows would 
adjust to exchange rate changes, only after a certain lag. It was also appreciated 
that, where underlying economic conditions were unstable, private capital flows 
might be insuflficient to prevent some exchange rate overshooting; while adjust-
ments in the goods market were taking place. On the whole, flexible rates were 
expected to prevent recurrence of the external maladjustments and to gradually 
eUminate the imbalances inherited from the past at the cost of exchange rate sta-
bility (Artus, J. and Young, J., 1979). 
To a large extent, these expectations have not been realised. For example, 
the adjustment process in the goods market has not worked well in countries 
like the Federal RepubUc of Germany, Japan, and Switzerland which maintained 
very strong current account positions, despite the appreciation of their currencies 
both before and after the establishment of flexible rates. On the other hand, the 
United States continued to experience recurring current account deficits despite 
the marked effective depreciation of the US dollar during 1972-1978, the same pe-
riod when the three above mentioned countries were enjoying a current account 
surplus. 
Artus and Young (1979) conclude that flexible rates can play a useful role 
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only if three interdependent conditions are met: (1) there is a supporting demand-
management policy, (2) changes in the relative prices between domestic goods and 
foreign goods are sustained, and (3) a shift in relative prices leads to a switch in 
domestic and foreign demand for foreign and domestic goods, so that there is no 
fall in the level of output. 
Another major argument for flexible rates is that they would make it possible 
for national authorities to achieve more stable rates of growth in the economy. The 
argument was based on three propositions: (1) flexible rates insulate a country's 
level of economic activity from expansions and contractions in the world economy, 
(2) flexible rates increase the degree of control the authorities have over the money 
supply and allow them to use both monetary and fiscal policy to influence the 
level of economic activity, without constraint from the external balance, and (3) 
the eflScacy of monetary policy is greatly enhanced by flexible rates, that is, the 
effect of a given change in the money supply on the level of economic activity is 
larger under flexible rates. 
The conclusion of greater insulation from variations in economic activity abroad 
under a flexible exchange rate system is based on the assumption that a real ex-
ternal disturbance leads to an exchange rate change which prevents the external 
disturbance from having an effect on the domestic economy. However, this might 
not be the case, for example, if a fall in foreign demand results from a recession 
abroad, accompanied by a decrease in the rate of return on investment, capital 
may tend to move to the home country, where the level of economic activity is 
sustained, and the interest rates, may be higher. Accordingly, some economists 
(Modigliani, F. and Askari, H., 1973) argue that this factor may more than off-
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set the effect of the worsening of the trade balance so that the exchange rate 
may appreciate rather than depreciate; hence, reducing the competitiveness of the 
country's export products which might be already in a difficult position due to the 
recession abroad. In this case, flexible rates would increase the impact of foreign 
disturbances on domestic economic activity rather than insulate it . 
As to the relation between flexible exchange rates and the control of the money 
supply, it is thought that flexible rates would allow the authorities to control the 
money supply but at the expense of disregarding the developments in the exchange 
rate. Such a condition led in many cases to exchange rate instability, where some 
economists (Dornbusch, R., 1977, and Artus, J., 1976) focussed attention on the 
high elasticity of the exchange rate with respect to changes in the money supply. 
Even if the money supply is kept stable, exchange rate instability may be a problem 
because of the short-run instabiUty of the demand for money. 
The argument that flexible rates enhance the efficacy of the demand-management 
policies, particularly monetary policies is doubtful. The response in the volume of 
foreign trade flows, for example, to a change in the exchange rate is hkely to be so 
small in the short-run that additional expansionary eflfect would not be noticeable, 
unless there is quite large unutilised capacity. A further weakness in the efficacy 
argument is that price increases caused by the exchange rate depreciation sharply 
reduce the expansionary effect of the increase in the money supply. Monetary poli-
cies affect the level of economic activity only if prices in the goods markets adjust 
slowly to a monetary change. By speeding up the price adjustment, flexible rates 
reduce the efficacy of monetary pohcies. In addition to that, flexible rates prevent 
the authorities from rehably estimating the quantitative effect of a certain change 
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in monetary policies. This effect wiU depend to a large extent on the behaviour 
of the exchange rate and the magnitude and timing of the effects of exchange rate 
changes on prices, and on the level of economic activity in the short-run (Artus, 
J., and Young, J., 1979). 
Is the floating exchange rate system stable? It is believed that flexible ex-
change rates would reflect the underlying economic conditions and as long as these 
conditions are stable, exchange rates would also be stable. The underlying eco-
nomic conditions in question were not precisely defined, but the impression that 
was left is that exchange rates would move only to the extent necessary to offset 
differential rates of inflation and to compensate for changes in real factors, such as 
tastes and production techniques, that usually take place gradually. 
Moreover, Artus and Young (1979) claimed that opponents to the flexible 
exchange rate argued that volatility is to be expected in an "auction market" such 
as the exchange market under floating rates simply because there are incessant 
surprises. 
I t is suggested that at every point in time, the exchange rate must be at a level 
such that the amount of financial assets denominated in a particular currency equal 
the amount that market participants desire to hold. This is not to say that relative 
prices in the goods markets do not influence exchange rates, but the adjustment 
process in the goods markets works so much slower than in the financial asset 
markets that they play a somewhat secondary role in the short-run. 
Another reason for exchange rate instabiUty may be the cyclical variations 
in the demand for foreign exchange originating from trade or financial activities 
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that may be sustained for a number of years and may lead to large exchange rate 
movements because of a lack of investors with both the funds and the wiUingness 
to take a longer-run open position. 
In addition to the above mentioned reasons for exchange rate instabifity, other 
reasons exist such as the existence of current account imbalances and the existence 
of a multiple reserve currency system in the central banks where any major action 
to change the composition of these reserves could lead to sharp exchange rate 
movements and disorderly market conditions. 
What are the costs of exchange rate instability? The detrimental effects (Artus, 
J., and Crockett, A., 1978) of flexible rates include: (1) a reduction in foreign trade, 
(2) a dechne in foreign investment, (3) adverse effects resulting from changes in 
the value of reserve currencies, and (4) price instability. 
Exchange rate flexibiUty by increasing the uncertainty associated with inter-
national transactions, would discourage both foreign trade and international in-
vestment. Foreign trade could be discouraged due to the risk included in exchange 
rate changes during the period between contract and settlement, or due to the risk 
of changes in the relative cost and price competitiveness of countries because of 
exchange rate changes. However, supporters of flexible rates defended their con-
cept on the basis that forward markets could be used to take care of the first type 
of risk and that over the long-run exchange rate changes would reflect changes in 
price and cost competitiveness. 
As to the possible instability in prices due to flexible exchange rates, it is argued 
that undue reliance on the exchange rate to correct certain external and domestic 
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imbalances can push a country into a vicious circle of depreciation and inflation. 
For currency depreciation may lead to price increases, owing to the presence of 
imported goods in the price index, and this in turn leads to an increase in wages 
that would lead to further increase in prices; hence, the need for more depreciation 
to preserve the country's competitiveness leading to a further feedback to prices, 
wages, and the exchange rate. However, it is believed that price and wage effects 
and vicious circles would have very limited effects on inflation i f the authorities 
do not accommodate incipient domestic costs and price increases by following 
expansionary monetary policies. Thus, it is demand-management poUcies rather 
than flexible rates that are the fundamental factor, and the case for a positive 
association of flexible rates and inflation rests on the view that there may be 
occasions when the authorities feel constrained to accommodate incipient domestic 
cost and price increases rather than accept temporary unemployment. 
2.4 The Politics of Structural Adjustment 
Whether structural adjustment programmes are recommended by the IMF or 
other agencies, or began spontaneously out of domestic considerations, they go 
to the very heart of structural transformation. These programmes with measures 
such as devaluation (leading to a decline in real wages) and increasing prices (by 
reducing government subsidies) have the potential of sowing poHtical unrest due 
to the withdrawl of privileges that many social and economic groups enjoyed un-
der import-substitution. Thus, structural adjustment is accompanied by a high 
political price; especially in countries that undertook adjustment as a last resort. 
The political price may take the form of riots such as in Morocco and Tunisia in 
1984, and Jordan in 1989, and may even lead to the fall of governments (Richards, 
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A. and Waterbury, J., 1990). 
Countries that engage in structural adjustment under pressure from the IMF 
or the World Bank find that the pressure becomes a domestic pohtical issue as 
no political leadership likes to appear to be bowing to external forces; especially 
when what is at stake is a purely domestic issue. In Turkey, for example, none of 
the major pohtical leaders in the 1970s could afford to advocate belt tightening 
(Barkey, H., 1990). 
From what preceded, it may be politically wise for the leadership to make great 
efforts to maintain the best possible relations with different pohtical parties or even 
with critics within the one ruhng party rather than risk isolation or retaliation by 
those opposed to the reforms. Hence, it may be wise to arrange for compensatory 
payments to those who will be disadvantaged by the process of hberalisation; 
especially pubhc sector managerial elites and organised labour who are usually 
well entrenched in the politics and economics of the old system. Moreover, if these 
prove rebellious, the leadership must make sure that other groups such as students 
will not be involved (Nelson, J. et. al., 1989). 
In this respect, in order to avoid any major social or political unrest it may be 
recommended that structural adjustment be phased out if there is no urgent need 
for a quick implementation of the new measures. The stages and pohcy priorities 
may be left to individual countries and their circumstances although it is generally 
agreed that trade liberalisation should come first followed by the liberalisation of 
domestic financial markets and only then by capital markets (Dornbusch, R. and 
Helmers, F., 1988). Otherwise, only in cases when a new regime comes to power 
through a coup or the ballot box is the leadership likely to be supported by a 
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consensus sufficient to allow it to lay out policy goals and to stick to them without 
jeopardising the cohesion of the regime (Nelson, J. et. al., 1989). 
2.5 Conclusion 
From what preceded one can realise that there is no final conclusion with 
respect to the effect of implementing the different adjustment poUcies, previously 
discussed, on an economy. Does devaluation lead to growth? Inflation? Or a 
viable current account? There is no final answer. In addition, empirical studies 
do not give any clear cut evidence as to the effects of adjustment poHcies on the 
economy for the results obtained vary from country to country. Hence, what can 
be concluded is that the measures prescribed in adjustment programmes are the 
second best or the least worse where the ultimate benefit is left to individual 
governments to attain and amend poUcies according to the economic environment 
and poUtical conditions prevailing in each country. 
It is worth mentioning that a conducive political environment before and after 
implementing structural adjustment programmes is essential for the success of the 
programme. Hence, it is recommended that the different pohcies of any programme 
be phased in slowly unless there is an urgent need for change. This is expected to 
quell any serious opposition to the liberalisation poUcies followed. 
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Chapter III 
A History of the Turkish Economy since 1970 
3.1 Introduction 
Turkish governments had been strongly committed until the beginning of 
1980 to rapid growth and modernisation through industrialisation and import-
substitution policies. This commitment was reflected in the GDP average annual 
growth rate which reached during the First Five Year Plan (1963-67), Second Five 
Year Plan (1968-72), and Third Five Year Plan (1973-77) 6.4%, 6.7%, and 7.2% 
respectively. However, this growth in GDP was achieved without any significant 
resources of oil or minerals, leading to an increased strain on existing resources and 
capabilities. On the other hand, the necessity to build an infrastructure and an 
industrial base for the growing economy increased the strain on Turkey's resources 
because of the government's inward-oriented poUcies. 
The public sector played a key role in Turkey's economic development. During 
1963-79, its share in total fixed investment fluctuated around 50%, and its share in 
fixed investment in manufacturing increased from 21% to about 49%. Nevertheless, 
the private sector played an important role as investment in this sector increased 
by 11.5% per annum in real terms during 1967-77 compared to an annual average 
increase of 4.8% between 1963-67. 
However, Turkish development during 1963-77 was suffering from several weak-
nesses. First, the level of exports was only 4% of GNP in 1977 compared to im-
56 
ports which represented about 20% of GNP. This highUghts the vulnerability of the 
Turkish economy and its balance of payments and the need to increase exports to 
increase foreign exchange revenues necessary to finance the economic development. 
Second, there was a lag in savings necessary to finance domestic investment. The 
lack of necessary credit led in the mid 1970s to a relatively high level of external 
borrowing and domestic inflationary pressures originating from excess demand. 
Third, the industrial sector was dominated by inefficient State Economic Enter-
prises (SEEs). The SEEs were suffering from increasing deficits and creating a 
heavy burden on the budget; hence, they further increased the inflationary pres-
sures since their investment programmes were financed mainly through borrowing 
from the Central Bank. 
In August 1970, the Turkish government devalued the lira due to the increas-
ing difficulties facing the economy. As a result, the exchange rate was increased 
for the following products: imports by about 50%, traditional agricultural exports 
(tobacco, hazelnuts, dried fruits, and raw cotton) by 28%, and manufactured ex-
ports by 7%. It is quite possible that it was the weak performance of exports 
that constituted the single most important factor leading to the 1970 devaluation. 
The new exchange rate policy proved to be quite successful as it was foUowed by 
three years of rapid increase in foreign exchange receipts which made it possible 
to increase imports and accumulate foreign reserves. In addition to that, the total 
value of exports increased from US$ 537 million in 1969 to US$ 1,317 million in 
1973. 
After 1973, Turkey faced growing external imbalances created by the sharp 
increase in oil prices, the increase in the prices of imported industrial supplies and 
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investment goods, the world recession which adversely affected Turkish exports of 
goods and services, and a reduction in Turkish workers' remittances. Given these 
factors which were mainly external, the Turkish governments should have revised 
their development strategies and foUowed more stringent economic policies. Yet, 
instead they preferred to sustain the high rate of growth during 1974-1976 at the 
expense of internal and external balances, postponing the crisis to 1977. 
In 1977, current account deficit reached US$ 3.4 bilUon compared to US$ 718 
million deficit in 1974. The rising external deficit was met first by a reduction in 
Turkey's foreign exchange reserves and later on by borrowing, mainly on a short-
term basis from the Euromarkets. These sources of borrowing began to dry up in 
1977 and substantial arrears accumulated. By the end of 1977, Turkey's short-term 
debt and trade arrears reached US$ 14,425 million equally divided between short-
term and medium-long term. By 1979, total debts reached US$ 13,604 milUon. 
3.2 Factors Leading to the Foreign Payments Crisis 
There are external and internal factors leading to the foreign payments crisis 
and the recession following it (TUSIAD, 1980). The external factors include: 
1. The adverse effects of the increase in oil prices on the balance of payments, 
production, and employment. 
2. The increase in the prices of industrial raw materials and investment goods 
that Turkey had to import. 
3. The recession in the west caused by the rise in oil prices adversely affected 
Turkish workers' remittances and Turkish exports. 
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The internal factors include: 
1. The government commitment to the growth in GNP led to an increase in con-
sumption during the crisis creating excess demand; hence, increasing the rate 
of inflation and the pressure on imports and foreign reserves. 
2. Government subsidisation of a number of commodities including petroleum, 
encouraged their use leading to more pressure on foreign exchange reserves. 
3. Deficit financing, partially due to the losses in state economic enterprises which 
increased the money supply; hence, exacerbating inflation. 
4. Agricultural support pricing poUcies increased the budget deficit and conse-
quently inflation. 
5. Successive devaluations failed to promote exports and induced new rounds of 
price increases. 
6. The rates of increase of various incomes far exceeded the rate of increase in 
real output; hence, increasing the inflationary pressures. 
The outcome was that although demand was expanding, GDP decreased by 
0.3% in real terms and exports were reduced by 1.2% in 1979. 
I t is clear from what preceded that Turkey should have scaled down its con-
sumption while expanding its productive base so that its resources would have been 
employed in an export-oriented poUcy or at least to meet the excess demand that 
would alleviate the pressure on foreign reserves. On the contrary, however, during 
most of that period, the rules of a market economy were ignored and governments 
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dealt with the problems facing them (mainly those related to the external balance) 
by more bureaucratic interference and quantitative controls. 
The crisis which started in 1974 and was postponed to 1977, like its prede-
cessors in 1958 and 1970, was primarily a foreign exchange crisis. By the end of 
1977, Turkey with an import bill of US$ 5.8 biUion had only US$ 1,733 miUion of 
exports. Workers' remittances provided another biUion dollars; hence, leaving a 
huge US$ 3.4 billion gap to be financed. The gap which was of similar size in 1976 
was financed by massive short-term external borrowing and a complete running 
down of foreign exchange reserves. By the end of 1977, the situation came close 
to a crisis with foreign lenders declining to make further loans, commercial arrears 
close to US$ 2 billion and the economy unable to grow without imports that could 
no longer be financed. 
The wholesale price index rose by 16% in 1971, 18% in 1972, and 20.5% in 
1973, making an average inflation rate of 18.2% per annum in 1970-73. Between 
1973-76, the annual spread between Turkey's domestic inflation and worldwide 
inflation remained between 8 and 10% points. Turkey did start a series of minor 
exchange rate adjustments in this period devaluing the Turkish Ura against the 
US dollar by an average of 5% points a year. Consequently, the upward drift in 
the price deflated exchange rate continued slowly but steadily. From 1974 to 1977, 
export revenues grew very slowly, officially recorded workers' remittances declined 
by about 40% and imports almost tripled. 
Between 1970-73, exports and imports were growing at about the same rate 
while workers' remittances grew somewhat more rapidly with the sum of exports 
and remittances overtaking the value of imports which jumped from US$ 2.1 biUion 
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in 1973 to US$ 3.8 billion in 1974, growing by 80% in one year. The foreign 
exchange gap created by this sharp increase in imports in 1974 was still moderate, 
consisting of US$ 819 million or about 2.8% of GDP. 
It is thus quite clear that the crisis was already apparent in 1975 and the situa-
tion did not improve in 1976 or 1977. On the contrary, in 1977 the foreign exchange 
gap reached US$ 3 bilUon which in March 1978 constituted 9% of GDP. The gap 
was temporarily closed by massive international borrowing and the running down 
of the foreign exchange reserves that accumulated in 1972 and 1973. But by the 
end of 1977, there were no more reserves to be run down and Turkey's borrowing 
capacity reached its limits. 
In August and September 1977 several measures were taken to try to extricate 
Turkey from economic turmoil. 
3.3 Demirel's Austerity Package (August and September 1977) 
This package included measures to (TUSIAD, 1980): 
1. Try to boost Turkey's exports and correct its balance of payments deficit. 
2. Fight inflation. 
3. Step up the pace of investment, help solve the financing problems, and decrease 
the excessive losses of state-run industries. 
3.3.1 Export Promotion 
A total of sixteen measures were introduced to boost Turkey's exports, these 
included simpUfication of export formalities, providing new faciUties to Turkish mi-
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grant workers to import their professional equipment, rearrangement of the system 
of customs duty concessions and exemptions, and allowing Turkish firms to import 
goods up to the value of 50% of their convertible lira deposits in the Central Bank 
with a two or more years spread. 
3.3.2 Fighting Inflation 
Measures to fight inflation included the following: 
1. No deficit-financing credits to be furnished by the Central Bank for budget or 
state-run industries. 
2. Production to be boosted and state aid to be provided for the completion of 
private sector investments and incomplete projects. 
3. Credit sales were limited to 12 months (a move designed to curb consumer 
demand). 
3.3.3 Decreasing the Losses of the SEEs 
The government could no longer shoulder the losses burden of SEEs which 
reached about TL 40,000 million. Therefore, price increases were introduced on a 
number of basic goods and services such as petrol, cement, steel, paper newsprint 
and other goods. These increases ranged from 100% to 15% and did not include 
goods like suger, tea, salt, and coal. The extra cash was planned to be used to 
balance the budget. 
Another measure to prevent the outflow of hard currencies was introduced 
when the government announced that Turkish tourists could not claim more than 
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a total of US$ 600 worth of foreign currency in one year for traveUing abroad. 
Previously, every Turk was allowed a tourist trip three times a year. 
3.4 Ecevit's Austerity Package 
Ecevit's government implemented stage by stage the long overdue measures to 
check inflation, curb the foreign exchange drain, and promote savings. 
Turkey entered 1978 with a standstill in foreign exchange transactions, overdue 
convertible Ura deposits, growing Uabilities in the form of imports on credit and 
some partial attempts for stabilisation. 
To get out of the economic crisis facing Turkey, the Ecevit government was 
determined to do two things at the same time (TUSIAD, 1980): 
1. Change the structure of the economy in a weU deflned direction. 
2. Get Turkey out of the bottle-neck it was in. 
Structural changes required a number of long-term measures, while to get out 
of the bottle-neck required short-term measures and concessions. 
The list of concessions was prepared by the IMF and included the foUowing: 
• A devaluation at an appropriate rate. 
• Control of the money supply. 
• A less ambitious investment target and a smaller budget. 
• An upward revision of the prices of SEEs. 
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• Limitation of current spending and wages and salaries to be kept within Hmits. 
• Rationality was to be the basis of agricultural support price policies. 
Starting from March 1st, 1978, the following measures were taken: 
• The 1978 budget was kept within austerity limits. 
• There were no new investments in the 1978 Annual Programme. A low rate of 
growth was accepted. 
• The Turkish hra was devalued. 
• Tax deductions on exports were decreased. 
• Prices of some SEE products were increased. 
• The import programme was determined at levels below the 1977 actual level. 
• Rates of interest were changed. 
• Limitations were brought to the use of Convertible Turkish Lira Deposits. 
• Limitations were brought to the importation of credit. 
• Limitations were brought to the private sector's activity in the trade of iron, 
steel, and the exploitation of mines. 
3.4.1 Phase I (February-March 1978) 
This phase of the package concentrated on eliminating the guarantee provided 
by the Central Bank against changes in the exchange rate for convertible Ura 
deposits (a type of short-term foreign currency credit widely used by private en-
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terprises in Turkey to finance imports). This brought to an end the short-term 
foreign borrowing; created stifFer controls on imports with waiver, and encouraged 
Turkish workers abroad to channel their savings into the Turkish economy. 
Imports through the "acceptance credit" system (i.e., using convertible lira 
deposits) were hard hit. The list of goods that could be imported with such 
credit was narrowed down and several items such as marine vessels built in foreign 
dockyards were left out of the list. Imports of steel and petrochemicals through 
the "acceptance credit" were to be handled entirely by the pubUc sector. 
At the end of phase I of the package, the 1978 fiscal budget was kept tight to 
t ry reduce the fiscal deficit, and measures were taken to increase budget revenues 
through a series of tax measures and to keep state expenditure as low as possible. 
Then came the introduction of the 1978 investment programme which aimed at 
a modest growth rate of 6.1% in 1978 and at increasing exports and decreasing 
imports. 
3.4.2 1978 Devaluation of the Turkish Lira 
On the 1st of March, 1978, the government announced a 23% devaluation 
in the Turkish Ura against the US doUar, 25% against the German Mark, 27% 
against the Swiss Franc, and 24% against the Pound Sterling. This was Turkey's 
biggest devaluation since 1970 when the Ura was devalued by 66% against the 
Dollar. I t complemented a 10% devaluation in September 1977 that was widely 
considered inadequate in banking and business circles. A day after the devaluation, 
the Ministry of Finance made a thorough reshuffle of all tax rebates for exports. 
The idea appeared to be to ease the treasury burden, since with the devaluation, 
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major export commodities would become more competitive in world markets. 
3.4.3 Phase I I (September 1978) 
This phase contained a rearrangement of the money and credit system. The 
aim was to promote savings, curb money supply growth, and reduce consumer 
spending. As a result, interest rates on bank deposits increased. 
Interest rates on savings' deposits were raised and bank credits were made more 
costly. Banks increased their prime lending rates to 16% from 14% which meant 
that the final cost to the borrower would be around 25%, taking into account bank 
charges. The Central Bank also created a new fund, "Interest Difference Rebate 
Fund", which was used to help finance credits for selected investment projects. 
Also, the general rediscount rate was raised by the Central Bank from 9% to 10%. 
3.4.4 Phase I I I (March 1979) 
This phase included six major targets which were announced on March 21, 
1979 under the name of "Economic Rescue Programme", these targets were as 
foUows: 
1. To ease the critical foreign currency situation. 
2. To reduce the inflation rate. 
3. To increase the use of productive capacity. 
4. To discourage consumption and channel savings to priority areas. 
5. To concentrate new investments in certain key areas and give priority to in-
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complete investments. 
6. To achieve a just balance in income distribution and to take measures to ease 
unemployment. 
The main policy measures were declared as follows: 
1. Public spending wUl be cut down to slow down the increase in prices. 
2. Local administrations w i l l increase their services to help cut down the increase 
in prices. I n addition to that, public transport wi l l be subsidised. 
3. Regulatory sales of basic goods by municipalities wi l l be recognised so as not 
to adversely affect private shopkeepers. 
4. Stepping up production, mainly in power and irrigation. 
5. The technological and productive potential of the armed forces wUl be fuUy 
utiUsed. 
6. The shift back to coal f rom fuel-oil wUl be accelerated. 
7. Private transport w i l l be temporarily restricted to save fuel. 
8. Measures to decrease unemployment wi l l be taken and labour-intensive projects 
w i l l be extended. 
9. Consumption of luxury goods wi l l be restricted and producers of such goods 
w i l l be encouraged to export. 
10. Firms w i l l be encouraged to increase sales. 
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11. The production and export targets of several key SEEs were rearranged and 
increased through the revision of the 1979 investment programme. 
3.4.4.1 Exchange Rate Measures 
On A p r i l 10, 1979 the government moved to eliminate the wide cross-rate 
differences created in the foreign exchange rates of the lira. 
The parity of the l ira against the US dollar was readjusted in view of the steady 
rise in the value of the dollar in international markets. The new parity was set at 
T L 26.50 instead of T L 25.00. Other exchange rates remained the same, the hra 
was revalued against the Swiss Franc f rom T L 16.67 to T L 15.50. 
A second move, apparently designed to attract more hard currency into Turkey 
involved a 40% premium for all workers' remittances and hard currency exchanged 
by incoming travellers at state supervised exchange offices. Although this was de-
scribed as "preferential treatment" i t was tentatively an introduction to a multiple 
exchange rate system. 
3.4.4.2 Bank Interest Rates 
A l l interest rates on deposits and credits whatever these credits were, short, 
medium or long-term, were increased, but interests on credits received by the pubUc 
sector and co-operatives were unchanged. I n addition to that, higher interest 
rates were applied to saving accounts opened by migrant workers. The interest 
on deposits w i t h a term between one and three years would have 10 points added 
to the normal interest rate, and savings wi th a term longer than three years, 
would get 15 points. Furthermore, all rediscount rates applied by the Central 
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Bank were raised by 1-4%. Moreover, investors that received credit to realise 
the export-oriented investment would get the interest they paid back f rom the 
"Interest Difference Rebate Fund". This was one of the measures to encourage 
export-oriented indusries. 
3.5 The Stand-by Agreement with the IMF in 1979 
I n July 1979, the Executive Board of the I M F approved the release of US$ 
325 miUion worth of credits to Turkey through a stand-by agreement after long 
negotiations f rom late 1977 w i t h the Demirel and Ecevit governments. Also, in 
1979 Turkey negotiated w i t h the OECD and obtained aid pledges which made her 
able to use US$ 600 to US$ 700 mil l ion of the total assistance pledged by the 
OECD and the Western banks. The remaining part totalhng almost the same 
amount would be released in 1980. Furthermore, a US$ 60 milUon programme 
credit was pledged by the World Bank. Thus, Turkey had the option of receiving 
about one bill ion US dollars worth of loans unt i l the end of 1979. 
Despite domestic and international efforts, 1979 was another difficult year for 
the economy; production stagnated, unemployment increased, inflation acceler-
ated, the balance of payments position remained tight, export performance was 
poor, severe import rationing continued, and the external debt position remained 
precarious. Pohcy initiatives taken un t i l then proved inadequate to reverse the 
tide as polit ical and economic uncertainties continued to erode the impact of those 
measures. 
Compared to a growth of 3% in 1978, GDP stagnated in 1979. The value-added 
i n agriculture increased by 3.1% and in services by about 0.3%, but dechned in 
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industry by about 5.6% due to worsening shortages of imported raw materials 
and energy; especially oi l . This stagnation was accompanied by an unprecedented 
inflat ion of about 65% in 1979. 
The overall pubUc sector deficit increased f rom about T L 169 bilUon in 1979 to 
T L 465 bilUon in 1980. One th i rd of the deficit was financed by borrowing f rom the 
Central Bank. The consolidated budget and the operations of the SEEs were al-
most equally responsible for the enlarged deficit (OECD, March 1981, 1990/1991). 
On the external account, exports fell to US$ 2.3 bilUon which meant a dechne 
by about 17%. Imports rose in value by about 10% to US$ 5.1 biUion but only 
due to substantial increase in prices for the actual volume had decreased by 19%. 
The current account deficit i n 1979 was roughly the same as in 1978, i.e., around 
US$ 1.4 bUlion. 
Also, throughout 1979, Turkey made a major effort to alleviate the critical 
burden of its external debt through: 
1. Slowing of short-term Uabilities. 
2. Debt relief arrangements. 
3. Efforts to pursue new sources of credits; especially medium and long-term cred-
its. 
The first debt rehef operation, arranged by the OECD consortium for Turkey 
in May 1978 involved consoUdating US$ 1.14 billion in arrears on guaranteed short-
te rm and bilateral medium and long-term debts, as well as amounts due over the 
thirteen month period May 21, 1978 to June 30, 1979. A second major rescheduUng 
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took place in July 1979 involving payments of about US$ 1.02 bilhon on official 
bilateral and private guaranteed credits due between July 1, 1979 and June 30, 
1980. A t h i r d major arrangement was finalised in July and August 1979 when 
commercial banks rescheduled convertible Hra deposits (US$ 2.3 bUlion), bankers' 
credits (US$ 429 mil l ion), and th i rd party reimbursement credits (US$ 300 miUion). 
About US$ 317 miUion in oil debt was also rolled over. The tota l amount thus 
rescheduled was about US$ 5.5 bill ion. Despite this, net arrears of about US$ 500 
mil l ion emerged given the remaining high debt service burden in 1979. 
3.6 Reasons for the Failure of the Austerity Packages 
The stability measures taken since August 1977 seem to be slow, hesitant, 
late, ineffective, and deprived of complementary measures. I n many instances, the 
measures failed because the prerequisites were not provided at the right time. 
The lack of enough foreign exchange reserves before a devaluation is announced 
seems to be the main bottle-neck which did not allow an effective outflow and inflow 
of foreign exchange to take place. This bottle-neck induced the reappearance of 
the black market even in cases where the after devaluation rate of exchange was far 
higher than the last rate at the black market before devaluation (TUSIAD, 1980). 
On the other hand, the expected inflation became so deeply rooted in such a 
way that immediatly following the devaluation prices increased nearly as much as 
the rate of devaluation i f not more. The low level of capacity use, the time lags 
involved in import ing necessary inputs, and the eagerness of consumers to buy, 
have all contributed to the rise i n prices. 
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The rate of devaluations of currency was soon exceeded by rising prices due to 
a large extent to the fact that the depreciation of the currency was not supported 
by additional immediate measures to curb spending such as reducing subsidies. 
However, the basic reason for the failure of the stability measures is that the 
policies were half-heartedly adopted just to please the I M F . In particular, the 
exchange rate arrangements did not preserve the competitiveness of Turkish goods 
and services part ly because the rates of devaluations were often below the required 
rate and par t ly because no further adjustments were made in order to keep the 
rate of foreign exchange at a reaUstic level. 
3.7 The Political Background of the 1980 Adjustment Programme 
I n the 1970s, sound economic management fell v ic t im to the poHtical expe-
diency of the Republicans People's party under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit 
and the Democrat party. That poUcy led to anarchy and economic stagnation in 
the late 1970s where more than ten people were killed every day and the GNP 
registered a negative growth in 1979 partly as a result of the continuous strikes 
by labour unions. I n that atmosphere, Ozal presented an economic package to his 
colleagues and the nation as measures of last resort. First, in his November 1979 
memorandum to the Prime Minister, Ozal as Planning Underscretary, argued that 
the radical measures were unavoidable since another year of indecision could only 
lead to a collapse of the Turkish state. Given the prevaiUng crisis atmosphere, he 
feared that, at the hands of an unforgiving electorate, an indecisive Justice party 
would suffer the same fate as its predecessor Ecevit's Repubhcans People's party 
(RPP) . 
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Although, the new economic measures were adopted in January 24, 1980, the 
state of anarchy that remained prevailing in Turkey led to a mihtary coup on 
September 12, 1980 (Barkey, H . , 1990). The structural adjustment reforms were 
polit ically risky as they meant less state intervention. Hence, the government was 
jeopordising its chances in being elected again and even of being overthrown as the 
electorate base was composed mainly of workers in urban areas and farmers in the 
rural areas who benefited substantially f rom the state support (Richards, A. and 
Waterbury, J., 1990). I n that respect, the 1980 coup was important for the hber-
alisation measures i n two ways. First, i t rescued the new economic package since 
Ozal discussed these measures w i t h the higher echelons of the Armed Forces before 
the coup took place. By doing that, he managed to get their approval since any 
economic success would improve their ability to import weapons and strengthen 
their position in the country. Second, the coup paved the way for restructuring 
the state's political foundations by eUminating those opposed to the hberahsation 
package which allowed taking diff icult decisions, such as the tax reform, without 
any major opposition. 
The coup and the resulting 1982 constitution introduced new restrictions on 
labour unions requiring them to abstain f rom any political activity and prohibit-
ing them f rom supporting or receiving support f rom any pohtical party. In addi-
t ion, the leftist Revolutionary Workers' Union Confederation (DISK) was dissolved. 
Furthermore, university faculties, student organisations, and labour unions were 
purged of radical leadership, politicians were arrested, and poHtical parties were 
dissolved. These measures, which were the cornerstone for the political success of 
the 1980 structural adjustment programme, curbed the abihty to oppose the new 
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reforms by those who were disadvantaged as real wages were reduced substantially 
due to the devaluation in the Turkish lira. I f these measures were not taken, i t 
would have been possible for those groups to oppose the reforms by resorting to vi -
olence and probably postpone the liberalisation measures indefinitely. Externally, 
the industrial countries backed Ozal by offering credits and foreign exchange in 
order to bolster Turkey's position in the wake of the Iranian revolution (Barkey, 
H . , 1990). 
I n 1982, after the banks' crash, the mil i tary government reacted by firing Ozal 
and replacing h im w i t h a team much less committed to economic reform. The new 
team relaxed the monetary and fiscal constraints paving the way for inflation to 
accelerate. I n 1983 elections were held in Turkey and the armed forces returned 
to their barracks. Af te r the elections, Ozal and his Motherland party (ANAP) 
returned w i t h a major i ty in the parUament (Krueger, A. and Aktan, 0. , 1992). 
However, i t was impl ic i t ly clear that the then President Kenan Evren, who was 
a General, and his officers stood behind Ozal's economic poHcies. In addition, 
prior to the 1987 elections, Ozal pumped over a bilHon dollars into the countryside 
through increases in agricultural prices. This helped the Motherland party win the 
elections and ensured the continuity of economic liberalisation (Nelson, J. et. al., 
1989). 
The commitment of the different parties to economic hberalisation and the fact 
that Ozal who designed and implemented them was in power since 1980 (except 
for the period between the banks' crash and the 1983 elections), was important 
for that programme to succeed, without any policy distortions. Finally, Turkey 
had the likehhood of sustaining a multi-party regime wi th in an export-led growth 
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economy. But all this was contingent on the ability of the economy to continue to 
export and grow. A n economic crisis could have led, or may lead i f i t occurs in 
the future, to a renewal of violence and probably the re-entry of the mihtary wi th 
all the uncertainties surrounding that situation (Richards, A. , and Waterbury, J., 
1990). I n this view, i t is important that Turkey takes its economic problems, such 
as the high inflat ion, large public deficit, and foreign debts seriously. 
3.8 Main Ingredients of the 1980 Stabilisation Programme 
On the 25th of January, 1980 Turkey initiated a stabilisation package aiming at 
qualitative changes in the functioning of the economy. A systematic classification 
of the policy mix of the stabilisation programmes included the following (TUSIAD, 
1980): 
/- Measures to increase foreign exchange earnings: 
• Devaluation. 
• Reduction of stamp duties on imports. 
• Abol i t ion of import duties on imported inputs of export products. 
• EstabUshment of a Price Stabilisation and Support Fund. 
• Encouragement of prefinancing exports. 
• Automatic adjustment of cross rate differentials. 
• Addi t ional promotion measures to exporters and industriahsts. 
• New rules for the purchase of offices and residential housing by Turkish workers 
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abroad against foreign exchange. 
/ / - Measures concerning price determination: 
• Abol i t ion of the Price Control Committee. 
• Autonomy of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in price fixing. 
• Elimination of subsidies on certain commodities and the decrease of the rate 
of subsidisation on other commodities. 
• Exemption of the import of newsprint f rom import taxes. 
• Substantial price increases for every key commodity produced by the SEEs. 
• Price hikes for petroleum products. 
/ / / - Measures related to income distribution: 
• Indexation of wages. 
• Revision of tax rates and tax immunities. 
I n addition to the above mentioned measures, there were other measures con-
cerning foreign firms, foreign capital, administration, and legislation. 
3.9 Main Features of the 1980 StabiUsation Programme 
3.9.1 Devaluation 
Under this measure the pari ty between the l ira and the US dollar was reduced 
f r o m T L 47.10 per US$ 1 to T L 70. This was the second largest monetary opera-
t ion of the last decade after the 77.7% devaluation of the Turkish l i ra undertaken 
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by the former government on June 1979. Along wi th devaluation, cross rates were 
readjusted to eliminate any differentials. I n order to reduce the impact of deval-
uation on the cost of imported inputs and as a measure to Hberalise trade, the 
government also reduced the rate of stamp duty on imports f rom 20% to 1%. 
3.9.2 Interest Rate Policy 
The government under this policy added 2 to 5 points to the lending rates of 
the commercial banks. Interest charged on the medium and long-term credits of 
commercial banks were raised f rom 20% to 22% and the rate on short-term credits 
was raised f rom 16% to 21%. 
3.9.3 Pricing Policies 
These poHcies mainly emphasised the role of market forces in determining 
prices. This was materialised by granting the SEEs their autonomy wi th respect 
to the determination of the market price of their goods and services and adjust-
ing that price whenever costs changed. Only three basic goods were to remain 
under government control: electricity for the production of ferrochromium and 
aluminium, coal, and all kinds of fertilisers. In addition, the government would 
continue to control the prices of services supplied by the State Railways, Turk-
ish Mari t ime, and Turkish Cargo lines. Some argued that granting autonomy to 
the SEEs was not enough, these institutions had to be reorganised so as to be 
profitable, but this seemed to require more work and pohtical courage, since SEEs 
suffered f rom overemployment, mismanagement, inefficiency, and lack of incentives 
for higher productivi ty ( T U S I A D , 1980). 
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3.9.4 Export Promotion Measures 
Under these measures, imports of materials to be used in the production of 
exports would be exempted f r o m all import taxes and duties. I n addition to that, 
foreign exchange would be allocated to exporters for the import of raw materials 
used in producing export goods. A n Export Promotion Fund was established 
w i t h the Central Bank to finance the preparations for export and exports credit 
at preferential rates. The revenues of the Fund would come f rom the import 
guarantee deposits where 50% of the import guarantee deposits of the importers 
w i t h the Central Bank would be transferred to the Fund. 
3.9.5 Trade Liberalisation 
Before 1980, Turkish trade was characterised by a comphcated system of quan-
t i tat ive barriers and import restrictions which intensified by the end of 1970 due 
to acute foreign exchange scarcity. Under this system, commodities were classi-
fied in the Quota list (imports subject to user specific semi-annual quantitative 
l imi ts) , Liberalisation List I (freely imported), or LiberaUsation List I I (subject 
to licence), supplemented by less important specialised lists. Only a fraction of 
imports (less than one sixth of the tota l value) was exempt f rom quantitative 
restrictions. Moreover, importers were further required to place an interest-free 
advance deposit guarantee w i t h an authorised commercial bank to obtain a six-
month import permit. I n 1979, deposit requirement rates were set at 20% on the 
value of imports for industrial use and 40% for commercial purposes. In addition, 
most imports were subject to tariffs and tariff-hke charges (averaging about three 
quarters of the basic t a r i f f rate) comprised a municipal tax, stamp duty, wharf 
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charge, and production tax. 
I n 1980, i n conjuction w i t h a substantial depreciation of the lira and the adop-
t ion of a flexible exchange rate policy, the authorities engaged in a process to 
dismantle trade restrictions. As a first step, advance deposit requirement rates 
were cut to 10-15% for industrial and 20-30% for commercial imports. Import 
regulations were simplified and commercial banks were allowed to retain a higher 
proportion of foreign exchange receipts. Exporters were granted ta r i f f exemptions 
on imported inputs and increased foreign exchange allocations. In January 1981 
the Quota List was abolished and a large number of items was transferred f rom 
Liberalisation List I I (including one th i rd of those previously subject to quotas) to 
List I . The value of liberalised imports (shifted f rom List I I to List I and f rom Quota 
List to the other lists) was equivalent to 18% of the value of restricted imports or 
12% of to ta l imports in the preceding year. Deposit requirement rates were lowered 
further to 10% and 20% for industrial and commercial imports respectively. How-
ever, in 1982 and 1983 import liberalisation slowed down considerably. The effect 
of a negligible reduction in the number of items subject to import Ucensing was 
more than offset by delays in the issuance of Hcences. Deposit requirement rates 
were reduced to 7.5% and 10% for the respective categories of imports (Kopits, 
G., 1987, p. 11). 
A t the beginning of 1984, import Uberalisation was resumed. The two principal 
lists were abolished and three new lists created: the Prohibited List (enumerating 
explicitly the banned import categories), the List of Imports subject to permission 
(replacing former List I I ) , and the Fund List (covering luxury goods imported 
upon payment of a specific levy in addition to tariffs) . Commodities not contained 
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in these new lists were automatically imported freely, provided tariffs had been 
paid. Roughly 60% of imports previously subject to licensing, or 45% of the total 
value of imports, was transferred to the Fund List or became freely importable. 
The reduction in quantitative restrictions was accompanied by cuts in the rates of 
customs duties and production taxes affecting about one fifth of the total value 
of imports. The average nominal ta r i f f rate of affected imports is estimated to 
have dropped f rom 39% to 23%. During 1985, the Prohibited List was phased out, 
narrowing down the number of banned commodities f rom 500 to 3 items (narcotics, 
weapons, and ammunition), and the number of import items on the Permission List 
was reduced f rom 1,000 to 245. In addition to some additional tar i f f rate cuts, by 
the end of 1985, deposit requirement rates were reduced to 1% for industrial uses 
and 3% for commercial uses (Kopits, G. 1987, p. 11). In January 1990, the import 
guarantee deposits were abrogated and import permissions for a large number of 
goods were abolished (OECD, 1992). Furthermore, in A p r i l 1990, import duties, 
fees, and surcharges on specific investment goods were either removed or lowered 
(OECD 1990/91). 
3.9.6 Privatisation 
The privatisation programme was launched in 1984 wi th the aim of increasing 
the efficiency of the companies sold and reducing the pubhc deficit. Already ma-
jo r i ty stakes in five cement companies, Usas airhne catering concern, and Ansan 
the Coca Cola franchise, had been sold. In addition, minority stakes in a num-
ber of private companies had been floated off. These included the power ut i l i ty 
Cukurova Electric, and Arcelik the household electrics group and other compa-
nies. Moreover, other enterprises are st i l l waiting their proposed sell-off such as 
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the state airhne (Turk Hava YoUari), the refineries corporation (Tupras), the petro-
chemicals complex (Petkim), and the textiles, leather, and porcelain conglomerate 
(Sumerbank). 
The privatisation process in Turkey was suffering f rom delay for many reasons 
such as the immatur i ty of the stock market. Moreover, some banking sources 
warned that large scale sell-offs could create serious digestion problems and crowd 
out the capital needs of the private sector. Another kind of problem was the 
fear that many companies would be owned by foreigners although according to 
the terms of the 1987 decree domestic buyers were given the priori ty over foreign 
buyers. Finally, the lack of private savings was considered a major obstacle behind 
the rapid progress of the privatisation process (Financial Times, 1990). 
The agency in charge of the privatisation of the SEEs (the Mass Housing and 
Pubhc Participation Fund, M H P P F ) is a large public holding company which was 
valued at about US$ 2.1 bill ion in 1988. The M H P P F finances its operations 
through earmarked revenues such as the whisky tax. In addition to its infrastruc-
ture and housing projects, the fund supports the SEEs managerially and financially 
to prepare them for privatisation. I n some cases, the M H P P F retains the golden 
share in the privatised company which prompted Waterbury (Nas, T . and Odekon, 
M . , 1992, p. 50) to conclude that the pubhc sector did not diminish after 1980, 
rather i t regrouped. 
3.10 The Exchange Rate Policy after 1980 
I n 1980, the Turkish l ira was devalued eight times, the nominal devaluation 
was 144% for the whole year giving rise to a 30% real devaluation. Af ter May 1981, 
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the exchange rate was adjusted daily and banks were allowed to set their own rates 
wi th in a specified band (8%) in either direction around the Central Bank's rate. 
The band was removed in July 1985 but a 1% band was reintroduced in March 
1986 (Kopits, C , 1987). In 1988, banks were permitted to fix their exchange rates 
wi th in 0.2% - 1% of the buying rate of the Central Bank for transactions less than 
US$ 50,000 each but they were free to fix the exchange rate for transactions above 
that l imi t (Turkiye Is Bankasi, 1989). 
Hence, although banks were obliged to operate wi th in a certain band in their 
foreign exchange transactions, that did not mean that the parity of the T L was 
being determined by the Central Bank. On the contrary, the rate was effectively 
determined by the market. This market, which is dominated mainly by banks, 
determines the rate according to daily supply and demand for hard currency. The 
Central Bank intervenes in the market for both economic and poUtical reasons 
(Turkey Confidential, 1990). A n example of economic intervention is the spending 
of about US$ 2.5 bil l ion of the Bank's reserves by June 1992 to preserve the value of 
the l i ra after an increase in l iquidi ty (Financial Times, 1992). On other occassions, 
the Central Bank bought foreign exchange to stabilise the hra and increase its 
reserves of hard currency. In fact, the Central Bank through its governor Rusdu 
Saracoglu, is committed to protect the convertibihty of the hra and stabUise i t by 
keeping the stock of money in circulation roughly in line wi th its foreign exchange 
holdings. PoUtical events also have had economic policy impUcations. The Bank 
had to intervene during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 for example in order to stabihse 
the value of the l ira due to capital flight. 
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3.11 Reform in the Interest Rate Policy 
Under this reform, interest ceilings were scrapped entirely in certain cases. 
The government would no longer intervene in the lending and borrowing rates of 
commercial banks. This means that banks are now free to negotiate the interest 
rates on deposits and credits. Hence, the era of cheap investment was over and 
investors had to incorporate more rationality into their decision-making. Higher 
interest rates on deposits are expected to induce savings and help the government 
fight inflation. However, exporters would continue to enjoy subsidised low cost 
credits and saving deposits by workers abroad would receive a premium of five 
points above the current rates for exchanging foreign currency. 
3.11.1 Banks' Crash in 1982 
In 1980, interest rates were deregulated with the aim of increasing savings 
through providing more adequate market determined return on deposits. In addi-
tion to that, the deregulation aimed at better allocation of investment credits and 
dissolving inefficient financial institutions. But deposit rates, although providing 
a positive real return, remained to be fixed by a "gentlemen's agreement" between 
the Turkish banks which put a ceiling on nominal interest rates in order to put a 
limit on the rise in interest rate level and avoid chaos in the market. 
In 1981-82, however, competition intensified from the side of unregulated, 
small, more aggressive savings houses raising their deposit rates, above the hmit 
agreed upon in the agreement, to attract more savings. Moreover, as inflation rates 
were falling real interest rates paid by those small banks became higher than those 
paid by large banks. Hence, the finance ministry ordered small savings houses 
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to cease trading and raised the required reserve ratio prompting savers to shift 
their savings from small banks to larger ones notably those owned or backed by 
the state. However, although the government tried to prevent the panic in June 
1982 by guaranteeing payment of interest and principal on deposit certificates and 
bonds and allowed banks in temporary trouble to call on emergency funding from 
the Central Bank, these measures did not prevent the coUapse of a number of 
small banks and the bankruptcy of the multimillionaire firm "Banker Kastelh", in 
addition to the losses incurred by savers. As a result, the government started once 
again to re-regulate deposit interest rates and many banks were taken over by the 
state. 
The flood of savings to large banks was a mixed blessing because they had 
to pay high real interest rates at a time of recession when it WCLS difficult to find 
enough first class borrowers; hence, profit decUned and the proportion of doubtful 
loans increased. 
In addition to the aggressive competition from small banks, there were other 
reasons for the failure of interest rates deregulation in Turkey. First, the bank-
ing system was characterised by an outdated organisational structure. Second, 
the majority of Turkish banks had an over-extended branch network and lacked 
modern business organisation, entailing high overhead costs. Third, was the low 
capitalisation of Turkish banks, but the government issued decrees to increase their 
capital, which made banks more vulnerable in a crisis. Fourth, were the traditional 
links with either the state or large private business which strongly influenced the 
composition of their own portofoUo (OECD, April 1983, p. 39). Finally, there 
was the lack of supervision over banks which did not prevent many of them from 
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over-exposing themselves to risk. 
3.12 Foreign Exchange Controls 
Early in 1982, the mihtary set up a Capital Markets Board. This issues regu-
lations for institutions marketing bonds and other financial instruments. 
The first major steps towards lifting foreign exchange controls in Turkey were 
taken in 1984. Residents and non-residents were allowed to possess foreign currency 
and to open foreign exchange deposit accounts. Turkish tourists were allowed to 
take up to US$ 1,000 per person for each journey and restrictions on importing 
Turkish lira, notes, securities, bills, and other commercial paper were abohshed. 
Commercial banks and exporters were allowed to retain 75% and 20% of foreign 
currency earnings respectively (in 1990, the banks' reserve requirement was reduced 
from 25% to 6.5%). Turkish residents were allowed to export capital up to US$ 2 
million with the permission of the Under-Secretary for the Treasury and Foreign 
Trade or the Council of Ministers for investments exceeding that amount (OECD, 
1984). 
In December 1985, the Istanbul stock market was opened which was an impor-
tant step towards increasing financial deepening and expanding capital markets 
in Turkey. Companies were encouraged to float shares to the public by reducing 
the corporate and dividend tax paid by those firms, this gave a boost to the stock 
market (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989-90). 
After the Umited liberalisation of foreign exchange controls in 1984, the gov-
ernment was sometimes obliged to tighten its measures due to changing economic 
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conditions. There was the need to maintain the delicate balance between inter-
est rates and the exchange rate. However, in August 1989, a major development 
occured with respect to the increasing Uberalisation of the foreign exchange regu-
lations with the publication of decree no. 32. The decree was concerned with the 
protection of the value of the lira and a new regime for foreign exchange transac-
tions which were liberalised further. The major measure in the decree was that 
Turkish nationals were allowed to purchase foreign securities abroad and foreign-
ers were allowed to buy Turkish securities on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). 
This implies the free movement of capital with its implications on the foreign ex-
change. By 1991, several amendments to decree no. 32 took place. The measures 
in their final form stated that residents in Turkey may transfer abroad any amount 
of foreign currency and open deposit accounts in foreign currency and use them 
freely. Non-residents may trade in Turkish securities quoted on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange and in securities issued by Turkish pubUc agencies. Foreigners were per-
mitted to open TL deposit accounts and freely transfer interest earnings. Also, 
residents were allowed to borrow abroad and Turkish banks were allowed to extend 
credits in foreign exchange with a minimum maturity of 3 years to Turkish foreign 
trade companies or Turkish residents who are eligible for this kind of credit. In 
addition, decree no. 32 and its amendments included other measures such as the 
free import and export of gold (Turkiye Is Bankasi, 1992 and Turkey Confidential, 
1990). 
The free movement of capital in and out of Turkey is an important factor 
in increasing the confidence in the country's economic poUcy. Furthermore, the 
lifting of the foreign exchange controls may affect: (1) capital flows into Turkey; 
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(2) interest rates; and (3) exchange rate. 
As to capital flows, a comparison between 1988 (before decree no. 32) and 1990 
(1991 was not used because it was exceptional due to the Gulf crisis) shows that the 
net capital flow which included direct investment, portfolio investment, and other 
capital for 1988 was US$ - 958 million. This figure turned positive in 1990 reaching 
US$ 4,037 mUHon. On the other hand, workers' remittances increased from US$ 
1,827 million in 1988 to US$ 3,349 million in 1990 despite the recession in the 
industrial world. In that respect, one can conclude that the lifting of the foreign 
exchange controls had a considerable positive impact on the inflow of capital and 
the Turkish economy as a whole. 
The impact of the liberalisation of the capital market on interest rates is im-
portant in terms of aligning domestic interest rates with international rates. This 
would prevent any outflow of capital from Turkey which is what happened in the 
late 1980s when, contrary to expectations, capital was attracted as reflected in 
the figures above. In that respect, it is important that interest rates remain to be 
freely determined by the market. 
Finally, the free movement of capital may have an eSect on the exchange rate 
through the depreciation or appreciation in the value of the Turkish lira depending 
on whether there is a negative or positive net capital inflow to Turkey. In that 
respect, the policy of the Central Bank is pivotal in terms of absorbing the surplus 
(in case the supply of capital is greater than demand) or depleting its reserves (in 
case demand is greater than supply) if the Bank is committed to a stable exchange 
rate policy. In the late 1980s, the Turkish lira was on an appreciating trend in real 
terms because inflation in Turkey was higher than the nominal depreciation in the 
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lira in addition to the surplus in the capital flow. This prompted many exporters 
to demand a rapid devaluation warning that markets will be lost and that it will 
be difficult to recover them. This led to the intervention of the Central Bank 
through buying hard currency from the market thus increasing its reserves and 
putting downward pressure on the lira (Turkey Confidential, 1990). However, in 
1991, the trend was reversed due to the Gulf crisis, obliging the Bank to intervene 
and depleting its reserves as a result of the capital flight. 
3.13 Goals of the 1980 Adjustment Programme 
The stated goal of the programme of "bringing about a major re-orientation 
of the economy" calls for: 
1. Greater reliance on market mechanisms by both the pubUc and private sectors. 
2. Reduction in the rate of inflation. 
3. Improved management of the balance of payments and external debts. 
4. PoUcies to encourage the efficiency and international competitiveness of the 
public and private sectors. 
5. The implementation of rational exchange rate policies and measures to encour-
age exports. 
6. Domestic resource mobihsation efforts to be substantially augmented through 
increased tax efforts, realistic SEE pricing, increased private savings via the 
banking system, and the development of financial markets. 
7. An investment pohcy aimed at fuller utilisation of existing productive capacity 
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and completion of ongoing projects requiring modest inputs and tailored to 
scarce resources. 
8. Conditions necessary to stimulate foreign investments in oil, industry, and agri-
culture. 
Following the announcement of this programme, the IMF approved a modi-
fication to the terms of the July 1979 stand-by arrangement and the release of 
larger second and third tranches on February 21 and March 24, 1980. In addition, 
SDR 71.6 million (US$ 93 million) in compensatory financing for export short-
falls was provided on February 21, 1980, together with the modification of the 
stand-by arrangement. In all, this resulted in the provision of US$ 301 miUion 
(SDR 231.6 million), with the remaining US$ 26 million (SDR 20 miUion) to be 
provided in June. However, on June 18th, this stand-by was cancelled. The IMF 
board approved a new three-year stand-by arrangement involving SDR 1.25 bUlion 
(US$ 1.63 bilUon), with SDR 460 mHlion (US$ 600 miUion) in the first year, SDR 
400 miUion (US$ 522 million) in the second year and SDR 390 milUon (US$ 509 
milUon) in the third year. The key conditions of the new stand-by were: 
1. Exchange rate policy was to be kept more flexible. 
2. The financial position of the public sector to be improved, mainly as a result 
of the restructuring of the operational policies of the SEEs. 
3. Monetary conditions to be kept extremely tight, as a result of the observance 
of limits on Central Bank lending. 
4. Interest rates to be adjusted to reflect market conditions. 
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Following the announcement of the programme, aid and debt reUef operations 
started. In meetings under the auspices of the OECD in March and April, US$ 1.16 
billion of bilateral aid was pledged. The World Bank also supported the OECD's 
and the IMF's efforts through a US$ 200 million structural adjustment loan in 
March 1980. Furthermore, about US$ 2.5 biUion in service payments to OECD 
countries on public and publicly-guaranteed debt, falling due prior to June 1983 
were rescheduled, again under the OECD auspices in July 1980. 
The Fund's three-year stand-by arrangement was followed by two one-year 
arrangements in 1983 and 1984 both at the amount of SDR 225 million. The 
World Bank, on the other hand, provided US$ 1,600 milhon through five structural 
adjustment loans during 1980-85 in support of structural reforms ranging from 
rationalisation of industrial production to pubUc finance and from external debt 
management system to financial sector restructuring.^ 
3.14 Impact of the 1980 Adjustment Programme on the Turkish Economy 
3.14.1 Economic Growth 
During 1980-1985, the period when the structural adjustment programme was 
implemented, the Turkish GNP managed to restore its positive growth trend after 
two years of negative growth in 1979 and 1980. Table 3.1 shows that GNP was 
growing at a negative rate of 0.4% and 1.1% in 1979 and 1980 respectively. This 
negative growth can be attributed mainly to the decrease in demand resulting 
from the cut in public spending and the restrictions on imports which adversly 
^ All figures and details of the Turkish adjustment programmes are obtained from, TUSIAD, "The 
Turkish Economy", Istanbul, 1980. 
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aflFected the industrial sectors that depend on such imports in their production. 
The economy achieved better growth in 1981 reaching 4.1% which could mainly 
be attributed to the eff"ects of the 1980 adjustment programme. 
Table 3.1: Percentage of GNP Growth by Main Economic Sectors (producers' 
value at 1968 prices) 
1979 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990* 1991* 
Agriculture 2.8 1.7 -0.1 3.5 2.4 7.9 2.1 8 - 11.1 7.1 - 1.5 
Industry -4.7 - 2.9 6.4 8.8 6.3 8.7 10 3.1 3 8.7 2.6 
Services 0.4 0.1 3.6 5.6 4 6.4 6.7 4.1 3.9 9.4 0.8 
GNP -0.4 - 1.1 3.3 5.9 5.1 8.1 7.4 3.7 1.7 9.7 0.3 
Sources: TUSIAD and Briefing. 
('•') At 1987 constant prices. 
It is also clear that the programme was oriented towards reviving Turkish 
industry, which had also been growing negatively in 1979 (-4.7%) and 1980 (-
2.9%), to increase the production of exports through devaluation which makes 
them more competitive abroad, in addition to increasing the production of import 
substitutes to reduce the demand on imports; hence, increase foreign exchange 
revenues and reduce the imports bill. Table 3.2 shows that the share of agriculture 
in GNP declined substantially from 21.1% in 1981 to 17.5% in 1990. On the other 
hand, the share of industry increased from 20.4% in 1981 to 23.2% in 1990 while 
the services sector increased its share from 58.5% in 1981 to 59.3% in 1990. The 
declining share of agriculture in GNP may not be necessarily due to a dechne in 
production for agricultural production was increasing throughout the 1980s but the 
growth in agriculture was much slower than the growth in the other two sectors. 
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Table 3.2: GNP Shares of the Main Economic Sectors (producers' 
values at constant 1968 prices) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Agriculture 21.1 21.5 20.7 20.3 19.8 19.7 18.8 19.5 17.1 17.5 
Industry 20.4 20.5 21.4 22.3 22.5 22.6 23.1 23 23.2 23.2 
Services 58.5 58 57.9 57.4 57.7 57.7 58.1 57.5 59.7 59.3 
GNP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: OECD, 1992. 
On the whole, one can say that the programme achieved its target of economic 
growth, in general, but this growth was not homogeneous in the whole economy; 
because it occured mainly in the industry and services sectors while the share of 
agriculture declined substantially. 
3.14.2 Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments 
According to the Economic Report of 1989 published by the Istanbul Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC), tax refunds and high foreign exchange rates, the two most 
important monetary tools used by the 1980 adjustment programme to promote 
exports were forgone. Hence, it is now being claimed that because of this the ex-
port target of US$ 12,485 miUion set for 1989 was not achieved and exports were 
less than in 1988. The report also refers to a survey conducted by the Central 
Bank and the Under Secretariat for the Treasury and Foreign Trade which con-
cludes that tax refunds do not play an important role in increasing exports, for 
the average contribution they make to total exports is 5.6%. However, it is worth 
mentioning that a new incentives system was put into practice at the beginning of 
1989. The principle elements of the new system are, according to the Economic 
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Report, providing performance credit and pre-shipment export credit by Exim 
bank, premium payments from the Support and Price Stability Fund, subsidised 
shipping charges, VAT refunds, low-cost energy, corporate income tax exclusion, 
and duty-free importation under an export incentives certificate. 
However, Turkish trade still faces some problems such as the need to diversify 
export markets where 65% of Turkey's exports are concentrated in ten countries. 
In addition, there is the need to estabUsh and develop subsectors to improve the 
quality of produced goods and their packing so that Turkish products can compete 
in the international market (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, 1989). 
On the other hand, the main problem facing the researcher into Turkish trade 
before 1980 is the size of the black market. It is beheved that Turkey until 1980, 
like any other state-controlled economy, had a large black market in trade and the 
foreign exchange market which makes any study relying on official data in those 
two fields inaccurate. The inability to determine the size of the black market makes 
it very difficult for any comparative study to assess the real impact of trade and 
exchange rate liberalisation after 1980. 
Early in 1975, the diflFerential between the free market exchange rate and the 
official rate was less than 10%. By the end of 1977, however, the free market 
exchange rate was 36% higher and rose to 51.6% in 1978. It rose even further 
early in 1979 reaching a 91.4% differential in March of that year, when the official 
rate was still TL 25 per US dollar while the free market rate was TL 47.85. That 
differential was eliminated with the June 1979 devaluation of the Turkish hra to 
TL 47.1 per US dollar. It nonetheless started rising again, reaching 15% by the 
end of 1979. In January 1980, the official rate was changed again to TL 70 per US 
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dollar. Thereafter, the official rate was altered frequently and disparities between 
the free (black) market and the official rate of the magnitude that had been in the 
1970s were not repeated (Krueger, A. and Aktan, 0., 1992). 
A related consequence of the overvaluation in the Turkish hra in the 1970s 
was the incentive for under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports, 
for smuggling, and for Turkish workers to refrain from repatriating their savings 
through official channels unless there were special incentives. Hence, Krueger and 
Aktan (1992) beheve that the recorded reduction in imports between 1977 and 1978 
of more than 20% and the sudden rise in exports in 1981-1985 may overestimate 
the real economic activity that was going on in Turkey and that there probably 
was a good deal of smuggling before 1980. 
In addition, Krueger and Aktan (1992) showed that there was over-invoicing 
of exports in Turkey (in order to benefit from export incentives) that went on 
untU 1985 and subsided after that due to the public outcry and the subsequent 
reduction in export incentives after that. As a result, faked invoicing diminished 
substantially though perhaps has not totally disappeared. Over-invoicing was clear 
from the trading partners and Turkey's figures in the individual category statistics 
for exports. However, Krueger and Aktan (1992) admit that it is not possible to 
estimate the extent to which disparities arise because of over-invoicing in Turkey 
or because of other statistical problems. On the whole, although over-invoicing 
reached a miximum of 21% of total exports in 1984, this would not make Turkish 
exports performance during the 1980s much less impressive; especially when we 
measure that exports growth against a worldwide recession. 
Table 3.3 shows that since the implementation of the 1980 stabilisation pro-
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gramme, with the liberalisation of trade and free market determination of the 
exchange rate, Turkish exports rose at a higher rate than imports where in 1981 
exports rose by 61.6% compared to 1980 and from 1980 to 1985 exports jumped 
from US$ 2.9 billion to almost US$ 8 billion that is about 173%. However, in 
1982 and 1983 Turkish trade stagnated due, according to Turkish sources, to the 
recession in world markets. As to imports, the table shows that they were growing 
at a lesser rate than exports leading to a descending trend in the trade deficit 
where Turkey started with a deficit equal to US$ 4,603 milUon in 1980 and ended 
up with a US$ 1,800 million deficit in 1988, although with some fluctuation during 
that period. However, in the period 1989 - 1991 the trade deficit increased again 
to above its average level in the 1980s. 
With regard to services, excluding remittances, income from this sector in-
creased substantially from US$ 761 million in 1980 to US$ 9,315 million in 1991. 
This huge increase in services can be attributed to the devaluation in the Turkish 
lira and the lifting of foreign exchange controls in the late 1980s which encouraged 
tourism and attracted capital leading to a fast growth in that sector. However, 
revenues from services were outweighed by expenditure in that sector until 1988 
when a surplus occurred in revenues for the first time in the 1980s. This surplus 
reached about US$ 2,500 milhon in 1991. 
On the other hand, remittances did not increase as a result of the new measures 
involving the exchange and interest rates. The amount remitted kept on fluctuating 
between about US$ 1,100 million and US$ 2,500 million during the period from 
1978 to 1988. However, after 1988 i.e., after the lifting of foreign exchange controls, 
remittances shot up to US$ 3,349 million in 1990 (despite the recession in the 
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industrial world) but decHned in 1991 to US$ 2,854 miUion due to the Gulf crisis. 
As to the exchange rate against the US dollar, table 3.4 shows that the Turkish 
lira depreciated substantially from TL 31.08 per US dollar in 1979 to TL 8,181 per 
US dollar in November 1992. This reflects the increasing pressure on the hra 
and the determination of the Turkish authorities to eliminate any erosion in the 
competitiveness of Turkish products abroad due to internal inflation or rises in 
wages. 
Table 3.4: Exchange Rate Changes in the Turkish Lira with respect to the US 
doUar 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Av. period TL/US$ 31.08 76.04 111.22 162.6 225.5 366.7 522 674.5 857.2 1,422.3 
% change in TL value* - 59.1 31.6 31.5 27.9 38.5 29.7 22.6 21.3 39.7 
Table 3.4: continued 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
Av. period TL/US$ 2,120 2,608 4,170 8,181" 
% change in TL value* 32.9 18.7 37.5 49 
Source: IFS and Briefing except (*). 
(a) Rate as of November 23, 1992. 
3.14.3 Interest Rates, Money Supply, and Savings 
Since the implementation of the 1980 adjustment programme and the conse-
quent market determination of interest rates those rates rose sharply making it 
more costly to launch any economic project and increasing the level of savings. 
On the other hand, the increase in interest rates led to the dissolution and the 
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Uquidation of many companies at an unprecedented rate due to either inefficiency 
or the rise in costs (see tables 3.5 and 3.6). 
Table 3.5: Interest Rates Changes in Turkey 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Deposit nominal interest rates 7.33 10.95 29.96 45 51.9 54.32 49.2 41.91 35.4 
(*) Deposit real interest rates -51.36 -99.24 -6.64 14.2 20.5 5.92 4.2 7.3 -3.4 
Lending nominal interest rates 18 25.67 35.58 36 35.5 52.33 53.5 52.63 50 
(*) Lending real interest rates -40.7 -84.52 -1.02 5.2 4.1 3.9 8.5 18 11.2 
Table 3.5: continued 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992'* 
Deposit nominal interest rates 72 52 50 70 70 
(*) Deposit real interest rates - 3.4 - 17.6 - 13.2 4 -
Lending interest rates 87.9 85 90 95 95 
(*) Lending real interest rates 12.5 15.4 26.4 29 -
source: IFS and Briefing except {*). 
Real interest rate = nominal interest rate - CPI. 
(a) As of July 2, 1992. 
Table 3.6: Dissolutions and Liquidations of Turkish Companies 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Number of companies 523 846 304 1,057 998 2,051 1,951 1,709 1,680 
Source: Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade 
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, Economic Report 1985, p. 120. 
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Many conclusions regarding Turkish economic activity in the 1980s can be 
drawn from table 3.7. First, it is clear that as in 1978, in 1979 credits were more 
than deposits available; hence, creating inflationary pressures due to the increase 
in the money supply. However, in the 1980s the situation changed and deposits 
met the demand on credit after interest rates were allowed to float freely. Second, 
it seems that savings in Turkey are not related to interest rates, since from 1980 to 
1984 interest rates rose sharply while savings did not follow that rise possibly due 
to the fall in real wages. In general, it can be suggested that the general trend for 
the average propensity to save over the 1980s remained constant (at about 0.22% 
of total income, 0.14% in urban areas and 0.33 in rural areas according to the 1990 
census of population) and nominal savings were more or less directly related to 
the expansion in the money supply. It is worth noting that while interest rates 
on deposits in 1985 and 1986 decreased in nominal terms and increased in real 
terms, the rate of savings decreased. On the other hand, while interest rates were 
increasing in real and nominal terms in 1982 and 1983, the rate of increase in 
savings did not follow the rise in interest rates, on the contrary the rate of savings 
again decreased. More precisely, in 1982-83, deposit interest rates increased from 
45% to 51.9% in nominal terms while the rate of increase in deposits dechned from 
56.2% in 1982 to 30.8% in 1983. This argument of inverse relationship between 
interest rates and deposits was true for the whole decade of the 1980s and early 
1990s. 
As to the relation between banks' credits and interest rates it is astonishing 
that the nominal rate of increase in credit was at its highest when lending interest 
rates were at their highest in nominal and real terms in 1985 and 1986, although 
99 
during 1979-1984 credits were decreajsing as interest rates were rising. 
From table 3.7 one can notice easily the directly positive relation between 
savings and the money supply where interest rates play a minor role in determining 
the level of savings. Hence, Turkish consumers still have weak response to changes 
in interest rates despite the increase in real wages (see table 5.7) and Turkish 
per capita income (constant 1968 prices) from TL 4,310 in 1982 to TL 5,360 in 
1990 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992-93). Moreover, investors seem to be more 
rational with respect to interest rates and their use of credits as can be seen from 
tables 3.7 and 3.5. 
As to the money supply, the Turkish government did not follow a strict poUcy 
during the last decade. For the money supply expanded at about an annual average 
of 55.5% during the period from 1980 to 1991 (see table 3.7). This loose pohcy 
might be one of the reasons behind the loss of control over inflation and threatens 
the achievements of the 1980 adjustment programme. 
3.14.4 Investment 
Investment was positive during the period 1981-1987 and high between 1985-
1987 and in 1990 as a result of the economic measures, mainly in pricing and 
interest rates policies, taken in 1980. This change in the economic environment 
led to a positive growth in investment in 1981 after three consecutive years of 
negative growth. 
When one examines tables 3.8 and 3.9 it is clear that investment, both pubhc 
and private, increased sharply between 1980 and 1990, this increase was reflected 
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in the share of investment in GNP which reached 24.8% in 1987 and decHned to 
22.5% in 1990 starting from a share of 19.5% in 1980. 
Table 3.8: Percentage Growth in Fixed Investment 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
% growth in fixed investment -10 -5 -7 1.7 3.5 3 0.1 16.7 12.3 5.2 
Table 3.8: continued 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992* 
% growth in fixed investment - 1.3 - 1 14.1 - 1 5.2 
Source: OECD, 1992. 
(*) 1992 programme. 
Table 3.9: Fixed capital investment as a percentage of GNP 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
% share 21.7 20.4 19.5 19.1 19 19.2 18.4 19.4 22 24.8 24.9 22.5 22.5 
Source: TUSIAD and OECD. 
Table 3.9 shows that the ratio of investment/GNP was fluctuating in the early 
1980s below its level in 1978-1979. This phenomenon persisted until 1985 when 
the share of investment in GNP started to rise again until 1989 when it started 
to decline again. This change in the investment share in GNP can be represented 
by a J-curve (see figure 3.1) which shows that the UberaJisation measures taken 
in 1980 had a negative impact on investment in the first few years despite the 
growth in GNP. I t is worth mentioning that the main reason for the decline in 
investment was the substantial slow down of private investment compared with 
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Figure 3.1: The Share of Investment In GNP In Turkey | 
s u u u 
a \ 
V 
1978 ig79 1980 ISSI 19821983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
the considerable rise in investment in the public sector (see table 3.10). 
In general, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Turkey had unutilised capacity 
in manufacturing, and it was not until the mid 1980s that all of it was exploited. 
During that period, investment was sluggish especially as real interest rates were 
much higher than the industrial sector had been used to before 1980. After 1985, 
with the success of Turkish manufactured exports and the "fuU" utilisation of the 
spare capacity, Turkish investors realised the need for more investment if they 
wanted to keep their market shares both at home and abroad as demand was 
increasing and much of the equipment used in production was getting old (most of 
the capital goods used were purchased in the 1970s). Hence, investment increased 
until 1989 when interest rates became very high (see table 3.5) making the cost of 
capital inhibiting for investors (Financial Times, November 18, 1992). 
Despite the Uberalisation measures taken by Turkey in 1980 and the decentral-
isation of the economy, table 3.10 suggests that the state still plays an important 
role in investment. Its share fluctuated around 45%-50% of total investment in 
1978-1980 and increased to about 60% during the implementation of the adjust-
ment programme in 1980-1985, to decrease after that to about 43% in 1990. Some 
Turkish sources (ICC, 1989) attribute this high pubhc share in investment to the 
nature of public investment which concentrates on infrastructure projects, which 
are capital-intensive, while private investment concentrates on productive projects. 
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Table 3.10: Percentages of Public and Private Fixed Capital Investment 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Pu. I.« 48.2 49.7 55.8 62.2 61.5 60.9 60 61.3 57.1 53.5 48.3 45.3 43.5 
Pr. I . * 51.8 50.3 44.2 37.8 38.5 39.1 40 38.7 42.9 46.5 51.7 54.7 56.5 
Source: TUSIAD and OECD. 
(a) PubUc investment. 
(b) Private investment. 
Whatever the case might be, it seems necessary for Turkey to accelerate the 
process of privatisation, increase credits to the private sector, and introduce incen-
tives to encourage private investment. 
3.14.5 Inflation 
As a result of the 1980 economic adjustment package, Turkey managed to bring 
down inflation from 110.2% in 1980 to 36.6% in 1981 and 30.8% in 1982. However, 
in 1984 inflation got out of control and jumped to 48.4% but then retreated in 
1987 to 38.8%. In 1988 onwards, the inflation rate in Turkey started to rise above 
its average in the previous years and reached 66% in 1991. 
Table 3.11: Consumer Price Index (percentage change over previous year) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
CPI 45.3 58.7 110.2 36.6 30.8 31.4 48.4 45 34.6 38.8 75.4 69.6 63.6 66 
Source: IFS. 
The decrease in inflation at the beginning of an adjustment programme and the 
continous increase afterwards may be explained as follows. First, the devaluation 
of currency and the rise in interest rates increase the investment and input costs. 
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This increase in costs drives the investors to exploit the unutilised capacity in 
the production process to reduce costs; hence, with tight monetary and fiscal 
policies and with decreasing domestic demand due to decreasing domestic real 
wages, inflation may go down in the short-run. In the long-run, inflation may 
shoot up once again after "ful l" utilisation of resources and unutilised capacity, 
rise in demand due to a rise in wages, the continuing depreciation in the Turkish 
lira, and the growth in the economy which, in many cases, is accompanied with 
inflationary pressures. 
3.14.6 Foreign Debts 
I t is difl&cult to evaluate whether it was for the benefit of Turkey to increase its 
foreign debts by nearly threefolds to get out of the bottle-neck it was in in 1979. 
Table 3.12 shows that Turkey started its 1980 adjustment programme with total 
foreign debts equal to US$ 13,604 million and in 1991 its total debts reached US$ 
48,661 milUon. I t is true that some aspects of the Turkish economy such as exports 
and GNP growth improved substantially, but were the costs worth the benefits? 
In addition, total debt/GNP ratio rose from 28.3% in 1981 to 50% in 1990. 
Moreover, the ratio of total debt/exports of goods and services increased from 
196.6% in 1981 to 223.3% in 1990 due to the dramatic increase in exports after 
1980. The major borrowers in Turkey are the government (more than 53% of total 
debts in 1992), the private sector (21% of total debts in 1992) and the Central 
Bank (about 14% of total debts in 1992). Moreover, the major lending sources, 
financing more than 80% of Turkey's foreign debts are the OECD countries, mul-
tilateral organisations (IMF, World Bank, and European Resettlement Fund), and 
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commercial banks. 
3.14.7 Public deficit 
Etatism in Turkey reUed on the government to carry out major investment 
projects which led to a heavy financial burden on the government's budget. This 
was reflected by the pubHc sector borrowing requirement presented in table 3.13 
which showed the tremendous increase in the deficit of the central government 
and its economic arm, the SEEs. The PSBR increased from about TL 169 bilUon 
in 1979 to about TL 64,000 billion in 1992. On the other hand, the Turkish 
government reduced its dependence on the Central Bank and foreign borrowing to 
finance its deficit and relied more on the domestic financial markets. The Central 
Bank which used to finance about one third (34.3%) of the pubUc deficit in 1980 
was financing 3.8% only of that deficit in 1989. However, this share rose to 20.8% 
in 1992. Meanwhile, financing the PSBR by borrowing from domestic financial 
sources increased from 30.2% in 1980 to 86.5% in 1992. 
These developments in the public sector borrowing requirement occurred de-
spite the committment to reduce this deficit through privatisation of the SEEs, 
reducing subsidies, and raising prices as part of the economic adjustment pohcies 
adopted in 1980. The continuing deficit in the pubhc sector shows that this sector 
is still the centre of gravity in the economy (Nas, T. and Odekon, M., 1992). 
An important change in the policy of financing the deficit is clear through 
the increase in reUance on domestic financial markets to finance the deficit while 
depending less on foreign borrowing and Central Bank financing. The latter poUcy 
reduced the growth in money supply which was the major cause of inflation before 
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1980 (see chapter 4). 
3.15 Income Distribution 
. The information available on the distribution of income and wealth in Turkey 
is very limited especially for the period of liberalisation. However, the studies of 
Hansen (1991), Celasun(1986) and the 1987 Income Distribution Survey by the 
State Institute of Statistics shed some light on the issue. The first two studies 
reported a widening in the income distribution gap represented by the Gini co-
efficient which increased from 0.50 in 1978 to 0.52 in 1983 (Celasun, M., 1986). 
Moreover, there was a decrease in the wealth of the lowest quintile from 2.8% of 
total wealth in 1978 to 2.6% in 1983 while there was an increase in the wealth 
of the highest quintile from 54.7% in 1978 to 55.9% in 1983 (Hansen, B., 1991). 
However, the 1987 income distribution survey suggests that the trend has been 
reversed with a decline in the Gini coefficient from 0.52 (according to Celasun) to 
0.43 with an even lower coefficient (0.41) for rural areas. The Gini coefficient for 
the urban areas was 0.44 suggesting a bigger income distribution gap in the cities. 
The decline in the Gini coefficient reflects the rise in income of the lowest 
quintile from 2.6% in 1983 to 5.2% in 1987 i.e., about double the income received 
by that percentage of the population in 1987 compared to 1983. As to the highest 
quintile, there was a decline in income from 55.9% of total income in 1983 to 49.9% 
in 1987. 
I t is clear from the above figures that the structural adjustment programme 
had initially aggravated the income distribution problem in Turkey in the first few 
years. However, the trend changed after the continuous growth in the economy 
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Figure 3.2: Lorenz Curve for Turkey 
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in the 1980s at an annual average of about 6%. The narrowing of the income 
distribution gap, whether represented by the Gini coefficient or the increase in 
income of the lowest quintile, may also be attributed to the continuing rise in wages 
in Turkey both in real and nominal terms after 1986. Nominal wages since 1986 
have been rising by more than the rate of inflation i.e., a rise in real wages (see table 
5.7 and OECD, 1992) thus causing a redistribution of income from profit earners 
to wage earners. In fact, the data on real wages show that those wages declined 
until 1986 after which they increased by an annual average of approximately 17% 
(much higher than the annual average growth in GNP which reached 5.9%) leading 
to a better Gini coefficient, hence, narrowing the income distribution gap. 
3.16 Turkey and the E C 
On 31 July 1959, Turkey applied to the European Community (EC) for an 
agreement of association and thus became the second country to do so, following 
Greece by a few weeks. The appUcation was motivated by poUtical considerations 
rather than economic realities. I t may be true that i f Greece had not apphed, 
i t would have taken Turkey much longer to apply. On 12 September 1963, the 
negotiations between Turkey and the EC ended resulting in the signiture of the 
Ankara agreement which stated the association formula between the two sides. 
The stated objectives of the association agreement are: (1) the establishment of 
a customs union; (2) the alignment in three stages of the economic and social 
policies of the two entities including the free movement of labour; and (3) financial 
cooperation to speed up the economic development of Turkey (Cendrowicz, M., 
1992). 
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The 1963 agreement specified a number of stages through which Turkey would 
pass: a preparatory phase, a transitional phase, and a final phase. The first phase 
was designed to last a minimum of five years and a maximum of ten, the second 
phase was designed to last a minimum of twelve years and a maximum of twenty 
two. The final phase would become operative only as a means of moving to full 
membership in the EC. This time table meant that Turkey could enter its final 
phase as early as 1980 or as late as 1995. 
The preparatory phase was characterised by unilateral aid from the EC to 
Turkey in terms of preferential tariflPs and quotas on Turkey's traditional agricul-
tural exports and a US$ 175 million loan (first financial protocol) to assist with 
industrial development projects. The basic aim of this aid and subsequent ones 
was to strengthen the Turkish economy in terms of its exports and its industrial 
structure in preparation for the transitional phase. During the transitional phase, 
it was envisaged that there would be a gradual shift to a customs union, with the 
principle of reciprocity being established. In particular, this phase was intended to 
include the acceptance of the common external tariff (CET) system, the gradual 
acceptance of the common agricultural poUcy (CAP) and the general relaxation of 
factor immobihties as outUned in the Treaty of Rome. 
The 1963 agreement set up three bodies to coordinate economic and political 
relationships between the EC and Turkey: (a) the Mixed ParUamentary Com-
mittee, (b) the Council of Association; and (c) the Association Committee. I t is 
primarily through the latter two bodies that Turkey has negotiated the different 
stages of its relationship with the EC. 
The preparatory phase could have ended in 1968. However, the negotiations of 
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the next step revealed fundamental disagreements mainly over the phasing of the 
industrial tariffs. Eventually, on 23 November 1970, Turkey signed an additional 
protocol with the EC, laying down the conditions, procedures, and time table for 
the transitional phase. An interim agreement was established to cover the inter-
vening period, and the protocol became effective in 1973. The transitional phase 
which was inauguarted by the additional protocol aimed at the establishment of 
a customs union over a period of twelve to twenty two years starting from 1 Jan-
uary 1973 in addition to economic cooperation. Thus, Turkey ends the transitional 
phase in 1995 (a maximum period of twenty two years was adhered to) with the 
setting up of a customs union with the EC. The union would remove customs duties 
and taxes, and includes the adoption of CETs and the elimination of quantitative 
restrictions in addition to eUminating any kind of export incentives. 
Progress towards achieving the customs union has not been going smoothly. 
On its side, the EC abolished both customs duties and quantitative restrictions 
on imports of industrial products according to the schedule laid down in the Ad-
ditional Protocol. However, the tremendous increase in the Turkish exports of 
textiles, led the EC to impose quota restrictions on these products from Turkey in 
1978. Also, Turkey fell behind schedule for the removal of tariffs and at present 
reached a 50 per cent reduction (on the twenty two years list), yet a 60 per cent 
reduction should by now have been reached (Cendrowicz, M., 1992). 
According to the Additional Protocol, the right of free movement of labour 
applies to Turkey from 1976, leading to complete free movement in 1986. However, 
this principle never materialised due to the unemployment problems in Europe. 
In addition, financial assistance amounting to US$ 195 million (second financial 
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protocol) was granted during 1971-77 followed by about US$ 250 million (third 
financial protocol) for 1979-81. In June 1980, the Association Council agreed a 
fourth financial protocol of about US$ 500 million. However, negotiations on this 
protocol came to an abrupt halt in June 1981 and the grant was frozen after the 
1980 miUtary coup and Turkey's bad human rights record. 
The economic impact of the establishment of the customs union with the EC is 
expected to be positive. Although Turkish exporters since 1980 have been relying 
on a generous export incentives scheme which will be abohshed by 1996 with 
the customs union, the negative impact of such a move must be weighed against 
the increase in exports of textiles and other competitive products which proved 
successful in penetrating the EC markets. On the other hand, industries such as 
automobile and electronics are expected to be under substantial pressure. 
Studies of the competitiveness of Turkish industry suggest that 75 per cent of 
Turkish industry would be capable of withstanding international competition, or 
that 22 per cent of manufacturing industry would risk elimination and that another 
35 per cent would need modest adaptations. Among diiferent industries, cotton 
textiles and clothing, glass, cement, some metal products and consumer and food 
products industries would have a good chance of meeting European competition. 
On the other hand, capital intensive industries such as parts of the steel industry 
and electronics would probably have difficulties without substantial adaptaion and 
increase in capital investment (Hale, W., 1990). 
In general, Turkey's exports to the EC are likely to depend very much on 
its success in improving standardisation, quality control, and on estabhshing an 
effective marketing network in Europe. This is necessary, not only to compete 
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against, but also to capture a larger share of the EC market from member counttries 
such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal and other countries on the Mediterranean. 
Finally, it may be said that, the obUgations assumed towards the Community 
within the framework of the customs union present no danger of straining Turkey's 
economy or arresting its industrialisation. 
3.16.1 Turkey's Full Membership in the E C 
On 14 April 1987, the Turkish Government presented a formal request to the 
then president of the EC's Council of Ministers for Turkey to become a full member 
of the EC. As usual, the Council in its turn asked the Commission to provide it 
with an Opinion on this request. As mentioned above, the motives for joining the 
EC are mainly political, rather than economic. These include the fact that Greece 
has full membership, which is interpreted in Ankara as a disadvantage for Turkey 
in its disputes with her neighbour if Turkey remains outside the EC. Other factors 
behind the application included the eagerness of Turkey to be acknowledged in the 
west as a liberal democracy and to be accepted as part of Europe and its culture. 
In its Opinion which was sent to the Council on 18 December 1989, the Com-
mission stated the Community is currently engaged in achieving progress towards 
political, economic, and monetary union. This reason prompted the Commission 
to believe that it would be unwise with regard to both the Turkey and the EC to 
start any negotiations regarding accession before 1993 at the earliest. However, 
this polite rejection of Turkey's application was made clear by Abel Matutes, the 
Commissioner of the Mediterranean PoUcy, in a press conference held on 18 De-
cember 1990, who confirmed that Turkey was "eligible to become a member of 
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the Community". This should assure the Turkish government that the EC has no 
reservations regarding Turkey's religious identity or its geographic position as a 
European country (Hale, W., 1992). 
Other reasons for rejecting Turkey's appUcation were mainly poUtical and eco-
nomic. On the pohtical side, Turkey's human rights record, its repression of the 
Kurds in the south east of the country, and its restrictions on trade unions' ac-
tivities were cited as barriers to full membership. In addition, Turkey's disputes 
with Greece both regarding Cyprus and offshore oil rights in the Aegean, were 
considered as obstacles for accession. 
Implicitly, the developments in eastern Europe and the possibility of Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia applying for full membership in addition to other countries 
from the EFTA region, who may be in a stronger position to join the Community, 
presented another obstacle for an early Turkish full membership. 
On the economic side, the disparities in income between the Community and 
Turkey present problems. Its income is less than one third of the average level of the 
Community. In addition, Turkey has high unemployment levels and a weak social 
security schemes. In these respects, the Community expects that the potential 
cost to the rest of the Community of Turkish accession would be high. Also, 
it is feared that because agricultural prices in Turkey are lower than the rest 
of the Community, the cost for the EC to support these prices to the levels of 
the CAP will be substantial. On Turkey's side, it is expected that the increase 
in agricultural prices under CAP would lead to an increase in food prices causing 
inflationary pressures. The increase in prices would increase the demand for higher 
wages thus eroding Turkey's comparative advantage in low labour costs (Hale, W., 
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1990). However, another argument may be that the increase in the income of 
Turkish farmers due to CAP would have a multiplier effect in terms of increasing 
consumption and savings. This would increase investment and enhance economic 
growth both in the urban and rural areas. 
The Opinion also included the need for accomplishing the customs union by 
1996, intensifying the dialogue between Ankara and the EC, starting negotiations 
to release the fourth financial protocol, and more cooperation at the financial 
and the industrial level. These were expected to enforce their interdependence 
and intensify the relations between Turkey and the EC as stated in the Ankara 
agreement. 
3.17 Turkey and the Black Sea Region 
The Black Sea and its surroundings is considered to have a great wealth po-
tential with respect to tourism and trade. In that respect, the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Declaration signed in June 1992 in Istanbul is considered an impor-
tant step forward towards economic development in Turkey. The countries that 
signed the declaration were: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, and Turkey. The main objectives of 
the declaration are: the free movement of the means of production (mainly people), 
cooperation in several fields (trade, industry, science and technology, environment, 
health, agriculture, tourism, mining, energy, transport, economic and commercial 
information, and pharmaceutics), reducing or ehminating trade barriers, and seek-
ing possibilities of establishing a Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank 
(there are already some Japanese amd European agencies interested in shares in 
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this Bank). Although the member states in the Declaration might have conflicting 
economic interests, it is believed that a common customs policy will be mutually 
beneficial. I t is hoped that, this declaration will help Turkey increase its exports 
and emerge as an economic power house in the region, channeUing western technol-
ogy and capital to the Black Sea states in need of investment and modernisation 
(Briefing, 1991 and 1992). 
Cooperation between Turkey and other countries; especially in the former So-
viet Union, has already started with the number of joint ventures between Turkish 
and Azeri companies reaching about 50. There are hundreds of such projects in 
the pipe line. Meanwhile, the Russian ambassador in Ankara expected the total 
volume of trade between Turkey and Russia to reach US$ 10 billion by 1997 (al-
though that volume was US$ 1,500 million only in 1991). On the other hand, i t 
is worth mentioning that there are problems also, Russia for instance has incurred 
payment arrears of around US$ 48 milliion from a US$ 1.15 billion credit extended 
by the Turkish Exim Bank. This led the Bank to freeze the credit (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1992). 
The question that may be asked here is whether Turkey regards the Black Sea 
economic cooperation region as a substitute or complement to its full membership 
in the EC. There is no doubt that Turkey's relations with the Black Sea countries 
will have positive impact on the Turkish economy in the form of increasing trade 
which could contribute to the economic growth of the country. However, it is 
unlikely that Turkey would give up its demand for a full membership in the EC. 
After all, i t is mainly the poHtics rather than the economics of a ful l membership 
in the EC that Turkey is interested in. In that respect, the economic growth that 
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may take place in Turkey in the coming decade due to Turkey's relations with the 
Black Sea countries may increase the per capita income in Turkey. This increase 
in income with its multipHer effect may leave the political issues that the EC 
Commission mentioned in its Opinion (if not solved) as the only barrier. 
3.18 Conclusion 
I t is difficult to confirm whether Turkey's 1980 adjustment programme was a 
success or a failure; since it was a mixture of both. On the one hand, the pro-
gramme managed to get Turkey out of the 1979 foreign exchange crisis through 
improving its trade balance substantially, restoring economic growth, reducing in-
flation (although it started rising again since 1987), eliminating the distortions 
caused by the black market in trade and exchange rate, reducing the income dis-
tribution gap, and increasing the inflow of capital through liberalising its foreign 
exchange controls. On the other hand, the costs that Turkey had to pay for such 
an improvement were considerable. Its foreign debts more than tripled and its 
currency lost substantial amounts of its value. Despite paying such a high cost, 
Turkey perhaps had no other choice to solve its economic problems. 
Since the establishment of the modern Turkish state in the 1920s, the Turkish 
currency was always overvalued and prices did not reflect the real costs of products 
leading to excess demand and more pressure on foreign exchange reserves. As to 
the money supply, Turkey always solved the shortage in deposits needed to finance 
its economic growth through increasing its money stock; hence, fuelhng inflation 
and adding pressure on the exchange rate parity. 
In the end, it seems that the programme was a mixed blessing. It managed to 
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boost the Turkish economy, but at costs which some of the programme supporters 
believe that Turkey would have had to pay sooner or later with or without ad-
justment. Also, it should be added that the survival of the adjustment process in 
Turkey was mainly due to the hesitance with respect to economic policy on the 
part of the Turkish governments in the late 1970s. This was followed by the mili-
tary coup of September 1980 that supported structural adjustment and ehminated 
any effective opposition to the new system. 
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Chapter IV 
The Impact of Liberalisation on the Turkish Economy: A 
Comparison with the 1970s 
4.1 Introduction 
I t is difficult to determine the impact of the 1980 adjustment programme on 
the Turkish economy unless an econometric study is carried out. In this study, 
the different relations between the major variables influencing the performance 
of the economy will be determined. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
the econometric relations in the 1970s and 1980s which may help to determine 
the changes that occurred in those relations due to the 1980 economic reforms. 
The figures used to build the econometric models have been collected from official 
Turkish sources and the International Monetary Fund (International Financial 
Statistics). 
During the 1970s, the Turkish economy was characterised by government poH-
cies that centered on price controls, an overvalued exchange rate, financial re-
pression, and a restrictive trade regime. These policies, which the consecutive 
Turkish governments implemented since the establishment of the Turkish state, 
were designed to serve the objective of the so-called "etatism", which is mainly an 
inward-oriented strategy adopted by all the Turkish governments until 1980. 
Before 1980, prices in Turkey were not determined on the basis of profit max-
imisation or cost of production; especially with respect to the products of the 
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state economic enterprises (SEE). Rather, an interventionist policy was adopted 
by the governments which determined the prices of the SEE products and agricul-
tural products disregarding market forces; although, some argue that the major 
determinant of prices was the socio-political environment prevaiUng at the time 
(Hatiboglu, Z., 1978). 
Until the beginning of the 1980s, Turkey foUowed a multiple exchange rate 
system which was overvalued by varying degrees throughout the 1970s. There 
were two official exchange rates, a lower rate (TL 35 per US dollar) apphed to most 
agricultural exports, imports of fertihsers, imports of petroleum, and petroleum 
products, and a higher rate (TL 47 per US dollar) apphed to all other transactions. 
Moreover, there was a limited official parallel market for exporters of manufactured 
products and minerals (World Bank, 1980). 
Within its financial market, Turkey had a fixed interest rates policy despite the 
rise in inflation. This rendered real interest rates negative throughout the 1970s. 
Moreover, in addition to the disequilibrium in interest rates, the Turkish economy 
was characterised by credit rationing and excessive intermediation costs. 
High tariflfs and similar levies (stamp duty, port charges, ...etc.) were imposed 
on imports into Turkey during the seventies. In addition, there were lists of goods 
which importers were allowed to import; these hsts were the liberalisation fist, 
quota Ust, and the bilateral trade agreement fist (Hatiboglu, Z., 1978). This U-
censing system for imports was estabhshed to protect domestic industry and to 
ensure that the hmited amount of official foreign exchange available was allocated 
among different commodities needed for economic development. 
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On the exports front, the government provided exporters with financial in-
centives that included: tax rebates, abatement of customs duties on imported 
equipment, preferential credits and others. However, these incentives were not 
sufficient to eliminate the bias against exports because they were too limited and 
should have been increased (World Bank, 1980). 
Turkey ended the 1970s in a hopeless economic situation, inflation was more 
than 100% and rising, unemployment above 10% and rising, there was a worsen-
ing current account, shortages of supply for the consumer and industrial markets, 
negative GNP growth and above all Turkey lost its creditworthiness in the inter-
national money market where creditors refused to lend her any more. 
Being in such a bad economic situation and facing a debt crisis, the Turkish 
government realised that it was no longer possible to continue the same line of 
policies i.e., import-substitution. Therefore, on the 24th of January, 1980 the 
Ozal administration followed the path of liberalisation under the auspices of the 
International Monetary Fund. However, although previous Turkish governments 
had adopted relatively more liberal policies at the time of crises such as in 1958, 
1970, and 1977-79, these policies were always half-hearted and not the right dose 
of liberalisation that Turkey needed to recover. Thus nothing short of an overall 
restructuring of the economy was necessary and immediate and substantial reforms 
in economic management became crucial as, in addition to the government's beUef 
that it was the time for fundamental changes, foreign creditors refused to provide 
Turkey with the funds it badly needed unless it reached an agreement with the 
IMF to reduce the current account deficit and improve the allocation of resources. 
The effects of the 1980 adjustment programme on Turkey have been ambiguous. 
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Exports rose sharply since 1980 reaching almost double their volume in 1982 while 
imports did not rise by the same proportion as exports; thereby narrowing the trade 
deficit gap, increasing the flow of foreign exchange, and paving the way for Turkey 
to regain its creditworthiness in the international market. The question which 
must be asked is whether it was the exchange rate liberalisation which caused this 
increase in exports. According to the theory that the IMF embraces, the answer is 
yes, it is the exchange rate that made Turkey's products more competitive in the 
world market; hence, increasing the demand for them. 
Our investigation considers whether the IMF's view is correct in the case of 
Turkey. For this purpose, two models have been designed, one for the decade before 
structural adjustment i.e., 1970-1979 and the second for the 1980-1989 period i.e., 
after economic reforms. This will facihtate a comparative study for the two periods 
regarding the impact of Uberalisation on the Turkish economy after 1980. 
Many regression equations were tried which gave a notion of the forces aff"ecting 
the Turkish economy, the most conclusive ones were put in the appendix at the 
end of the chapter. In addition, several economic models, some of which were 
specifically for Turkey, were consulted before deciding on the final one below. 
Celasun's (1986) model Simlog-1 may have been the most appropriate model since 
i t is a general equilibrium system influenced by macroecocnomic and external trade 
relations characterising the Turkish economy. However, an enormous amount of 
data was needed, given the size of the model (91 equations). This was not available 
for the Turkish economy which precluded the use of the model. 
The structural form of the model used in this chapter is a modification of the 
Conway model (Nas, T. and Odekon, M. , 1988) which was originally designed to 
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test the impact of trade liberalisation on Turkey. Several equations were added to 
the model to reflect the impact of structural adjustment as a whole on variables 
including those used by Conway. However, the lack of data on several variables 
used by Conway in his model required their replacement by proxies. Real capital 
stock was replaced by real investment, total output was replaced by industrial 
output, real imports replaced real imported inputs use, US inflation replaced real 
dollar price of imported goods, and expected inflation was replaced by the exchange 
rate as any devaluation would alarm people to a possible round of rises in prices. 
I t is worth mentioning that Conway's model is an extension of his previous model 
(Conway, P., 1987) which was designed mainly to study the effects of external 
shocks and trade liberalisation on the Turkish economy. 
The simultaneous equations in the structural form were estimated using two-
stage least squares. Moreover, after estimation, the real consumption equation 
that was part of Conway's model was found to have a very low (0.23) according 
to my data. Therefore, it was dropped from the simultaneous system. 
The second section of this chapter presents the economic model for Turkey 
after 1980 with an interpretation of the results. The third section demonstrates 
the results of the estimation of the model for the 1970-1979 period. In the fourth 
section, a comparative study will be carried out for the two models and their 
results. Finally, the fifth section provides the conclusions and remarks on the 
findings followed by the appendix. 
4.2 Econometric Model for Turkey after 1980 
The model below is a simple macroeceonmic model for Turkey composed of 
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a simultaneous linear equation system in logarithmic form. The core part of the 
model i.e., Conway's model, consists of the equations for the dependent variables of 
industrial production, real gross domestic product (RGDP), labour, real imports, 
real investment, real money supply, and real quasi-money supply. The rest of the 
equations were incorporated in the model in order to modify it for the purposes of 
this study. The model has no lags which is one of its advantages given the hmited 
number of observations available. In addition, since the data used are annual, it 
may be assumed that one year is enough to spot any changes, in the short-run, 
in the economic variables under study. It is the lack of data and the consequent 
weakness of some statistical results that make the conclusions from this model 
tentative and indicative only. 
Estimation of the equations below suggests that real imports have a negative 
effect on industrial production in Turkey as the former increases while an increase 
in industrial production would lead to an increase in imports. This confusing 
result may be explained on the basis that Turkish imports are divided into con-
sumption goods, intermediate goods, and capital goods (unfortunately there is no 
data based on that classification). Therfore, it is assumed that the increase in the 
imports of consumption goods is negatively affecting Turkish industrial ouput due 
to more competitiveness of imported products. On the other hand, the imports of 
industrial intermediate and capital goods are necessary for increasing production 
in manufacturing; hence, the positive relationship. These findings show the need 
for selectivity in Turkey with respect to trade liberalisation as import-substitution 
industries are hit by unprotected trade. Moreover, labour as an input plays an 
important role in industrial production and contributes to real economic growth. 
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structural form of the Simultaneous Equations in the 1980s 
I n ( I P ) = - 359.9 - 0.371n(RGDP) - 0.471n(Rimports) + 22.21n(Labour) 
(28.3) (0.8) (0.2) (1.7) 
-0.311n(Rwages) (1) 
(0.16) 
i?^ = 0.99 DW = 2.9 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 3.05) 
In(RGDP) = - 6.6 + 0.371n(RI) + 0.431n(Labour) + 0.061n(Rimports) (2) 
(5.2) (0.04) (0.3) (0.04) 
B? = 0.99 DW = 2.45(chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 2.74) 
In(Labour) = 16.3 + 0.731n(RGDP) - 0.171n(RI) - 0.021n(Rwages) (3) 
(0.6) (0.33) (0.1) (0.03) 
i?^ = 0.95 DW = 1.74 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 3.45) 
In(Exports) = 7.85 + 0.431n(Exchange) - 0.911n(l+t) + 1.031n(IP) -
(1.3) (1.0) (0.4) (0.9) 
0.71n(Rwages) (4) 
(0.4) 
i?^ = 0.99 DW = 1.60 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.001) 
In(Rimports) = 4.85 - 0.21n(USinf1) + 0.181n(IP) + 0.151n(l+t) (5) 
(0.4) (0.08) (0.04) (0.2) 
J?^ = 0.92 DW = 2.25 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.70) 
In ( R I ) = - 3.01 + 1.741n(RGDP) + 0.121n(Rwages) + 0.007RIRR (6) 
(0.4) (0.11) (0.07) (0.006) 
i?-^ = 0.99 DW = 1.66 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.28) 
In(WPI) = 2.66 + l . O l l n (Exchange) + 0.021n(RM2) + 0.21n(USinf 1) (7) 
(0.5) (0.07) (0.4) (0.1) 
i?^ = 0.99 DW = 2.16 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 1.08) 
ln(RM2) = - 2.03 + 0.231n(DIR) + 1.61n(RGDP) - 0.091n(Exchange) (8) 
(0.1) (0.03) (0.3) (0.05) 
i?2 = 0.98 DW = 2.58 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 3.86) 
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ln(RQM2) = - 4.85 + 0.751n(DIR) + 2.91n(RGDP) - 0.221n(Exchange) (9) 
(0.4) (0.1) (1.1) (0.2) 
= 0.95 DW = 2.08 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.16) 
In(Rdeposits) = - 0.74 + 0.381n(DIR) + 0.551n(RWAGES) (10) 
(0.5) (0.04) (0.08) 
i?^ = 0.94 DW = 2.20 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 1.51) 
In ( R c r e d i t s ) = - 0.96 + 0.361n(DIR) + 0.771n(RM2) (11) 
(0.6) (0.22) (0.25) 
= 0.93 DW = 1.88 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.006) 
RI = r e a l investment 
IP = i n d u s t r i a l production 
RGDP = r e a l gross domestic product 
Rimports = r e a l imports 
Rwages = r e a l wages 
Rcredits = r e a l c r e d i t s from banks 
DIR = nominal i n t e r e s t rates 
RQM2 = r e a l quasi-money supply 
Exchange = nominal exchange rate 
t = ef f e c t i v e t a r i f f s 
U Sinfl = US i n f l a t i o n 
RIRR = r e a l international rate of 
return 
RM2 = r e a l money supply 
Rdeposits = r e a l deposits in banks 
N.B.: the chi-square for serial correlation was included because of the small 
number of observations (degrees of freedom) which renders the DW test unrehable. 
The critical value of the chi-square in this case is 3.84 at the 5% significance level. 
The increase in wages has a very minor effect on employment in Turkey which 
suggests that there was an inelastic demand for labour. However, this result is not 
statistically significant, thus it requires a very cautious interpretation. Labour is 
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of course the main input in both industry and agriculture and hence any economic 
growth relies on labour. This is clear from equations 2 and 3 which suggest that 
any 1 per cent increase in labour is accompanied by a 0.43 per cent increase in real 
GDP, while a 1 per cent increase in real GDP may lead to a 0.73 per cent increase 
in labour use. The statistical insignificance should be noted, however, so caution 
must also be exercised in the interpretation. 
An increase in real imports by 1 per cent has a very minor (0.06 per cent) 
impact on economic growth in Turkey. However, on the export side, industrial 
production seems to be the driving force behind the rise in exports in the 1980s 
(supporting the results of the regression equations in the appendix). The elasticity 
of those two variables is almost unity. On the other hand, the exchange rate 
devaluation has a relatively much weaker effect where a 1 per cent depreciation 
in the value of the Turkish lira would lead to a 0.43 per cent increase in exports. 
From this result, one may conclude that although the continuing devaluation in the 
lira since 1980 has a positive effect on Turkey's exports, the fact that the country 
had enough unutilised industrial capacity in addition to other factors (availabihty 
of foreign exchange, export incentives, and depressed domestic demand) was the 
spearhead of the remarkable increase in the volume of Turkish exports; especially 
in the early 1980s. 
The inflationary impact of the depreciation in the Turkish currency is sub-
stantial. It may be argued that the stricter monetary policy followed after 1980 in 
terms of money creation in comparison with the 1970s led to a negligible impact 
on the increase in prices. However, the instability in the value of the lira against 
foreign currencies is the major contributor to inflation in Turkey after economic 
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reforms. 
Real money supply is mainly affected by economic growth where a 1 per cent 
increase in real gross domestic product leads to a 1.6 per cent increase in real M2 
and a 2.86 per cent increase in real quasi-money supply (foreign currency, time, and 
saving deposits). These results agree with the economic theory since any economic 
growth requires monetary growth to finance it otherwise demand wiU not be met 
by supply leading to stagnation and inflation (stagflation). However, it is clear 
that the multipliers of real M2 and RQM2 are quite high mainly due to the role of 
the state and its SEEs as the main investors in Turkey who rely on Central Bank 
finances. 
The above analysis mainly demonstrates the relationship between the endoge-
nous variables in the structural form of the model and other variables in that 
model. However, the question that may arise here concerns the effect of the pre-
determined variables (exogenous variables) on the endogenous variables. This is 
made up of two components: the direct effect of a predetermined variable on the 
endogenous variable in question (an effect that could be captured from the above 
structural form of the model) and the indirect effect through the effect of the pre-
determined variable on another endogenous variable which in turn influences the 
endogenous variable in question. This total effect is captured by the reduced form 
of the model below which expresses each endogenous variable solely in terms of 
predetermined variables having solved out the simultaneous interaction of the en-
dogenous variables within themselves (Desai, M., 1976). In the familiar notation 
we have the reduced form equation By = Ax -|- u of the structural form which 
turned out to be, in matrix form and ignoring the error term, according to KHen 
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model I as foUows: 
1 0.37 •22.16 0 0.47 0 0 0 0 0 0- ln{IP) ' 
0 1 -0.43 0 -0.07 -0.3 0 0 0 0 0 ln{RGDP) 
0 -0.74 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 In(Labour) 
1.03 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ln{Exports) 
0.18 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ln{Rimports) 
0 -1.74 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ln{RI) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.02 0 0 0 ln{WPI) 
0 -1.6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ln{RM2) 
0 -2.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ln{RQM2) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 In(Rdeposits) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.78 0 0 1. . ln{Rcredits) . 
' -359.9 0 0 0 0 -0.31 0 ' 
-6.6 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
16.3 0 0 0 0 -0.02 0 unity 
7.85 0 -0.91 0.43 0 -0.7 0 ln(USinfl) 
4.85 0.2 0.15 0 0 0 0 ln{l +1) 
-3.0 0 0 0 0.007 0.12 0 ln{Exchange) 
2.7 0.23 0 1.01 0 0 0 RIRR 
-2.03 0 0 -0.09 0 0 0.24 ln{Rwages) 
-4.85 0 0 -0.23 0 0 0.75 ln{DIR) . 
-0.75 0 0 0 0 0.55 0.39 
. -0.95 0 0 0 0 0 0.36 4 
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Hence, the reduced form y = B ^Ax is, in matrix form: 
ln{IP) • ' 6.01 -1.96 1.47 0 0.26 0.95 0 ' 
ln{RGDP) -0.4 -0.23 0.18 0 0.03 0.24 0 
ln{Labour) 16.63 -0.1 0.08 0 0.01 0.06 0 unity 
ln{Exports) 14.04 -2.02 0.6 0.43 0.26 0.28 0 ln{USinfl) 
In^Rimports) 5.93 -0.55 0.41 0 0.05 0.17 0 ln{\ +1) 
ln{RI) = -3.7 -0.41 0.31 0 0.06 0.53 0 ln[Exchange) 
ln{WPI) 2.65 0.22 0.01 1.01 0 0.01 0 RIRR 
ln{RM2) -2.67 -0.37 0.28 -0.09 0.05 0.38 0.24 ln{Rwages) 
ln(RQM2) -6.01 -0.67 0.5 -0.23 0.09 0.68 0.75 . ln{DIR) 
ln{Rdeposits) -0.75 0 0 0 0 0.55 0.39 
. ln{Rcredits) , . -3.04 -0.29 0.22 -0.07 0.04 0.29 0.55. 
The above reduced form model shows the impact of any change in the ex-
ogenous variables on the endogenous variables under study during the 1980-1989 
period. It is clear that world inflation (proxied by US inflation) has a substantial 
effect on Turkish exports as any rise in the prices of capital and intermediate goods 
would hit the competitiveness of Turkish exports. An increase in world inflation 
would lead to a reduction in industrial production in Turkey where domestic pro-
ducers depend on imported inputs in manufacturing. So, although a rise in prices 
abroad may, in theory, increase the competitiveness of Turkish products in the 
international market, the fact that domestic production wiU be adversely affected 
by that increase in prices would have a negative impact on exports given the direct 
relation between the two (see equation 4 in the structural form above). The above 
argument is clearer when one looks at the relation between US inflation and real 
imports where the latter decreases by 0.55 per cent for every 1 per cent increase in 
world prices. This would then have its multiplier effect on exports and industrial 
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production, decreasing the latter by 1.96 per cent and the former by 2.02 per cent. 
It is worth mentioning that the multiplier effect of an increase in US inflation on 
exports and industrial production is almost equal i.e., about 2 per cent, reflecting 
the result in the structural form where the elasticity of change in exports to any 
change in industrial production is almost unity. 
In addition, the decline in exports, industrial production, real investment, and 
real money supply has an impact on real GDP which would shrink as a result by 
0.23 per cent for a 1 per cent increase in world prices. The above reduced form 
shows that inflation (proxied here by the wholesale price index) in Turkey is slightly 
affected by international inflation. The rise in Turkish inflation and the decline in 
real investment and industrial production would consequently lead to a decHne in 
real credits and real money supply, but real deposits will remain unaffected. 
Trade liberalisation in Turkey after 1980 with the reduction in tariffs on im-
ported goods that followed had a considerable effect on many variables such as 
industrial production, exports, real imports, real investment, real money, and real 
quasi-money supply. An increase in tariffs, in the 1980s, by 1 per cent would in-
crease production in the manufacturing sector by 1.47 per cent, a result that shows 
how more protection to domestically produced goods in Turkey may help increase 
productivity. Furthermore, the impact on industrial production is reflected by ex-
ports and imports which increase by 0.6 per cent and 0.41 per cent respectively for 
every 1 per cent increase in tariffs. In addition, any increase in tariffs would en-
courage real investment to meet the demand domestically (for import substitutes) 
and abroad (exports). Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that a rise in tariffs would 
have a minor effect on real imports and a substantial negative effect on exports in 
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the structural form of the model; however, the picture changed after allowing for 
the total effect to take place. A question that may be raised here is why exports 
would rise with an increase in tariffs which would increase the cost of production; 
especially in industries that rely on imported inputs, which would consequently 
erode the competitiveness of Turkish goods abroad? A possible explanation could 
be that first, in most cases in Turkey, tariffs are higher on final goods than in-
termediate goods; this together with the increase in demand for domestic goods 
explains the rise in industrial production. 
Conway (1987) comments on the effects of trade Uberalisation in the 1980s 
saying that the trade liberalisation pohcy with the largest positive impact on the 
trade balance was the lowering of imported-input tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
This means costs of imported inputs are not very high for Turkish exporters and 
producers which allows them to remain quite competitive internationally. Second, 
despite the existence of some tariffs on imported inputs, other factors, such as the 
depreciation in the Turkish Ura, the existence of unutilised capacity, and export in-
centives, do contribute to the growth in exports and the competitiveness of Turkish 
exporters in world markets. Baysan and Blitzer (in Aricanh, T. and Rodrik, D., 
1990) beheve that improved EERs (effective exchange rates in Turkey), provided 
the needed extra push on the supply side. At the same time, EERs above the 
level corresponding to the upward turning point of marginal costs (where unused 
capacity starts disappearing) would, in the short run, be expected to generate little 
additional supply response but would improve financial profits for the exporters, 
strengthening firms' balance sheets. 
On the other hand, the increase in tariffs does not inhibit imports (real imports 
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would rise by 0.41 per cent for a 1 per cent increase in tariffs) which shows their 
(imports) inelasticity; especially with respect to intermediate and capital goods. 
The demand for imports wUl result in an increase in the demand for real credits as 
the rise in tariffs makes imported goods more expensive. A 1 per cent increase in 
tariffs would result in a 0.22 per cent increase in real credits with no effects on real 
deposits. This situation will lead to an expansion in real money and quasi-money 
supply by 0.28 per cent and 0.5 per cent respectively. 
The impact of tariffs on inflation in the 1980s is considered very small according 
to the reduced form for the model above. A 1 per cent increase in tariffs leads to 
a 0.01 per cent increase in inflation. This result is contradictory to the findings of 
Conway (1987) who concluded that tariff reduction lowered prices through lower 
production costs and through lower imported final-goods prices. 
With respect to the exchange rate, the depreciation in the Ura had a mod-
erate effect on exports as discussed above. On the other hand, the total effect 
of depreciation on prices is inflationary with an elasticity of almost unity. This 
result supports Conway's (1987) findings that the devaluations of the period led to 
increased inflation. Also, the changes in the exchange rate of the lira has a minor 
effect on investment due to the zero multiplier in the reduced form of the model 
(a zero means a very minor or non-existing relationship). Moreover, the impact of 
depreciation in the lira on the expansion of real M2 is very minor and negative. A 1 
per cent increase in the exchange rate i.e., depreciation, may lead to a 0.09 decUne 
in real M2. However, although the nominal money supply increased substantially 
in the last decade due to the bolstering of the Central Bank's devaluation account, 
real M2 did not follow the same trend. It is worth mentioning that the devaluation 
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account which shows the net foreign Uabilities of the Bank has grown dramatically 
in recent years as a result of the Bank's growing foreign liabilities (workers' remit-
tances, foreign investment, exports, and foreign exchange borrowing, ...etc.) and 
the rapid depreciation in the Turkish lira (OECD Economic Surveys, 1990/1991). 
On the other hand, the expansion in money supply to finance the pubhc sector 
borrowing requirement (which increased due to the continuous fall in the value 
of the Turkish currency) diminished substantially in the 1980s from about 34 per 
cent of total PSBR in 1980 to about 4 per cent in 1991 (OECD Economic Surveys, 
1990/1991). 
The real international rate of return (RIRR) was found to have a minor impact 
on the Turkish economic performance according to the above study. The only 
result worth mentioning is the multiplier for industrial production and exports 
which increase by 0.26 per cent each for every 1 per cent increase in RIRR. 
Moreover, real wages have a substantial impact on industrial production. Any 
1 per cent increase in the former leads to a 0.95 per cent increase in the latter 
possibly as a result of increasing demand due to higher real incomes. The increase 
in industrial production would subsequently affect exports and real investment 
which would increase to meet the rise in demand. 
However, a rise in real wages does not, surprisingly, lead to a rise in prices 
despite the increase in demand, although Turkish industries are mainly labour-
intensive. This may be due to the low share of labour costs in the income statement 
of Turkish manufacturing firms which stood at an average of about 7 per cent of 
total sales between 1982 and 1988 in comparison with about 20% for German, 
Italian, and Spanish firms (see table 5.5). Moreover, a rise in real wages by 1 
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per cent would lead to a 0.55 per cent increase in real deposits and 0.29 per cent 
increase in real credits. The former would rise due to the increasing marginal 
propensity to save while the latter would increase to finance real investment. 
Finally, an increase in nominal interest rates in Turkey by 1 per cent would 
have a strong effect on real quasi-money supply (0.75 per cent), a moderate effect 
on real deposits (0.39 per cent) and real credits (0.55 per cent), and a weak effect 
on real money supply (0.24 per cent). The relationship between interest rates on 
the one hand and real deposits and credits on the other hand is interesting because 
it is expected, according to the theory, that a stronger positive relationship would 
exist between interest rates and deposits and a negative relationship between the 
former and credits. These results show that the liberalisation of interest rates in 
Turkey had a less than expected performance while credits are inelastic to changes 
in the costs of borrowing, probably due to Turkey's thin financial markets and the 
role of the government as a major borrower. 
Other researchers in the field arrived at the same conclusion with respect to 
the relation between interest rates and deposits. Anand, Chhibber, and van Wi-
jnbergen (AricanU, T. and Rodrik, D., 1990) found that the higher than average 
growth in the Turkish economy and in private disposable income is perceived as 
temporary rather than permanent which would therefore have a smaller effect on 
consumption and a larger effect on savings. On the other hand, they found that 
rising real rates of interest have been a major factor in the increase in private 
savings. However, Rittenberg concluded the opposite. He found that the interest 
rate policy and the financial environment (in Turkey) appear to have been work-
ing at odds in the post-liberalisation period. Despite higher real interest rates, 
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shaken public confidence discouraged savings. Although both studies used econo-
metric methods, the results were conflicting; hence, the findings of this study are 
considered somewhere in between. 
Moreover, it should be made clear that some variables used in the estimation 
of the equations of the above model are not significantly different from zero due 
to the high standard of error as a result of the small sample used in the study. 
However, it was inconvenient to drop them due to their theoretical importance in 
determining the variable in question. 
4.3 An Econometric Model for the 1970s 
The structural form of the model made up of the 11 simultaneous equations 
below shows the relations between the same variables under study in the previous 
section. This was necessary in order to spot the changes that occurred in the 
Turkish economy after implementing the 1980 economic reforms. 
Equation one below shows that industrial production in Turkey is negatively 
related to real imports. As imports increased by 1 per cent, industrial production 
would decrease by 0.54 per cent, a result that justifies the protectionist poUcies 
adopted by different Turkish government to protect their industries. In addition, an 
increase in real wages would have a negative impact on industrial production which 
again defends the fixed wages policy adopted by Turkey before 1980. However, it 
must be made clear that this (last) result is statistically not significant due to the 
high standard error of the coefficient. Hence, this result should be treated with 
extreme caution. 
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structural form of the Simultaneous Equations in the 1970s 
I n ( I P ) = -170.2 + 0.881n(RGDP) - 0.541n(Rimports) + 10.91n(Labour) 
(19.2) (0.3) (0.2) (1.24) 
-0.781n(Rwages) (1) 
(0.8) 
= 0.99 DW = 2.6 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 1.77) 
ln((RGDP) = 20.8 + 0.951n(RI) - 1.161n(Labour) + 0.041n(Rimports) (2) 
(16.5) (0.2) (0.9) (0.11) 
R^ = 0.95 DW = 1.12 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 1.06) 
In(Labour) = 18.9 - 0.371n(RGDP) + 0.451n(RI) - 0.211n(Rwages) (3) 
(2.0) (0.19) (0.2) (0.2) 
i?2 = 0.87 DW = 1.51 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.00004) 
In(Exports) = 2.0 - 3.42In(Exchange) + 7.821n(l+t) + 1.961n(IP) + 
(4.0) (1.2) (3.1) (0.4) 
0.931n(Rwages) (4) 
(0.5) 
i?2 = 0.99 DW = 2.72 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 3.06) 
In(Rimports) = 5.54 - 0. lln(USinf 1) + 0.251n(IP) - 5.01n(l+t) (5) 
(0.6) (0.22) (0.09) (1.4) 
i?2 = 0.84 DW = 2.15 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.96) 
I n ( R I ) = - 8.17 + 1.421n(RGDP) + 0.921n(Rwages) - 0.02RIRR (6) 
(4.7) (0.15) (0.6) (0.02) 
i?^ = 0.97 DW = 1.99 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.06) 
In(WPI) = 5.06 + 0.691n (Exchange) + 1.61n(RM2) + 0.21n(USinf 1) (7) 
(3.1) (0.7) (1.1) (0.3) 
i?2 = 0.78 DW = 1.74 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.69) 
ln(RM2) = - 0.83 - 0.061n(DIR) + 0.891n(RGDP) - 0.091n(Exchange) (8) 
(0.2) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) 
R"^ = 0.98 DW = 1.97 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.08) 
ln(RQM2) = 1.64 - 1.271n(DIR) + 2.21n(RGDP) - 0.981n(Exchange) (9) 
(1.0) (0.37) (0.47) (0.26) 
i?2 = 0.77 DW = 1.71 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation = 0.38) 
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In(Rdeposits) = 0.71 + 0.771n(DIR) + 0.261n(Rwages) (10) 
(10.0) (0.4) (1.36) 
i?^ = 0.53 DW = 1.12 (chi-square for s e r i a l c orrelation = 0.80) 
In ( R c r e d i t s ) = 1.65 - 0.431n(DIR) + 1.641n(RM2) (11) 
(0.3) (0.08) (0.15) 
i?2 = 0.95 DW = 2.21 (chi-square for s e r i a l correlation =0.2) 
RI = r e a l investment Exchange = nominal exchange rate 
IP = i n d u s t r i a l production t = ef f e c t i v e t a r i f f s 
RGDP = r e a l gross domestic product USinfl = US i n f l a t i o n 
Rwages = r e a l wages RIRR = r e a l international rate of 
Rimports = r e a l imports return 
DIR = nominal i n t e r s t rates RM2 = r e a l money supply 
Rcredits = r e a l c r e d i t s from banks Rdeposits = r e a l deposits i n banks 
RQM2 = r e a l quasi-money supply 
N.B.: the chi-square for serial correlation was included because of the small 
number of observations (degrees of freedom) which renders the DW test unrehable. 
The critical value of the chi-square in this case is 3.84 at the 5% significance level. 
Moreover, real gross domestic product was found to have a strong relation with 
real investment. A 1 per cent increase in real investment would lead to a 0.95 per 
cent increase in real GDR This may be due to the impact of public investment 
which was dominant in the 1970s and had quite a substantial impact on economic 
growth. 
According to the above structural form, labour use is determined by real in-
vestment, real wages, and real GDR Any increase in real wages or real GDP 
(statistically insignificant relationships due to high standard error) would reduce 
the amount of labour used by 0.21 per cent and 0.37 per cent respectively. On the 
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other hand, an increase in real investment by 1 per cent would increase labour use 
by 0.45 per cent. 
As far as exports are concerned, there is a strong negative relationship with 
the exchange rate suggesting that a devaluation would have serious consequences 
on Turkish exports in the 1970s (although this was not what happened when 
Turkey devalued its currency during that period). In addition, as in the 1980s, 
industrial production is an important determinant of exports in the 1970s. A 1 
per cent increase in industrial production would lead to a 1.96 per cent increase 
in exports. On the other hand, real imports are also affected by production in the 
manufacturing sector with a 0.25 per cent increase in the former for a 1 per cent 
increase in the latter. This result could be related to the dependence of Turkish 
producers on imported inputs in their production. 
Inflation in Turkey during the 1970s was strongly related to the increase in 
real money supply according to equation 7 in the above model. A 1 per cent 
increase in RM2 would raise prices by 1.6 per cent (one should be cautious when 
interpreting this result because the statistical significance of the relationship is 
weak). The increase in money supply in Turkey was a regular poUcy followed by 
the government before 1980 to finance its pubUc sector borrowing requirement and 
its five-year plans aimed at increasing the economic growth of Turkey (see equation 
8 where a 1 per cent increase in real GDP is related to a 0.89 per cent increase in 
real M2). 
Moreover, there was a strong relationship between RM2 and real credits in 
the 1970s which is not surprising. Before 1980, banks granted loans to investors 
(private and public), without due regard to inflationary pressures. In many cases 
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these banks referred to the Central Bank when they were short of liquidity. 
The reduced fo rm below shows the relationship between the exogenous vari-
ables and the dependent variables in the model which was not illustrated in the 
structural fo rm completely i.e., the total effect taking place between the variables. 
The reduced form equation By = A x + u of the structural form turned out to 
be, in matr ix fo rm and ignoring the error term, as follows: 
1 -0 .89 -10.9 0 0.54 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' ln{IP) 
0 1 1.17 0 -0 .04 -0.95 0 0 0 0 0 ln{RGDP) 
0 0.37 1 0 0 -0.45 0 0 0 0 0 ln{Labour) 
1.96 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 In(Exports) 
0.25 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ln{Rimports) 
0 -1.42 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ln{RI) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 .6 0 0 0 IniWPI) 
0 -0.89 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ln{RM2) 
0 -2.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ln{RQM2) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ln{Rdeposits) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.64 0 0 1 . . ln{Rcredits) , 
147 
' -170.2 0 0 0 0 -0.79 0 • 
20.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18.9 0 0 0 0 -0.22 0 unity 
1.9 0 7.83 -3 .42 0 0.93 0 ln{USinfl) 
5.54 - 0 . 1 - 5 .0 0 0 0 0 ln{l +1) 
-8 .2 0 0 0 -0.02 0.92 0 ln{Exchange) 
5.1 0.2 0 0.7 0 0 0 RIRR 
-0.83 0 0 -0 .09 0 0 -0.06 ln{Rwages) 
1.64 0 0 - 1 .0 0 0 -1.27 . ln{DIR) 
0.71 0 0 0 0 0.26 0.77 
. 1.65 0 0 0 0 0 -0.43 . 
Hence, the reduced fo rm y = 5 ^Ax is, in matrix form: 
r ln{IP) ] r 222.92 0.22 11.11 0 0.38 -31.48 0 • 
In(RGDP) 68.13 0.05 2.59 0 0.14 -9.69 0 
ln{Labour) 33.54 0.01 0.7 0 0.03 -2.41 0 umty 
ln{Exports) 438.82 0.44 29.61 -3.42 0.74 -60.77 0 ln{USinfl) 
ln{Rimports) 61.27 -0.04 -2.22 0 0.09 -7.78 0 ln{l +1) 
ln{RI) 88.55 0.07 3.68 0 0.18 -12.85 0 ln{Exchange) 
ln{WPI) 100.79 0.27 3.69 0.56 0.2 -13.8 -0.1 RIRR 
ln{RM2) 59.81 0.05 2.31 -0.09 0.12 -8.63 -0.06 ln{Rwages) 
ln{RQM2) 150.85 0.11 5.68 -1.0 0.3 -21.23 -1.27 . ln{DIR) 
ln{Rdeposits) 0.71 0 0 0 0 0.26 0.77 
. ln{Rcredits) . . 99.74 0.08 3.79 -0.15 0.2 -14.15 -0.53 > 
World inflat ion in the 1970s did not have a serious effect on industrial produc-
t ion i n Turkey. The latter would increase by 0.22 per cent for every 1 per cent 
increase in US inflat ion. Moreover, exports would increase, possibly due to the 
increase in industrial production (see structural form) by about 0.44 per cent i.e., 
about the same amount estimated by the simultanuous equation system. On the 
other hand, imports would be marginally aff"ected by a reduction equal to 0.04 per 
cent; however, the result is statistically insignificant. These findings show that as 
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world prices go up, Turkish products become more price competitive; therefore, 
leading to a rise in exports. Furthermore, there is a moderate but direct relation-
ship, although statistically not different f rom zero, between world inflation and 
Turkish inflat ion. A rise by 1 per cent in the former would lead to a 0.27 per cent 
increase in the latter. 
W i t h regard to tariffs, an increase of 1 per cent would reduce real imports by 
2.22 per cent which would increase the productivi ty of import-substitution indus-
tries by 11.11 per cent; thereby, raising exports by 29.61 per cent. The increase 
in product ivi ty would require an increase in investment by 3.68 per cent; hence, 
increasing inf lat ion (due to the increase i n tariflfs and the demand for domestic 
resources) by 3.69 per cent, real money supply by 2.31 per cent, and real credits 
by 3.79 per cent. The resulting increase in the demand for money to finance the 
increasing economic activi ty would increase real quasi-money supply by 5.68 per 
cent. 
Any increase in the exchange rate in the 1970s would reduce exports by 3.42 
per cent for a 1 per cent depreciation in the Turkish lira. This may be due to 
the increasing demand for domestic products; especially import substitutes, as the 
prices of imports increase dramatically due to the depreciation in the Hra. This 
pressure on domestic production would reduce the amount available for exports 
depriving the country f rom the foreign exchange revenues i t badly needed. 
The major effect of a 1 per cent increase in the real international rate of re-
t u r n is on Turkish exports which would rise by 0.74 per cent. This result may 
be explained in two ways: first, the increase in RIRR would leave people in the 
international community richer; thus, increasing the demand for goods including 
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Turkish ones. A second explanation could be that an increase in RIRR may be an 
incentive to save more by buying cheaper products in which the price competitive-
ness of Turkish exports has an advantage. 
A n increase in real wages would have a negative impact on all variables under 
study except real deposits. A 1 per cent rise in real wages would reduce industrial 
production, exports, real investment, real quasi-money supply, real GDP, and in-
flation substantially. This result reflects the importance of the fixed wage pohcy 
adopted by Turkish governments before 1980. Although a rise in wages is likely 
to increase domestic demand and subsequently production and economic growth, 
i t seems that the negative cost effect of such a move was crippUng for the Turkish 
economy in the 1970s. 
Finally, the fixed interest rate policy in Turkey before 1980 was quite effective 
in terms of attracting savings and inhibi t ing the demand for credits. On the other 
hand, any rise in interest rates by 1 per cent would reduce inflation by 0.1 per 
cent, quite a disastrous economic tool to fight the increase in prices at the time 
given Turkey's high inflat ion. 
The coefficients w i t h high standard of error should have been dropped f rom 
the structural fo rm of the model but, as in the 1980s model, this was not done due 
to the theoretical importance of each variable in the above equations. 
4.4 A Comparison between the 1970s and 1980s 
Several changes occurred during the past two decades under scrutiny in the 
relationship between the dependent variables and independent variables included 
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in this study. Industrial production was found to have an important impact on 
exports in both decades, although i t had a greater effect in the 1970s, wi th a 
minor effect on imports which was eroded further in the 1980s. Surprisingly, the 
exchange rate had a moderate effect on exports contrary to the theory and the 
findings of other researchers such as Dornbusch (in Dornbusch, R. and Helmers, 
L . , 1988) who concluded that adjustments of the real exchange rates can, in some 
cases, yield fast growth in exports. On the other hand. Fry (1986) stated in his 
conclusion that the rapid recovery in exports would not have occurred without a 
radical reform of exchange rate policy. Also, Odekon (Nas, T . and Odekon, M . , 
1992) concluded that the rise in the real lending rates, real depreciation of the T L , 
and the value-added tax have all contrtibuted to the high and persistent inflation 
in Turkey. 
The exchange rate devaluation was a complementary instrument, rather than 
a major one, in determining the volume of Turkish exports; especially in the 1980s; 
a result that is supported by the findings of Baysan and Blitzer (in Aricanh, T . 
and Rodrik, D. , 1990). They used data on sectoral exports, total subsidy rates, 
and real exchange rates for the period 1980-1984 and found that i t was not pos-
sible to establish any statistically significant relationships among those variables. 
Variations in EERs do not seem to explain the sharp differences among sectors 
in export growth performance. Moreover, they pointed out that although deval-
uations raised the costs of production due to higher costs of many intermediates, 
marginal costs of Turkish firms actually declined in late 1980. This decHne in costs 
may be due to the more efficient use of previously unutilised capacity. In addition, 
they stressed that the growth in manufactured exports did not stem f rom the es-
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tablishment of new export industries, but f rom existing capacity in industries that 
before had been producing mostly for the domestic market. 
Krueger and Aktan (1992) estimated the relationship between the exchange 
rates and exports (for the period 1975-1989) and arrived at exactly the same coef-
ficient (0.43) as in the above model. Thus their findings support the results of this 
research on that issue. However, the authors did not use the industrial production 
variable in their model which is a basic difference between the model in this study 
and their model. In addition, they beheve that during the 1980-1984 period the 
rapid export growth in Turkey was accomplished largely out of existing excess ca-
pacity at the time. Af te r 1984, real investment increased leading to an increase in 
the industrial capacity. This interpretation of the events in Turkey in the 1980s 
does not contradict the conclusions of this study where the emphasis is on the 
relationship between exports and industrial production disregarding the source of 
the latter whether i t is excess capacity or an increeise in investment. Hence, when 
Krueger and Aktan (1992) refer to industrial capacity (whether increased through 
more efficiency or investment) as one of the causes of the rise in exports in the 
1980s, they are impHcitly supporting the findings of the above model w i th regard 
to exports and industrial production. 
Consequently, according to the results of this study which are supported by 
the findings of other researchers in the field, the growth in exports is not mainly 
a devaluation phenomenon. Exports growth was largely due to the increase in 
industrial production facilitated by factors such as export incentives, the existence 
of unutilised capacity, depressed domestic demand, and the availability of foreign 
exchange. Those factors, combined w i t h a depreciated Ura helped sharpen the 
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competitiveness of Turkish exporters in world markets especially in the early 1980s. 
I t is clear f rom the above structural form of the models that the relationships 
between real money supply and real credits decUned in the 1980s in comparison 
w i t h the 1970s. This may be due to the strict monetary policy followed by Turkey 
after 1980. The Turkish Central Bank, in the 1970s, used to finance many of 
the credits to Turkish companies mainly the state economic enterprises (SEEs); 
however, this practice diminished substantially after 1980 wi th the rationalisation 
of costs in most of those enterprises (OECD Economic Surveys, Apr i l 1980 and 
1990/1991). 
The determinants of inflat ion in Turkey changed their roles after economic Ub-
eralisation. World inflat ion, however, st i l l has almost the same effect i t used to 
have in the 1970s. Although, in the 1970s, RM2 had an important role in deter-
mining W P I followed by the exchange rate. This role changed in the 1980s wi th 
the exchange rate having the single most important effect on prices in Turkey wi th 
real money supply having a very minor impact. These results are supported by 
Conway's (Conway, P., 1987 and Nas, T . and Odekon, M . , 1988) conclusions of his 
two studies that the devaluations after 1980 contributed heavily to the inflation 
rate. I n addition, he beheves that money supply growth has also been important 
( in Turkish inf lat ion) , although i t had its greatest relative impact during the ex-
pansionary 1973-1977 period. Moreover, a World Bank study (World Bank, 1980) 
found that inflat ion i n Turkey is not "purely a monetary phenomenon", adding that 
money supply does affect prices but there are some price changes which cannot 
be explained by past monetary expansion only. Furthermore, Krueger and Aktan 
(1992) also believe that the depreciation in the lira is leading to more inflation in 
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Turkey. 
Other non-monetary (exogenous) events exert upward pressure on prices in 
Turkey such as the increase in import prices (represented in this study by US 
inflat ion) and increases in agricultural support prices for income policy reasons. In 
addition, Conway (1987) also views that the rise in the US-dollar price of imported 
inputs and final goods prices raised inflation in the 1980s. This rise in US inflation 
had a negative effect on exports, imports, and industrial production in the 1980s, 
while its effect was much milder in the 1970s. This may be due to the liberalisation 
of trade which left Turkey more exposed to any changes in the world markets. 
The reduction in tariffs had a strong positive effect on inflation in comparison 
w i t h the 1970s. This may be due to the higher flow of imported products which 
became more expensive after devaluation. On the other hand, exports and imports 
had high multipliers i n the 1970s w i t h respect to any change in tariffs, while in the 
last decade, these multipliers diminished substantially. 
Finally, w i t h respect to financial liberalisation, interest rates, deposits, and 
credits i n Turkey, surprisingly had a more theoretically plausible relationship dur-
ing the 1970s. Real deposits were more responsive to changes in the interest rates 
in the 1970s while real credits had almost the same multipUer but wi th an opposite 
sign after 1980. 
4.5 Conclusion and Summary 
I t is quite surprising to have completely unexpected results w i th respect to the 
relation between exports and the exchange rate, commercial banks' deposits and 
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interest rates. Although the theory emphasises the relation between the exchange 
rate and exports, that proved to be moderate in the case of Turkey in the 1980s. 
As for the relation between money supply and inflation, this turned out to be weak 
w i t h a strong influence mainly f rom the exchange rate on the latter. In addition, 
interest rates turned out to have a moderate effect on the volume of deposits while 
the theoretical (inverse) relationship between credits and interest rates existed in 
the 1970s and not after liberalisation. 
Surprisingly, the exchange rate before 1980 had a weak effect on trade, while 
in the 1980s, industrial production was the major determinant of exports. I t is 
believed that trade liberalisation, export incentives, and the exploitation of the 
industrial unutilised capacity (this factor existed mainly in the early 1980s) are 
important factors contributing to the increase in industrial production and; hence, 
exports. Furthermore, the exchange rate had a stronger effect on inflation after 
liberalisation than before i t . Hence, the liberalisation of the exchange rate added 
to the inflationary pressures in Turkey. Moreover, money supply turned out to be 
directly affected by the economic growth of Turkey. 
On the whole, the results seem to be mixed and i t is difllcult to judge which 
decade and; hence, which economic system was better for Turkey. But since the 
economy has been liberalised (after 1980) i t has been exposed more to market forces 
both domestically and internationally, leading to better allocation of resources. 
Certainly, the trade balance has improved substantially and i t is beheved that 
the Turkish economy now is in a relatively better position despite the continuing 
problem of inflat ion and the depreciation in the hra. 
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4.6 Appendix: Trade and Exchange Rates 
The relationship between exports, imports, and industrial production was in-
vestigated in isolation of other variables using the Ordinary Least Squares method 
(OLS). The equations below were important in giving a notion about the relation 
between the different variables in the economy before going ahead wi th building 
the overall model presented in the chapter. 
4.6,1 Exports 
Table 4.1 demonstrates the econometric relationship between real exports, real 
exchange rates (RER), and real industrial production in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Dur ing the fixed exchange rate period and wi th import-substitution pohcies in the 
1970s, real exchange rate had a minor role in the determination of real exports. 
Any one percent increase in RER would lead to only 0.11 percent increase in 
real exports. On the other hand, after the 1980 devaluation and the Uberalisation 
of the exchange rate, the coefficient of RER increased by 0.08; thus, real exports 
would increase by a 0.19 (0.11 + 0.08) percent for any one percent increase in the 
real exchange rate. 
There are two aspects related to the exchange rate result above that should be 
mentioned. First, there is a weak relation between RER and real exports, second 
the statistically insignificant (high standard of error) coefficients of RER suggest 
that the variable should be dropped. 
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Table 4.1: Determinants of Real Exports 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
In(REXPO) A 1.56 0.70 
D - 1.95 1.20 
In(RIP) 0.47 0.16 
In(DRIP) 0.46 0.19 
In(RER) 0.11 0.13 
In(DRER) 0.10 0.14 
R^ = 0.97, DW-statistic equal 2.92, Chi-square for: serial 
correlation (6.3), critical value is 3.84 at the 5% significance 
level. 
n = 19 observations f r o m 1972 to 1990. 
A = intercept. 
D = intercept dummy (0 for 1970s and 1 for 1980s). 
REXPO = real exports. 
R IP = real industrial production. 
DRIP = real industrial production multipUed by the dummy varible. 
RER = real exchange rate. 
D R E R = real exchange rate multiplied by the dummy variable. 
Moreover, real industrial production seems to be the driving force behind any 
increase in real exports in Turkey according to table 4.1. During the decade of the 
1970s, any one percent increase in real industrial production would lead to a 0.47 
percent increase in real exports. However, after 1980 and wi th the export-oriented 
economic pohcies and the related trade liberalisation and export incentives, the 
impact of any one percent increase in real industrial production would lead to a 
0.93 (0.47 -I- 0.46) percent increase in real exports i.e., almost double in comparison 
w i t h the 1970s. 
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Table 4.2 shows the econometric relationship between real exports and real 
industrial production, excluding real exchange rate. The results are very significant 
despite excluding a theoretically important factor, such as the exchange rate. 
Table 4.2: Determinants of Real Exports 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
In (REXPO) A 1.05 0.40 
D - 3.23 1.15 
In(RIP) 0.65 0.17 
In(DRIP) 0.88 0.25 
R^ = 0.95, DW-statistic equal 1.75, Chi-square for: serial 
correlation (0.02), critical value is 3.84 at the 5% significance 
level. 
n = 20 observations f rom 1971 to 1990. 
A = intercept. 
D = intercept dummy (0 for 1970s and 1 for 1980s). 
R E X P O = real exports. 
RIP = real industrial production. 
DRIP = real industrial production multiplied by the dummy varible. 
I n table 4.2 there is a strong relationship between real industrial production 
and real exports i n comparison w i t h the relationship in table 4.1. Real exports 
in the 1970s would increase by 0.65 percent for every one percent increase in real 
industrial production. I n the 1980s, the former would increase by 1.53 (0.65 ^-
0.88) percent for every one percent increase in the latter. This may explain the 
fast domination of industrial products in Turkish exports, after 1980, replacing 
the tradit ional dominant position of agriculture. Moreover, i t is worth mentioning 
that the negative coeflScient of the dummy variables i n the above equations may 
161 
be largely due to the decrease in real exports due to the recession in the industrial 
countries after the 1979 increase in oil prices. 
The increase in the impact of real industrial production on real exports could 
be at tr ibuted to the changing attitude wi th respect to exports after 1980 and 
abandoning the import-substi tution policy which aimed most of Turkey's industrial 
production at the domestic market. Moreover, the liberalisation of trade which 
facilitated the imports of needed production-inputs and the existence of unutilised 
industrial capacity in addition to export incentives may be considered the major 
factors behind the increase in Turkish real exports since 1980. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 support the findings of the model while contradicting the 
results of table 4.1 of a weak relationship between real exports and real exchange 
rate. Figure 4.1 shows that changes in exports over time are very similar to the 
fluctuations occuring in industrial production. On the other hand, figure 4.2 shows 
that the fluctuations in the exchange rate in Turkey are directly reflected in the 
performance of exports w i t h no lags, thus just i fying the drop of the lagged vari-
ables in the model and table 4.1 above. However, i t is worth mentioning that the 
seemingly unrealisatic increase in real exports in both figures may be due to the 
substantial increase in the exchange rate as noted in figure 4.2. The more than 
twofold increase in the exchange rate and the decline in the infiation rate f rom 
about 70% to 66% between 1989 and 1991 may be the main cause for the boost of 
the T L value of real exports. 
4.6.2 Imports 
Table 4.3 presents the different determinants of Turkish real imports in the 
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Real Imports 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
In(RIMPO) A 2.88 0.93 
D 0.43 0.20 
In(RER) 0.70 0.12 
In(DRER) - 0.50 0.20 
ln(RIP_i) 0.39 0.19 
ln(DRIP_i) - 0.20 0.07 
ln(RCRED_i) 1.16 0.24 
ln(RCRED_i) - 1.06 0.25 
B? = 0.95, DW-statistic equal 2.70, Chi-square for: serial 
correlation (3.47), critical value is 3.84 at the 5% significance 
level. 
n = 19 observations from 1972 to 1990. 
A = intercept. 
D = intercept dummy (0 for 1970s and 1 for 1980s). 
RIMPO = real imports. 
RER = real exchange rate. 
DRER = real exchange rate multiplied by the dummy variable. 
RIP_1 = real industrial production lagged by one period. 
DRIP_i = one period lagged real industrial production 
multiplied by the dummy varible. 
RCRED_i = real credits from commercial banks lagged by one period. 
DRCRED_i = one period lagged real credits multiplied by the 
dummy variable. 
past two decades. The real exchange rate, real industrial production, and real 
credits turned out to have an important influence on the volume of real imports 
in the 1970s. However, this influence faded after structural adjustment measures 
in 1980. 
The Turkish exchange rate was overvalued throughout the decade of the 1970s, 
thus imports were underpriced (but tariff's were high on many products; especially 
final goods), while exports were overpriced. Under that policy, the econometric 
relationship in table 4.3 shows that any one percent change in real exchange rate 
would lead to a 0.7 percent change in real imports. Hence, a devaluation in the 
1970s will only lead to more products being imported under the above mentioned 
fixed exchange rate system. However, in the 1980s, after the Uberahsation of the 
exchange rate, with imports being more expensive due to continuous devaluations 
in the Turkish lira, real imports became much more elastic with respect to changes 
in the exchange rate. Any one percent increase/decrease in RER would lead to 
0.20 (0.70 - 0.50) percent increase/decrease in real imports. 
Another factor that worked side by side with the exchange rate in Turkey is real 
industrial production. In the 1970s, any increase in real industrial production by 
one percent would lead to an increase by 0.39 percent in real imports the following 
year. This relation could be explained on the basis that the industrial sector in 
Turkey rehed on cheap (low tariff and overvalued exchange rate) production inputs 
and capital goods; especially in periods of abundant foreign exchange reserves. 
However, after 1980, the Hberalisation of the exchange rate made imported 
products more expensive which allowed Turkish manufacturers to compete in the 
field of intermediate and capital goods production. Thus, an increase in real in-
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dustrial output by one percent would lead to an increase in real imports by 0.19 
(0.39 - 0.20) percent the following year compared with a 0.39 percent increase in 
the 1970s. Hence, Turkey managed to achieve an import-substitution target by 
liberalisation; although, ironically, it tried to avoid the latter for decades in order 
to attain the former. 
The third factor influencing real imports is real credits. In the 1970s, any 
one percent increase in real credits would lead to a 1.16 percent increase in real 
imports the following year. However, there was a dramatic change after 1980 with 
only 0.10 (1.16 - 1.06) percent change in real imports for every one percent change 
in real credits the previous year. 
The fact that Turkish industrialists could get cheap loans (low interest rates) 
from banks and the ability to buy cheap imports (low tariffs and overvalued ex-
change rate) during the 1970s meant that those industrialists could easily import 
their needed intermediate and capital goods at low costs; thus, bolstering the im-
port bill and leading to the quite big coefficient for real credits in relation to real 
imports. 
Meanwhile, the adjustment programme in 1980 which Hberalised the exchange 
rate and interest rates increased the prices of imports and the cost of borrow-
ing. The result was less imports through loans according to table 4.3 and the 
development of domestic import-substitution industries faciUtated by its increas-
ing competitiveness due to the higher prices of imports. 
Moreover, table 4.4 shows that a one period lagged real imports in the 1970s 
had a large effect on real industrial production the following year. A one percent 
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increase in real imports in the 1970s would lead to a 0.65 percent increase in 
real industrial production the following year. This could be attributed to the 
great dependence of Turkish industries on imported production inputs. However, 
the economic liberalisation after 1980 reduced the rehance of manufacturers on 
imported inputs by producing some of those inputs domestically, as mentioned 
above, or due to the increase in their prices after devaluation which resulted in 
more efllcient manufacturing. After 1980, a one percent increase in real imports 
would increase real industrial production by 0.25 (0.65 - 0.40) percent. 
As to the relation between RER and real industrial prodution, it is clear from 
table 4.4 that any one percent increase in the real exchange rate (due to devalu-
ation or inflation) would decrease real industrial output by 0.73 percent. This is 
true since any devaluation or rise in prices would increase the costs of industrial 
production. 
Meanwhile, with the Uberalisation of prices and an export-oriented poUcy, the 
real exchange rate had a small positive effect in the 1980s (although the change 
was dramatic in comparison with the 1970s). A one percent change in RER would 
lead to a 0.25 (0.98 - 0.73) percent change in real industrial production. This 
result could be explained on the basis that a devaluation would lead to more 
competitiveness at home and abroad; hence, stimulating production. 
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Real Industrial Production 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
In(RIP) A - 2.60 0.70 
D 0.28 0.17 
ln(RIMPO_i) 0.65 0.18 
ln(DRIMPO_i) - 0.40 0.13 
ln(RER_i) - 0.73 0.21 
ln(DRER_i) 0.98 0.23 
= 0.92, DW-statistic equal 1.73, Chi-square for: serial 
correlation (0.46), critical value is 3.84 at the 5% significance 
level. 
n = 18 observations from 1973 to 1990. 
A = intercept. 
D = intercept dummy (0 for 1970s and 1 for 1980s). 
RIP = real industrial production. 
RIMPO_i = real imports lagged by one period. 
DRIMPO_i = one period lagged real imports multiplied by 
the dummy variable. 
RER_i = real exchange rate lagged by one period. 
DRER_i = one period lagged real exchange rate multiplied by 
the dummy variable. 
From the above results, one can say that the exchange rate theories related to 
structural adjustment were partially true in Turkey. The real exchange rate had 
a weak econometric relation with exports contrary to the theory which suggests 
more competitiveness of domestically produced goods in the world market with 
every devaluation. The reason behind the increase in Turkish exports since 1980 
proved to be real industrial production. Moreover, in an attempt to test whether 
RER is indirectly related to exports through industrial production, the result was 
a weak relationship between the two variables. 
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On the other hand, real exchange rate proved to have a strong inverse econo-
metric relationship with real imports which supports the theory. In addition, the 
way real credits used to be spent in the 1970s seem to have changed. Those are 
being spent presumably on productive projects to increase industrial production 
rather than purchasing imports which was the case before 1980. Furthermore, real 
imports turned out to have a humble impact on industrial production in the last 
decade compared to a strong relation in the 1970s. 
Real industrial production which is the main reason for the increase in export 
growth in Turkey, according to this research, is beheved to be accompanied by 
other factors that helped achieve the dramatic export increase since 1980. These 
are mainly: the use of previously unutiUsed capacity, trade hberalisation, and the 
increase in export incentives; unfortunately, the impact of these factors could not 
be studied econometrically due to the lack of data. 
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Chapter V 
Turkish Manufacturing in the 198Gs: The Textile Industry 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of 1980, and with the implementation of its adjustment 
programme, Turkey adopted an export-oriented industrial drive aided mainly by its 
unutilised industrial capacity at the time and the competitiveness of its depreciated 
currency. 
Aiming to be "Japan of the Middle East", Turkey concentrated its efforts on 
developing its industrial capacity. The industry share in GNP rose from 25% to 
29% between 1980 and 1990 (Economist Intelhgence Unit, 1992-93). This phe-
nomenon was reflected in exports as exports of the manufacturing sector rose from 
35.1% in 1979 to about 77% in 1991 (OECD, 1980 and 1992). However, it is worth 
mentioning that the official Turkish definition of manufactured goods is quite loose 
and includes items such as processed agricultural goods. Therefore, one should be 
careful when interpreting figures related to production in the manufacturing sector 
in Turkey. 
Turkish exports are of particular importance in this study because of their 
spectacular success (from US$ 2,261 million in 1979 to US$ 13,598 million in 1991) 
since the launching of the adjustment programme in 1980 where they increased 
by about US$ 900 million annually. On the other hand, the whole "success" of 
the adjustment programme may hinge on the continuing flow of Turkish exports 
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to the world markets which will prevent the occurrence of any foreign exchange 
bottlenecks like the ones Turkey used to have in past decades. 
This chapter will deal with Turkish manufactured products in general and 
Turkish textile industry in particular. In addition, Turkey's export markets and 
the role of export incentives in promoting manufactured exports will be discussed. 
5.2 Turkish Industry 
Turkey's share in world exports increased substantially in the last decade; 
especially in chemicals, iron and steel, and machines and transport equipment. 
Table 5.1 shows the rise in the ratios of selected Turkish exports to world exports 
from 1979 to 1988. It is worth mentioning that not all products rose by the 
same amount and that agricultural exports showed the slowest growth during the 
period under study. Moreover, textiles exports almost tripled their share, chemicals 
jumped from a share of 0.02 per cent to 0.38 per cent, the iron and steel industry 
had a great rise from 0.04 per cent to 1.37 per cent, while the machines and 
transport equipment industries had the highest leap from 0.001 per cent to 0.07 
per cent. The rise in Turkey's share in world exports; especially in the exports 
of heavy industries, demonstrates that Turkey has the potential to become an 
advanced industrial country. 
Although some might argue that the rise in Turkish exports, mainly heavy 
industry, was due to the slackening demand at home; especially at the beginning 
of the 1980s, the figures in table 5.2 refute this argument. 
Table 5.2 shows the annual percentage change in Turkish industrial produc-
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tion in selected sectors. The figures show quite high annual increases with textiles 
having a relatively lower growth rate. The high increase in the output of heavy 
industry sectors (iron and steel, and machinery and transport equipment) and 
chemicals shows the determination of the Turkish government to develop the in-
dustrial sector with an orientation towards heavy industrialisation. This strategy 
becomes very clear from the growth figures of Turkey's gross fixed capital forma-
tion in machinery and equipment which reached 11.7% of GDP in 1987. This is 
considered to be among the highest in the OECD countries (OECD, 1992). 
On the other hand, Turkey achieved high growth rates in heavy industry both 
in terms of productivity and exports and although the country could not be clas-
sified as industrial by European standards, it achieved substantial progress in that 
field in comparison with the late 1970s. Turkish exports of chemicals, iron and 
steel, and machinery and transport equipment achieved a remarkable increase by 
1991 compared to the figures of 1979. Table 5.3 shows that textiles exports in-
creased from US$ 378 miUion in 1979 to US$ 4,328 million in 1991, iron and steel 
exports also increased from US$ 31 million in 1979 to US$ 1,452 miUion in 1991. 
Therefore, one can say that Turkey's export-oriented industrial drive is paying off 
with textiles as the spearhead of Turkish exports. In addition, other heavy industry 
products proved to be important in supporting the Turkish trade balance. 
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Table 5.3: Turkish Imports and Exports of Selected 
Products (US$ million) 
1979 1991 
Imports Exports Imports Exports 
Textiles 46 378 557 4,328 
Chemicals 524 23 2,150 464 
Iron and Steel 345 31 2,011 1,452 
Machinery 903 18 3,756 265 
Source: OECD, 1992. 
5.2.1 Ownership 
The state's economic policy in Turkey represented by etatism i.e., state inter-
vention in economic affairs, led to the establishment of the state economic enter-
prises (SEEs) which were sharing the production of almost every commodity with 
the private sector. However, after 1980, the role of the pubhc sector diminished 
after the privatisation of some SEEs and the expansion of the private sector as a 
response to the government's packages of incentives to investors and exporters. 
In 1978, the public sector share of industrial output was about 30% (table 5.4) 
employing about one third of the industrial labour force and dominating the to-
bacco industry (91.8%) with large shares in food (34.2%), beverages (56%), paper 
(50.2%), chemicals (43.7%), iron and steel (48.9%), and basic metals (41.6%) in-
dustries. However, with the new economic trend and due to the inefliciencies and 
over-manning, the public sector share diminished in 1989 to about 23% of total 
industrial output with, still, a major domination in the tobacco industry (75.9%) 
and a large share in the beverages (48.1%), paper (41.7%), chemicals (50.3%), iron 
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Table 5.4: Shares of the Public Sector in Industrial Output (TL biUion) 
1978 1989 
Public Private* %" Public Private** %" 
Food manufacturing 33.1 63.6 34.2 3,711 11,219 24.8 
Beverages 6.24 4.9 56 1,053 1,136 48.1 
Tobbaco 27 2.4 91.8 2,601 825.7 75.9 
Textiles 10.3 73.8 12.25 1,268 12,414 9.3 
Wearing apparel 0.1 4.73 2.07 66.4 4,811 1.4 
Pur & leather - 2.25 - - 419.5 -
Pootwear 0.7 1.3 35 87.3 196.8 30.7 
Wood & cork 2.5 5.75 30.3 325.8 599.1 35.2 
Purniture 0.08 1.25 6.01 - 291.1 -
Paper 5.97 5.92 50.2 980.2 1,368 41.7 
Printing & publishing 0.52 5.5 8.6 115.7 1,072 9.74 
Chemicals 12.3 15.8 43.7 3,582 3,535 50.3 
Petroleum refineries 0.62 - - 13,513 - -
Glass - 5.43 - 24.4 1,450 1.6 
Rubber - 10.2 - - 1,703 -
Iron & steel 23.9 24.9 48.9 4,133 8,064 33.9 
Basic metals 4.7 6.6 41.6 887 2,143 29.3 
Metal products 3.2 20.5 13.5 107 3,089 3.3 
Machinery 9.3 24 27.9 500 3,828 11.5 
Electrical machinery 0.47 25.7 1.8 51 4,638 1.1 
Transport Equipment 5.6 30.5 15.5 477.3 5,714 7.7 
Scientific Equip. - 0.5 - 33.3 216 13.3 
Other products 0.22 1.8 10.9 8.7 251.7 3.3 
Av. Share of pu. sect. 27.9 22.74 
(*) Establishments where 10 or more persons are engaged. 
(**) Establishments where 25 or more persons are engaged. 
(a) Percentage share of the public sector (own calculation). 
(b) for 1987. 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
and steel (33.9%), and wood and cork (35.2%) industries. 
The Turkish private manufacturing sector is characterised, with some excep-
tions, by small (less than 50 workers) and medium-scale establishments (50-200 
workers). By contrast, large extabUshments dominate the public sector in general, 
where those establishments are roughly ten times the size of an average private 
nianufacturing firm (World Bank, 1982). 
From the above mentioned, it is clear that the private manufacturing sector is 
more dominant and relatively efficient; therefore it is necessary to shed some light 
on two issues. First, the financial structure for the private manufacturing firms 
and second, the capacity utilisation in those firms. 
5.2.2 Financial Structure of Turkish Private Manufacturing Firms 
Turkey's comparative advantage in low labour cost and low value-added prod-
ucts compared to other European countries gives its industrial products an edge of 
competitiveness, whether in the domestic market or abroad. This fact is reflected 
in the higher profits earned by private firms in Turkey compared to those in other 
European countries (table 5.5). 
Moreover, total financial assets of Turkish firms compared to their fixed assets 
have been rising leaving the ratios for Portugal and Spain at lower levels. This 
suggests that the financial position of Turkish firms is better than the position of 
their Spanish or Portugese counterparts. 
On the other hand, the indebtedness of Turkish firms has been dechning since 
1982, and i t reached almost the levels of indebtedness of German and Italian firms. 
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Table 5.5: International Comparisons of Some Financial Indicators 
for Private Manufacturing Firms (% of total sales) 
Turkey 1987 
1986 1987 1988 Portugal Spain Italy Germany 
Income Statement 
Value-added 14.7 17.1 17.4 21.9 26.9 24.5 27.9 
Labour costs 6.4 5.9 6.3 14.3 20.3 18.0 21.9 
Operating profits 8.3 11.2 11.1 7.6 6.7 6.5 6.0 
Financial revenues^  2.6 2.6 3.3 n.a. 1.7 1.3 2.0 
Financial costs^  2.5 1.8 3.4 5.2 4.2 3.4 2.8 
Corporate taxes 2.9 3.8 3.5 1.0 1.5 2.1 1.6 
Net profits 5.7 8.5 8.1 3.6 2.9 2.7 2.8 
Exports 17.4 16.5 20.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Retention ratio^ 56.0 56.3 63.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Assets 
Total fixed assets 27.1 22.1 19.6 33.6 29.6 16.9 14.1 
Total financial assets 5.5 4.8 4.5 4.9 5.9 7.1 9.2 
Financial / fixed assets 20.1 21.6 22.9 14.5 19.8 42.0 65.6 
Liabilities 
Total financial debt 37.8 29.1 25.9 34.6 27.3 21.0 23.1 
ST / LT debt* 128.9 111.2 120.4 84.8 97.7 109.7 164.4 
Bonds / LT debt 9.4 15.9 6.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(1) Dividends received from participations plus other revenues. 
(2) Other expenses. 
(3) Dividends to be distributed as per cent of profits. 
(*) Short-term / Long-term debt. 
Source: OECD, 1990/1991. 
However, the Turkish firms' borrowings are characterised by a relatively higher 
share of short-term debts compared to other European firms (table 5.5) , with the 
exception of Germany. 
Finally, given the low share of bonds in long-term debts it seems that Turkish 
firms are having difficulties in raising funds by issuing bonds. This may be due to 
the inefficiency of the Turkish capital market and the higher yields on other kinds 
of investments, whether government securities or commercial banks' interest rates. 
Summarising, despite the marked improvements in the financial position and 
profitabiHty of Turkish firms, these firms remain vulnerable to changes in the costs 
of borrowing and labour which may affect their competitiveness. 
5.2.3 Capacity Utilisation in the Private Manufacturing Sector 
In 1980, Turkish manufacturing suffered from shortages of imported inputs 
caused by the scarcity of foreign exchange, depressed domestic demand, labour 
disputes (affecting especially textiles, glass, and metal industries), power shortages, 
and the scarcity of funds. These factors led to under-utilisation of the productive 
capacity where only 40.5% of that capacity was used (World bank, 1982). 
However, towards the end of the 1980s and with the liberalisation measures 
taking effect, most of the above mentioned causes for the under-utiUsation of the 
productive capacity ceased to exist, leading to the exploitation of more than 80% 
of that capacity in some sectors. 
The average capacity utilisation in the first two quarters of 1992 was 74.9% 
(table 5.6) which is relatively high. However, this utilisation reached 88%, 80.4%, 
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and 79.7% in the soil products, basic metals, and textile (including clothing and 
leather) industries respectively. On the other hand, some industries such as the 
machinery and transport equipment stiU has a relatively low utUisation of their 
productive capacity, suggesting that it is still inefficient compared to other sectors. 
The lower capacity utilisation in 1991 in comparison with 1988 may be due to the 
Gulf crisis and its negative impact on economic activity; especially at the beginning 
of the year. 
Table 5.6 : Capacity Utilisation in the Private Sector (%) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992* 
Food, beverages, tobacco 73.7 74.1 73.9 - - 72.4 67.3 
Textiles, clothing, leather 78.3 81.9 82.1 - - 76.1 79.7 
Forestry products 62.8 89.7 72.2 - - 69 77.5 
Paper, printing 77.4 83.4 80.6 - - 77.3 73.2 
Chemicals, petroleum products, rubber 70.6 75.7 75.2 - - 73.2 73.6 
Soil products 80.2 82.9 82.5 - - 81.8 88 
Basic metals 72.7 71.4 73.2 - - 77.6 80.4 
Machinery & Transp. equip. 69.4 71.2 66.6 - - 67 73.4 
Others 65.2 68.9 61.8 - - 55 62.8 
Total 72.7 75.2 74.3 - - 73.3 74.9 
Source: Istanbul Chamber of Industry and Yapi Kredi Economic 
Review (January 1992). 
(*) Average of first two quarters. 
Furthermore, the State Institute of Statistics completed a survey on capacity 
utilisation in the manufacturing sector in Turkey based on data obtained from 
2,500 major industrial estabUshments. According to the survey, the ratios for 
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reasons given by industries for operating below full capacity in the last quarter 
of 1991 were (Briefing, 1991): inadequate domestic demand (55.5%), inadequate 
external demand (16.3%), problems related to labour (3.8%), financial difficulties 
(4.6%), insufficient domestic raw material (3.8%), and insufficient imported raw 
material (1.3%). 
5.2.4 Wages in the Manufacturing Sector 
There is no doubt that in the last two years there has been a tremendous change 
in wages, Turkey's comparative advantage in manufacturing. Between 1988 and 
1991, wages in the private sector jumped from TL 16,423 per day to TL 170,593 
(table 5.7), in the public sector, wages rose from TL 9,226 per day in 1988 to TL 
113,844 in 1991. On the whole, this led to a 50.6% rise in real wages in the private 
sector and 56.6% rise in the public sector in 1991 in comparison with 1990. 
However, the huge rise in wages in comparison with 1979, when the average 
daily wage was about TL 282 per day, may aflfect Turkey's comparative advantage 
in the long-run and hence the competitiveness of its exports. On the other hand, it 
should be mentioned that official wage statistics may be an inappropriate indicator 
for the rise in total labour incomes as they refer to wage settlements of unionised 
workers which cover only about two-fifths of employment (OECD, 1992). 
Estimates of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry indicate that the share of labour 
costs in the net value-added of the largest 500 firms in Turkey decreased from about 
one half at the beginning of the 1980s to one third in 1988; hence, labour costs 
became less important than interest payments. But with the wage increases in 
the last two years, labour costs have accounted for about 60% of the firms' net 
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value-added in 1990, substantially more than interest payments (OECD, 1992). 
Therefore, without an exchange rate devaluation or a decHne in prices, Turkey 
may lose its competitiveness in the world market leading to detrimental effects at 
home. This may bring the "success" of the 1980 adjustment programme to a halt. 
5.2.5 Problems Facing Turkish Industry 
Turkish industry suffers from the uneconomic small size of estabUshments; 
especially in the textiles sector (table 5.8). This problem goes back in origin 
to the import-substitution policy implemented before 1980 which allowed such 
establishments to exist in a protected domestic market. 
Another problem is the lack of expenditure on research and development (R 
& D) in most firms. The share of gross domestic expenditure on R & D in GNP 
decHned from 0.76 in 1983 to 0.54 in 1987 ranking Turkey below all other OECD 
countries for whom data are available. However, in October 1989, Turkey through 
its newly created High Council of Science and Technology decided to establish a 
Science and Technology Fund whose resources will be used to promote industrial 
R & D (OECD, 1990/1991). 
Moreover, other problems still face Turkish manufacturing although attempts 
are being made to solve them. These problems include inadequate faciUties for 
labour training, deficient technical and management methods, out-of-date ma-
chinery, marketing problems, and the level of technology. However, not all these 
problems exist in the same sector or establishment. Their weight and existance 
varies from one sector to another and from one estabUshment to another. 
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5.3 The Textile Industry 
From the above tables (tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) and comments, there is no 
doubt that the textiles industry is the engine of growth of Turkish exports, although 
other industries are growing rapidly. In 1991, the textiles share in total exports 
rose to 31.8% compared to 19.1% in 1979. However, in value terms, textiles and 
clothing exports rose more than tenfold from US$ 377.6 million in 1979 to US$ 
4,328 million in 1991. Thus, it is important to shed some light on this sector in 
particular due to its weight in the Turkish economy and the potential it has for 
the development of the country. 
Table 5.8 showed that the textile sector was by far the largest manufacturing 
sector in terms of value-added and the number of people employed and it was con-
sidered the second largest sector, after food manufacturing, in terms of output, and 
the third with respect to the number of establishments involved. As mentioned 
earlier, the textiles sector has quite a large number of small establishments (em-
ploying between 1 and 9 persons) involved in production. On the other hand, the 
textile sector grew by about 50% in terms of the number of establishments since the 
beginning of the adjustment programme. In 1978, the total number of medium and 
large estabUshments in the textile sector was 942 establishment employing 194,244 
persons; however, by 1988 the number of establishments rose to 1,369 employing 
183,952 persons. Thus, despite almost a 50% rise in the number of productive 
units involved in textiles, the number of people employed in those units dechned 
by about 10,000 person suggesting that before 1980, the firms were over-manned, 
inefficient, and extremely labour intensive. However, the state of the textile sector 
now, although better than it was in the 1970s, is still below its potential level. 
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The Financial Times reported from Turkey on the 16th of December, 1987 and 
November 16, 1992 that: much of the machinery used in the textile industry is 
out-of-date. More than 90% of spinning mills and 95% of weaving plants are over 
ten years old, compared to figures of 40% and 50% for West Germany. Therefore 
there is a need for investment on a large scale (about US$ 6 biUion) over the next 
five years. Recently, imports of capital goods increased by 34% which a sign of an 
increase in investment in the manufacturing sector including textiles. 
Moreover, the Turkish textile plants have lower productivity per worker, com-
pared to their European counterparts, presumably because they are less capital-
intensive. On the other hand, Turkish manufacturers use about 80% of their 
productive capacity on average (see table 5.6) which is considered quite high. In 
addition, the Turkish industry has low labour costs and a realistic value of the the 
lira which outweigh the deficiencies in the sector thus rendering its products more 
competitive abroad. 
In what follows, an analysis of the textile industry will be carried out according 
to its subsectors concentrating mainly on the cotton and wool industries. 
5.3.1 Textiles Subsectors in Turkey 
The Turkish textile industry is divided into four main sectors: yarn, fabrics, 
ready-made clothes, and carpets. Each one of these sectors is divided into subsec-
tors depending either on the material used in manufacturing (e.g., cotton, wool, 
...etc.) or the method of manufacturing (e.g., spinning, weaving, ...etc.). Table 5.9 
shows the different production figures for every sector (except ready-made clothes, 
due to the unavailability of the data). It is clear that cotton is the spearhead 
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of Turkish yarn and fabric production while synthetic fibre production is gaining 
momentum; especially in fabrics. 
Table 5.9: Yarns, Fabrics, and Carpets Production in 
Turkey 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Yarn ('000 tons) 
Cotton 319.3 356.2 335 320 276.5 
Wool 47.5 49.5 56.6 52.9 63.7 
Man-made (synthetic) - 73 68 70 -
Fabrics (miUion meters) 
Cotton 486 567.9 580 550.2 578.4 
Wool 22.1 22.6 21.7 21.2 24.3 
Man-made (synthetics) - 114 167 135 -
Carpets ('000 m^) 12,968 6,421 7,982 9,182 11,010 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
In what follows an analysis of the different textile subsectors will be carried out 
concentrating mainly on the deficiencies of those subsectors. However, this anaJ-
ysis should not mislead the reader into understanding that the textile industry 
in Turkey is uncompetitive. On the contrary, the deficiencies mentioned, if over-
come, would lead to a full exploitation of Turkey's potential in the textiles sector. 
Meanwhile, the industry (mainly large firms) remains extremely competitive to the 
extent where the EC had to impose quotas on Turkish products in order to protect 
European textile companies. The factors leading to Turkish competitiveness are 
considered to be low labour costs, low input costs (mainly cotton and wool), the 
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depreciating lira, and available unutiUsed industrial capacity especially in the early 
1980s. 
5.3.1.1 Cotton Spinning 
Cotton spinning is considered the backbone of the textile sector and by far 
the most developed subsector in the industry. Most of the productive capacity in 
this segment was developed through previous five-years plans, mainly in the 1970s. 
However, the success of this sector and its high profitability after 1980 initiated 
more investment, both public and private. 
As to international competitiveness, the majority of Turkish spinning plants 
have satisfactory capacity utilisation but the very large spinning plants still need to 
produce on an economies of scale basis. This combined with their slower spinning 
speeds (compared to their European counterparts) and the high finance costs, 
increases the amount of lost production. 
The productivity performance of some cotton spinners is below international 
standards, and labour productivity (in man-hours per ton) is lower than the Eu-
ropean standards by about a factor of two to three. However, this is not the 
case in all plants, as productivity values differ from one plant to another with the 
best producers achieving European productivity levels. Machine productivity is 
also lower in Turkey due to lower speeds and less machine hours per year (6,750 
hour/year). But despite these deficiencies which hinder Turkey from fully exploit-
ing its resources, the Turkish spinning costs remain lower than those in Europe 
although Turkey has high energy costs, low labour productivity, and high finance 
costs. This competitiveness is mainly due to low labour costs and low domestic 
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cotton prices. 
There are two technologies in cotton spinning: the traditional ring and the 
newer open-end (rotor). Open-end yarn is cheaper, more uniform, and can use 
lower quality raw materials while ring spun yarn has higher tensile strength and 
uses less energy. European countries adopted the former technology in varying 
degrees, while Turkey is still at a low stage with respect to this technology. 
Turkey's major markets for cotton yarn could be divided into three segments: 
the first segment constitutes about 15% of the customers requiring combed yarn, 
the second segment comprises about 45% of the market who are ready to pay 
a premium of 10 to 20% for ring-spun carded yarn over open-end, and finally 
customers who are indifferent to the type of yarn and unwilling to pay a premium 
for ring-spun yarn. The latter constitute about 40% of the market. However, 
Turkey has been traditionally strong in producing ring spun yarn, but the new 
weaving technologies in Europe has been capable of reducing the dependence on 
the ring spun yarn characteristics; hence, making it possible to use the cheaper 
European open-end yarn. Therefore, unless Turkey adopts the new technology in 
spinning to keep its market share in yarn and downstream segments such as cotton 
fabric, fabric processing, and garments, there will be a decHne in the demand for 
its exports in Europe, its main market for textile products. 
In summary, in order to exploit Turkey's resources and improve its interna-
tional competitiveness in cotton spinning further Turkey needs to take the follow-
ing measures in order of priority: 
• Raising productivity (labour and machine). 
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• Increasing the number of hours per year machinery is used. 
• Quality improvement and standardisation. 
No new capacity investment is needed, but replacements for using open-end 
technology instead of ring technology is needed. 
5.3.1.2 Cotton Weaving 
This subsector has a lower rate of investment compared to the amount of funds 
invested in cotton spinning. Hence, the development in this sector in terms of the 
increase in the number of looms has been Hmited. About 60% of all public sector 
looms in Turkey are over 25 years old, while in the more modernised private sector 
this ratio is 20%, with about 60% of looms over 10 years old. Moreover, cotton 
weaving is characterised by the large number of small firms (16-20% of fabric 
production) and the relatively low penetration of the more efficient shuttleless 
looms. 
The weaving technology has made dramatic improvements with the shuttleless 
looms having become predominant over older shuttle looms. Due to the lower 
noise and vibration they make, less labour is needed for the same output, there is 
better quality (about one fourth of the number of faults per m^ compared to the old 
technology), lower costs, and more productivity (in weft km per hour). Turkey has 
been adopting the new technology, with shuttleless looms accounting for one third 
of total fabric production. However, about 45% of total fabrics produced is too 
narrow to be exported and hence consumed in the domestic market. Therefore, 
there is a need to modernise this sector so that Turkey can exploit its export 
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markets by replacing the old narrow shuttle looms with wider shuttleless ones. 
The total number of looms in the cotton weaving sector is 48,513 looms with the 
private sector having 13,000 of them including 4,030 shuttleless. Sumerbank has 
8,143 looms with only 70 shuttleless while small firms have the remaining 27,370 
looms of which only 50 are shuttleless. 
The small weavers are concentrated in the DenizU, Usak, Gaziantep, and Bursa 
regions where they produce a wide range of fabrics with some concentration in 
towels, bedsheets, and Buldan cheesecloth. They use about 50% of all cotton yarn 
domestically traded and produce mainly for the domestic market because their 
products are not exportable due to quality and width reasons. 
A very large portion of cotton weavers are vertically integrated: 87% backwards 
into spinning and 74% forward into fabric processing. Both of these ratios are very 
high compared to more developed countries with better intermediate markets. 
On the whole, the impressively high capacity utilisation (87%) of Turkish cot-
ton weavers reflects their efficiency and together with their vertical integration 
means that they are cost competitive in European markets due to low labour 
costs. Moreover, the quality of the products of mainly small Turkish firms (which 
compete in the domestic market) in this subsector could be improved to increase 
the competitive abilities of domestic garment makers. Finally, improvements re-
quire more investment in shuttleless looms and a reduction in the protection for 
domestic fabric producers. 
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5.3.1.3 Fabric Processing 
The efficiency and competitiveness of this sector are very important because of 
its effects on the whole textile sector, since it determines the ultimate value-added 
gained by Turkey (processing increases fabric value-added by about 20% in wool 
and at least 80% in cotton). In addition to this, fabric processing affects the export 
competitiveness of knitted and woven garments as well as the finished fabric itself. 
The quality of fabric processing in Turkey has been regarded as unsatisfactory 
by some exports agents and overseas importers. This inadequate quality of fabric 
processing negatively aflFected the competitiveness of Turkish garment makers in 
the European markets leading them to rely on imported fabric for a large portion 
of their activity. The major deficiencies in the quality result from: 
• Raw material problems (i.e., low quality chemicals, incorrect mixing, ...etc.). 
• Process control (pressure, temperature, speed, pH, ...etc.) 
• Incorrect machine operation and maintenance (e.g., inadequate cleaning, me-
chanical friction, ...etc.). 
• Poor human skills and inadequate personnel for process management. 
As to cost competitiveness, the most important cost component in Turkish 
fabric processing is energy, followed by input costs such as dyestuff and chemicals. 
Fabric processing, in general, is energy intensive; in addition to that, Turkish fabric 
processors are quite wasteful in their energy usage; hence, entailing extra costs. 
Reasons for energy waste include: non-energy efficient technologies used and the 
lack of incentives offered for energy saving investments. 
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Dyestuff and chemicals costs are much higher (by 30-40%) in Turkey compared 
to Europe. In addition to that, the quality produced is not competitive. The main 
reasons for cost differences are import duties on dyestuffs, transportation costs, 
and international pricing differentials imposed by dyestuff makers. 
There is adequate capacity to process the amount of cotton and wool fabrics 
produced domestically. In addition, modern technology penetration is evident; 
especially in the private sector fabric processing which has about two thirds of its 
capacity less than ten years old. On the whole, about one third of the existing 
processing capacity in Turkey (mainly in the pubUc sector) is below the minimum 
competitive level needed to export. 
On the whole, the inefficiencies in this sector result in higher costs by about 20-
30% above European standards. These inefficiencies should be measured against 
low labour costs and the continuing depreciation in the Ura. Certain measures 
should be taken to improve the international competitiveness of this subsector, 
these measures include: removal of tariffs on the industry's inputs, measures to save 
energy, improving capacity utilisation, and replacing obsolete capacity estimated 
to be about 30% of the total. 
5.3.1.4 Synthetic Fibres 
The synthetic fibre subsector plays an important role in determining the com-
petitiveness of the textile sector, because it affects relative prices through the 
different mix of fibre used. Turkish synthetic fibre production capacity increased 
rapidly; especially in polyester and acryUc. In 1985, installed capacity was 146,100 
tons in polyester, 25,400 tons in nylon, and 100,000 tons in acrylic. Turkey has now 
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become a significant world producer of acrylic and to a lesser extent, polyester. 
The utilisation of this capacity has been above international averages. However, 
the prices of Turkish synthetic fibres are higher than those in Europe; hence, Turk-
ish manufacturers still use a higher share of cotton in their fibre mix compared to 
European manufacturers. The reason for the higher prices in Turkey Hes in the 
import duties and fund contributions imposed on the raw materials of synthetic 
fibres. If these restrictions are Ufted, prices will fall paving the way for downstream 
users to have access to good quality and competitively priced synthetic fibre inputs; 
hence, increasing their export competitiveness. 
5.3.1.5 Wool Spinning 
Unlike cotton spinning, the wool sector in Turkey is largely based on meet-
ing domestic demand requirements. Turkey is one of the largest wool producing 
countries, but domestic wool production is suitable only for use in coarse fabrics, 
blankets, and carpets. Almost all merino wool used in Turkey is imported; there-
fore, due to its high cost, the yarns produced contain a very high proportion of 
synthetic fibres unlike cotton yarns. 
Much of the capacity in this sector has grown in the last twenty years; especially 
in the 1970s. There are approximately 531,000 spindles in the woolen sector, 
389,000 spindles worsted, 44,000 semi-worsted, and 98,000 woollen. Of these, some 
47% of the spindles are over 20 years old, with the highest proportion of old spindles 
found in the woollen sector and the highest proportion of new spindles (under 20 
years old) being in the semi-worsted sector. The production capacity of these 
spindles is 39,000 tons worsted, 50,000 tons semi-worsted, and 60,000 tons woollen 
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yarn. Thus, comparing the production figures with these capacities indicates that 
the capacity utilisation is low in worsted and semi-worsted spinning (72% and 66% 
respectively) and high (89%) in woollen spinning. 
The major component of cost in wool yarn production is raw materials, ac-
counting for up to 70% of total production cost. However, this cost may be reduced 
if the import duties and fund contributions were Ufted or reduced. Moreover, these 
restrictions have had distorting effects on the sector, particularly on worsted spin-
ning. 
Spinning machinery in the large private sector firms is relatively recent with 
75% of worsted and 86% of semi-worsted spindles less than 12 years old, and 78% 
of woollen spindles under 12 years old. However, in the pubhc sector (Sumerbank) 
and small private firms the spindles are older. 
5,3.1.6 Wool Weaving 
The wool weaving subsector in Turkey is almost exclusively oriented towards 
the domestic market. As in cotton weaving, Turkey has a large number of small 
wool weaving firms producing the coarser woollen fabrics and blankets with major 
differences in loom technology and average age between large and small firms. 
The sector's capacity has not increased substantially with the investment of 
private firms in shuttleless looms. The old looms replaced have been sold to the 
small producers. In 1984, Turkey produced 18,000 tons of worsted and fine woollen 
cloth, 5,000 tons of medium coarse woollen cloth, and 7,000 tons of blankets. This 
represented capacity utiUsation levels of 82% in worsted and fine woollen weaving 
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and 40% in medium-coarse woollen cloth and blanket weaving - an overall average 
of 58%. Most of the unutilised capacity is concentrated in the smaller firms in the 
sector. 
Small firms represent nearly 60% of Turkey's wool weaving capacity, though a 
smaller proportion of output. Poor machinery produces low quality uncompetitive 
fabric sustainable only because there is a significant domestic demand for cheap 
low quality products due to low real income levels. 
Wool weavers in the private sector invested heavily in shuttleless technology 
where 60% of the looms are rapier or projectile technology. Machinery in this sector 
is relatively recent with 86% of looms 15 years or less old. The productivity levels 
are comparable with those in Europe; however the plants are sUghtly over-manned 
compared to their European counterparts. 
On the whole, there is a need to reduce the role of the small companies to 
allow other firms, producing good quahties, to have easier access to fabric inputs. 
This may improve the quality of final products ; hence, meeting the demand in the 
domestic market and abroad. 
5.3.1.7 Machine Carpets 
Much of Turkey's machine carpet capacity was added in the 1970s when the 
government promoted machine carpet production for domestic sales with the aim 
of increasing the availability of hand knotted rugs for export. The capacity of this 
sector is about 53 million square metres per year; however, the capacity utilisation 
is low at about 45%, despite the annual rise in the demand for machine carpets by 
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more than 10%. Export dependence of this sector is low since Turkish producers 
are uncompetitive with Belgian and Far Eastern producers who dominate Turkey's 
potential export markets. 
5.3.1.8 Hand knotted Carpets 
Turkey has the largest hand knotted carpet industry in the world with 240,000 
looms, of which 80% are active and about 500,000 knotters of carpets. A significant 
portion of production is consumed domestically, and in export terms Turkey falls 
behind India, Pakistan, Morocco, and China. 
Turkey produces wool, floss, and silk rugs, with the latter two accounting for 
3% of capacity. The cost structure of rug production consists of raw material and 
labour costs plus some finance costs as rugs take a considerable time to produce. 
Looms are cheap and easily made. The Turkish carpet industry is extremely flexible 
to meet any rise in demand, but Turkish labour costs do not allow producers to 
compete with Indian and Pakistani carpet knotters on a price basis. Therefore, 
increasing the export volume depends either on creating or growing export markets 
or improving the quality and design of Turkish carpets. 
The fragmentation of this sector leads to little control over design, colour, 
or quality and without this control many rugs are produced which do not meet 
the export market specifications. Hence, there is a need to concentrate the rugs 
production in ateliers by providing the necessary incentives. 
5.3.1.9 Knitting 
The Turkish knitting sector consists of many small firms (about 65% of total 
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capacity) and few large firms. The large firms produce mainly T-shirts and under-
wear for both the domestic and export markets while small firms produce sweaters, 
lingerie, and limited quantities of dress fabric mainly for the domestic market. 
The total capacity of this sector is about 160,000 tons; however, only 80,000-
100,000 tons of that capacity is utilised because first, many machines are old, and 
second, many machines are sometimes idle because of fashion shifts away from their 
products (e.g., idle double jersey machines when single jersey knitted fabric is in 
fashion). Hence, measuring against those two factors, one can say that capacity 
utilisation in this sector stands at about 65-70%. 
At present, the export dependence of this sector is low, around 15% of to-
tal output despite the fact that the potential is much more than that. Many of 
the Turkish knitters are forward integrated into garment manufacture while other 
knitters are backward integrated into yarn. As to the cost structure, raw materials 
(primarily yarn) and finance costs form the major portion while labour is a minor 
element. 
Moreover, Turkey faces problems with respect to cost competitiveness in a 
number of knitted goods, this is due to: 
• higher domestic synthetic fibre costs. 
• Low capacity utiUsation. 
• Finishing costs and quality. 
• Infrastructure problems (design capabihty, branding, fashion flexibility, ... etc.) 
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Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that large firms do not have these problems. 
On the whole, this sector has a potential for exports with a lesser competitiveness 
from other countries compared to cotton products. However, the export drive 
depends on the response of the importing countries, mainly the EC, in the long-
run in terms of quota restrictions or the possibility of Ufting them by 1996 as part 
of the proposed Customs Union with the European Community. The eUmination of 
the quotas imposed by the EC would ultimately give a tremendous boost to Turkish 
textile exports to the Community hence improving its trade deficit and providing 
the country with the hard currency necessary for its economic development. 
5.3.1.10 Woven Ready Made GEurments 
This sector is one of the most important sectors in the Turkish textUe industry 
in terms of employment (100,000 persons in mid 1980s, a significant proportion 
of total textile employment) and foreign exchange receipts from exports (8.5% of 
total export revenues in 1989, see table 5.12). Nevertheless, the sector needs some 
modernisation and large scale production, which is limited, due to its extremely 
fragmented nature. However, three factors prevented the development of larger 
scale enterprises in Turkey, these are: small domestic order sizes (around 1,000 
pieces) due to the lack of large retail networks, lack of stabihty in the export 
markets, and lack of expertise in running larger garment operations. 
As a measure of how dominant small workshops are in Turkey, it can be noted 
that the percentage of all garment companies with over ten workers is 45% in 
Hong Kong and 95% in Germany while it is only 2% in Turkey. This domination 
by small workshops leads to lack of economies of scale and excessive intra-Turkish 
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competition in export markets. 
Although this subsector is competitive enough in the European markets, some 
problems facing the industry must be solved to fully exploit the potential of this 
subsector and expand the ready made garments export markets. These problems 
include: 
• Improving price realisation which is a reflection of the tangible and intangible 
benefits provided to the buyer such as, fabric quality, design content, dehvery 
speed, delivery rehabihty, adherence to specifications, ...etc. This may increase 
the average export value on the same volume by a substantial amount. 
• Improvements in fabric quaUty and accessories (e.g., labels, zips, buttons, 
...etc.). 
• Lack of export marketing skills; especially with respect to trade fairs. 
• Lack of design skills. 
Overall, the industry has a competitive strength due to low labour costs and 
proximity to major markets. However, it would be helpful if the distortions rep-
resented by the above mentioned problems were dealt with in order that Turkey 
fully exploits its potential. 
5.3.2 Turkish Textile Export Markets 
The major consuming regions of Turkish textile products are: the European 
Community, the United States, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe (table 5.10). 
Turkey has a strong market presence in several EC textile importing countries, 
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mainly Germany. Turkey's textile exports are mainly pure cotton products with 
much smaller export volumes of synthetics, synthetic blends, and wool. However, 
the entry of Spain and Portugal (major manufacturers of cotton products) to the 
European Community creates several problems for Turkish cotton exporters in the 
region. Hence, Turkey has to increase its production and marketing of synthetic 
products to the extent that the constraints of the EC quota pohcy permit (see 
table 5.11) at least until the end of 1995 when Turkey establishes the proposed 
Customs Union with the EC. In addition, Turkey should seek opportunities to 
increase price realisation even after the establishment of the Customs Union with 
the EC because that will add to the competitiveness of its products. 
The US market is dominated by Chinese and south east Asian products. Their 
low labour costs and high specialisation present strong competition for Turkish 
textiles; especially in the standardised product segments. In addition, Turkey lacks 
proximity to the US market and also suffers from import tariff's and quotas against 
its products. This in addition to the increasing penetration of cheap Asian textiles 
to the Turkish market is putting the Turkish textile producers at a disdvantage 
which obliged Turkey to impose a 20% antidumping tax on cotton yarn from 
Pakistan in October 1991 to protect its own industries (Financial Times, November 
18, 1992). 
Turning to the Middle East, this market is relatively small compared to the 
EC; hence, Turkish exporters can not rely on it as a permenant importer of their 
goods; especially as this market is relatively volatile as a result of pohtical influ-
ences, payment difficulties, and the possibility of rapid import-substitution by the 
Middle Eastern countries themselves. Moreover, despite the fact that Turkey can 
202 
Table 5.10: Turkish Exports by Countries (US$ milhon) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
O E C D countries 4,292 6,445 6,707 7,175 8,810 8,856 
EEC countries 3,263 4,868 5,098 5,408 6,893 7,042 
of which 
Germany 1,444 2,184 2,149 2,175 3,064 3,413 
France 299 500 499 595 737 688 
United Kingdom 334 541 576 616 745 676 
Italy 580 851 955 978 1,106 972 
Other O E C D countries 1,029 1,577 1,609 1,767 1,917 1,814 
of which 
Japan 99 156 209 233 239 226 
Switzerland 162 356 265 173 293 246 
United States 549 714 761 971 968 913 
Eastern Europe 310 334 609 1,030 987 1,262 
Middle East & N. Africa 2,494 2,918 3,239 2,608 2,498 2,729 
of which 
Iran 564 440 546 561 496 487 
Iraq 553 945 986 445 214 122 
Kuwait 121 247 199 167 92 8 
Libya 136 141 218 227 220 237 
Saudi Arabia 358 408 359 364 338 475 
Other Countries 247 323 821 550 1,665 750 
Total 7,456 10,190 11,662 11,625 12,960 13,598 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
exploit the advantages of its proximity to the Middle East and the absence of quota 
restraints, it faces tough cost competition from Asian suppUers. 
Table 5.11: EC Quotas 
on Turkish Yarns (tons) 
1984 1985 
Germany 25,945 26,100 
France 3,010 3,090 
Italy 30,488 30,636 
Benelux 13,590 13,680 
U.K. 3,820 3,940 
Ireland 155 156 
Denmark 53 56 
Greece 39 42 
Source: Financial Times, 
from EC Commission, 
1984. 
Eastern Europe is an even smaller market than the Middle East although Turk-
ish penetration of the Eastern European market has been increasing dramatically. 
In terms of sales value however the market is relatively small. It is also volatile and 
usually trades on a non-monetary (barter) basis, which is less welcome than hard 
currency. However, with the new political developments in that region and the 
recently signed Declaration of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, it is beheved 
that there is a good export potential for Turkey in these markets. 
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Table 5.12: Exports of Ready-Made Clothing (US$ '000) 
1987 1988 1989 
Knitwear 
Underwear 287,604 407,633 482,296 
Outwear 483,207 545,775 709,850 
Gloves,socks,stockings 23,621 36,406 45,038 
Subtotal 794,432 989,814 1,237,184 
Woven Clothing 
Outwear for men & boys 190,741 238,982 256,506 
Outwear for women & girls 456,240 499,184 512,438 
Underwear for men &: boys 102,232 118,574 133,237 
Underwear for women &: girls 13,986 9,299 67,975 
Subtotal 763,199 866,039 970,156 
Other 4,541 6,976 17,407 
Total 1,562,172 1,862,829 2,224,747 
Source: Export Promotion Center. 
Table 5.12 shows that ready made clothes have the major share in the export 
of textiles. In 1989, the total value of ready made clothes exported reached US$ 
2,225 million i.e., about 20% of total foreign exchange receipts from exports which 
reached US$ 11,625 miUion. Within this category of exports, knitwear exports 
increased by more than 50% between 1987 and 1989, and as a result accounted 
for the largest proportion with US$ 1,237 milHon. In 1990, exports of ready made 
clothing reached US$ 2,900 million while in 1991 the share of clothes in total 
Turkish exports rose to 23.5% (about 70% of total textiles exports) with an increase 
in value to US$ 3,200 million. Moreover, until July 1992, exports of ready made 
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clothing reached US$ 2,200 miUion (Financial Times, November 18, 1992). No 
data is available for the breakdown of exports in this category after 1989. The 
next most important category was woven clothing with exports worth US$ 970 
million in 1989. Yarns and fabrics (table 5.13) took the third and fourth places 
respectively. 
Table 5.13: Turkish Yarns & Fabrics Exports 
(quantity: 1,000 tons, value: US$ miUion) 
1988 1989 
Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Yarns 
Cotton 107 354 90 265 
Wool 1 4 1 4 
Man-Made 75 231 69 209 
Subtotal 183 589 160 478 
Fabrics 
Cotton 28 209 34 254 
Wool - 5 1.83 14 
Man-Made 25 169 15 127 
Subtotal 53 383 50.83 395 
Source: Export Promotion Center. 
However, it is difficult to determine the status of Turkish carpets exports as 
there are no figures for them. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that exports of 
wool yarns have been the same in 1988 and 1989 while wool fabric exports rose from 
US$ 5 million in 1988 to US$ 14 million in 1989; although domestic production was 
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almost the same during those two years. This shows that wool fabrics are either 
becoming increasingly competitive in world markets or that there is a dechne in 
demand at home. 
5.4 Export Incentives 
As textiles represent the spearhead of Turkish exports, it is necessary to discuss 
the competitiveness of these exports from both the quality and cost sides. These 
two factors are, of course, inherent in the industry itself (as demonstrated in the 
previous section) but can be influenced by external policies implemented by the 
government (including export incentives). In view of the significance of textiles in 
relation to total exports, it is worth dealing with export incentives at this stage. 
Export incentives of course influence not only textiles exports, but Turkish exports 
as a whole; especially manufactured products, as we will see later. 
To be eligible for export incentives, the share of minerals and manufactured 
products in total exports must be at least 75% and the minimum export volume 
requirement is US$ 30 million for each company which must also have a paid up 
capital of TL 500 million^' (Nas, T. and Odekon, M., 1992). Exporters usually 
apply to the TUB (Tesvik ve Uygulama BaskanUgi) for an export incentive cer-
tificate, and on the basis of this receive a multitude of incentives of which the 
most significant are preferential credit, foreign exchange allocation (for imported 
inputs), and export tax rebates. For preferential credit, the certificate is presented 
to the commercial bank which, after extending the credit, discounts all or part of 
it at the Central Bank. Usually, export credits are granted at a rate lower than 
^ Regulations for large foreign trade Turkish companies. 
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the one charged on similar projects whose output is not directed for exports. For 
foreign exchange allocations, the certificate gives the exporter the right to pur-
chase foreign exchange from the commercial bank, which is later repaid by the 
Central Bank, as well as the right to import duty-free inputs up to the amount 
of purchased foreign exchange. The former is becoming of less importance with 
the liberalisation of foreign exchange transactions. Finally, export tax rebates are 
supposed to reimburse exporters, after the completion of the export process, for 
the indirect taxes they paid during the manufacturing of their products. In what 
follows, each one of the above mentioned incentives will be discussed briefly before 
a conclusion is reached as to which is the most efi"ective. 
5.4.1 Export Tax Rebates 
Originally, before 1975, tax rebates were paid individually for each exported 
product. However, after 1975, all products eligible for export tax rebates were 
arranged in ten fists and after 1987 these fists were reduced to five. The rebates 
varied according to the product (list); however, the average was about 21% in 1984. 
For all exports between US$ 2 milhon and US$ 10 million, the exporter receives 
an additional marginal rebate of 6% and for exports between US$ 10 mUhon and 
US$ 30 million, the additional rebate is 12% (Milanovic, B., 1986 and Aricanh, T. 
and Rodrik, D., 1990). 
The subsidy element in the export tax rebate scheme depends on: (1) the 
share of eligible exports in total exports, (2) the average tax rebate rate, and (3) 
the actual indirect taxes paid for which the scheme is supposed to compensate. 
Obviously, the higher the share of indirect taxes in the total value of exports, the 
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less would be the incentive value of the scheme. Table 5.14, shows the export tax 
rebates in different industries whUe table 5.15 demonstrates the subsidy component 
in every industry. With respect to the tax rebates, it is clear that the iron and 
steel industry enjoyed the highest tax rebate rate followed by the fabricated metal 
products. 
Table 5.15: Export Tax Rebate Subsidy Component (% of export value) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Food & beverages 2.6 6.42 5.9 7.24 2.9 4.6 4.2 0.8 - 2 
Textiles & clothing 2.19 9.34 12.05 10.76 0.7 - 5 - 4.5 - 4.9 - 7.4 
Leather & fur 7.32 12.89 17.7 15.33 3.5 - 0.7 - 3.3 - 3.4 - 3.7 
Paper 0.33 14.22 9.71 8.02 3 0.4 - 0.9 6 - 4.4 
Chemicals 2.45 6.27 12.4 10.82 6.1 7.1 6.4 5.4 1.2 
Rubber & plastic 3.71 11.96 9.37 10.13 4.6 2.1 - 1.3 - 1.5 - 3.5 
Glass 2.47 10.89 6.8 9.59 2.9 3.4 3.5 0.4 - 3.1 
Cement 10.7 18.8 16.09 13.82 13.4 11.2 27.8 10.3 - 3 
Iron & steel 2.18 9.38 13.65 16.14 12.6 12.9 10.2 9.3 7.4 
Non-ferous metals 5.31 11.8 12.45 14.26 - 6.9 - 6.7 - 11 - 12.2 - 16.5 
Fabricated metal prod. 19.52 62.04 79.04 50.54 10.8 14.6 4.9 10.7 0.2 
Non-electric, mach. 2.73 9.74 17.79 6.75 4.2 3.2 2.7 1.3 - 2.8 
Electrical machinery 3.54 10.9 13.21 14.87 5.5 6.1 4.4 - 0.1 - 3 
Transp. equip. 3.96 6.32 4.57 3.61 0.5 - 2.8 - 3.9 - 4 - 11.3 
Source: Milanovic, B., World Bank (1986) and Krueger, A. and Aktan, 0., 
1992. 
It is worth mentioning that with the proposed Customs Union with the EC by 
1996, export tax rebates to domestic industries are to be lifted. Thus, products that 
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are heavily dependent on government support such as fabricated metal products 
(see table 5.15) are expected to be negatively affected. 
However, this negative impact w i l l be outweighed by the benefits gained in 
terms of increased exports of textiles and other products which rely less on such 
subsidies. These products are expected to perform well after the estabhshment 
of the Customs Union which would remove any tariffs and quotas facing Turkish 
exports to the Community. Meanwhile, as part of its preparation for the proposed 
Union, the Turkish government seems to be phasing out tax rebates which reached 
8% in 1992 down f r o m 12% last year (OECD, 1992). 
5.4.2 Export Credits 
The incentive value of export credits lies in the difference between the rate of 
interest charged on general short-term (ST) credits and a lower rate of interest 
on export credits. Several funds were used for this purpose. One was the Export 
Promotion Fund estabUshed in the 1960s as the Special Export Fund. Its name 
was changed in 1980 to the EPF. I t provided credit for exporters of fresh f ru i t 
and vegetables, marine products, export trading companies, and construction con-
tractors overseas. A second fund was the Interest Rate Rebate Fund which was 
intended to compensate the difference in interest rates between general and export 
credits. I n mid 1987, the Turkish Export Credit Bank (Export-Import Bank) was 
charged w i t h the responsibiUty of supplying credits to exporters and providing 
insurance for exporters, investors abroad, and contractors. In 1989, the Foreign 
Trade Corporate Companies Rediscount Credit Facility was established which ex-
tended credits through the Export - Import Bank to Turkish companies involved in 
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foreign trade whose exports exceeded US$ 100 mill ion per year (Krueger, A. and 
Oktan, 0 . , 1992). 
Table 5.16 shows that the interest rate differential between general and export 
credits is decUning. This is mainly due to the rise in the interest rate charged on 
export credits. 
Table 5.16: Interest Rates on Export and General Short-Term 
Credit (% p.a.) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
(1) 15.1 20.3 27.2 28.0 46.1 55 52.9 40 40.7 37.1 
(2) 38.3 50.2 47.5 46.9 63.1 72 72.8 77.6 64.8 64.1 
(3) 23.3 29.9 20.3 18.9 17.0 17 19.9 37.6 24.1 27 
Source: Milanovic, B. , World Bank, (1986) and Krueger, A. and 
Aktan , 0 . , 1992. 
(1) Nominal interest rate on export credits. 
(2) Nominal interest rate on general ST credits. 
(3) The differential: (2) - (1). 
The difference between the interest rate on general and export credit stems 
f r o m three factors: (i) a higher base rate for the general credit; ( i i) a positive 
contribution to the Interest Rate Rebate Fund ( IRRF) on general credits versus 
a net subsidy received f rom the Fund on export credits; and (ii i) exemption of 
export credits f rom the transaction tax. Factors (i i) and (i i i ) represent the most 
obvious subsidies. 
The subsidy component of export credits is demonstrated in table 5.17 where 
high subsidies are clearly concentrated in capital (heavy industry) goods. In addi-
t ion , i t is clear f rom the table that the manufacturing sector's share in the credits' 
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subsidy is increasing (i t almost doubled between 1980 and 1989). Industries w i th 
the highest subsidy component i n 1989 were food and beverages, textiles, nonfer-
rous metals, metal products, non-electrical machinery, rubber k plastic, and glass 
and ceramics. whUe industries w i t h the lowest subsidy component included paper 
and leather. Finally, i t is worth mentioning that soft-term credits are st i l l granted 
(no detailed data is available) through the Turkish Eximbank providing exports 
exceeded US$ 1 mil l ion (OECD, 1992). 
Finally, un t i l the liberalisation of exchange coiitrols which permitted foreign 
borrowing, the preferential rates of export credits was a valuable incentive for 
exporters. However, i t lost some of its value wi th the liberalisation of the foreign 
exchange system in Turkey, and some exporters even stopped using the Export-
Impor t Bank credits altogether. 
5.4.3 Foreign Exchange Allocation 
Exporters applying to the T U B for this facility get ( i f their apphcation was 
accepted) foreign exchange for their import needs and/or receive the right to duty-
free imports up to the amount of the allocated foreign exchange. The latter should 
not exceed 40% of the pledged export value. 
The incentive value of this scheme is two fold. First, i t gives right to duty-
free imports of intermediate and raw materials. The amounts of duties saved 
represent the subsidy. Second, foreign currency generally used to have a premium 
over its official rate which could be appropriated by the exporter. However, as 
the overvaluation of the Turkish Ura ceased to exist w i th the UberaUsation of the 
exchange rate, this part of the subsidy is now close to n i l . In terms of individual 
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industries, subsidies are heavily concentrated in four: non-ferrous metals, metal 
products, electrical machinery, and transport equipment. 
Other incentives included the foreign exchange allocation scheme which allowed 
exporters to retain foreign exchange f rom their export activities. In 1989, the 
retention ratio was 30% of to ta l export receipts i f surrender of the foreign exchange 
was wi th in 3 months. This scheme became irrelevent w i t h the liberalisation of the 
payments system in Turkey. Another export incentive which started in 1981 was 
the permission given to exporters to claim an exemption f rom their corporate 
profits taxes equal to 20% of the value of their exports and to pay a much lower 
rate on their exempted portion. The tax exemption was worth 6-8% of the value 
of exports for a profitable company. In addition, in 1987, a transportation export 
incentive was granted (about US$ 6 per ton). Another incentive scheme that 
started in 1987 also was an advance payment of 30% of the export tax refund 
(Krueger, A . and Aktan , O., 1992). 
Moreover, in addition to the above mentioned export incentives, the govern-
ment introduced a 4% across-the-board cash premium to exporters in 1985. This 
new export incentive was intended as a compensation for reduced tax rebate rates. 
Furthermore, a new system of cash incentives was introduced in January 1987. 
This is a selective system of export subsidies covering 110 commodity categories. 
The rates of payments are specific and, in principle, determined on the basis of 
comparison of domestic costs and international prices. Data on the implementation 
of this new incentive are not yet available (AricanH, T . and Rodrik, D., 1990). 
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5.4.4 Export Incentives: An Assessment 
On the whole, the real effective exchange rate remains one of the export in-
centives for Turkish manufacturers despite its moderate role (see chapter 4). The 
exchange rate determines the price competitiveness of Turkish products, which to-
gether w i t h direct export incentives and the availabihty of industrial capacity may 
keep the export drive i n Turkey thr iv ing. 
According to a survey carried out in Milanovic's paper, 80% of export firms 
included in the survey preferred tax rebates among other incentives. This might 
be one of the reasons for the increasing share of tax rebates in comparison wi th 
other incentives (see table 5.18). 
Table 5.18: Weights of the Export Incentives (% of export value) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Tcix Rebate 0.0 3.6 10.07 11.5 11.07 
Preferential Export Credits 16.6 12.51 6.36 6.47 1.07 
Foreign Exchange Allocation 5.45 4.39 4.18 5.42 2.94 
Total 22.05 20.50 20.61 23.39 15.08 
Source: Milanovic, B. , World Bank, 1986. 
Moreover, w i t h export incentives fading due to the intention of the government 
to stimulate exports less through direct export subsidies as part of the preparation 
for the Customs Union w i t h the EC by 1996 (no data is available for the new 
changes in export incentives after 1989, despite contacting some Turkish sources 
such as the Export Promotion Center) one can say that these subsidies (in addition 
to other external factors such as the Iran-Iraq war) played an important role in 
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boosting Turkish exports at the beginning of the 1980s. 
5.5 Conclusion 
I n the end one can say that despite some of the problems faced by the Turkish 
manufacturing sector in general and some subsectors i n the textile industry in par-
ticular, the low labour costs, low input costs of cotton and wool, the availabiUty of 
unutifised industrial capacity especially before 1985, and the depreciation in the 
l i ra helped Turkish textiles in gaining an edge of competitiveness in the EC which 
made the achievement in the 1980s quite impressive. However, this success is not 
secure f rom an economic point of view whether internally or externally. Internally, 
the threat of rising inflat ion, rising interest rates, and the increasing squeeze on 
domestic financial resources due to the increasing budget deficit puts downward 
pressure on the development of Turkish industry and its ability to increase its in-
dustrial capacity which is necessary to raise industrial production. Externally this 
depends on the quota restrictions implemented by the governments of Turkey's 
major export markets (mainly the EC) , the establishment of the Customs Union 
w i t h the EC by 1996, and the abili ty of Turkish exporters to enter new markets 
(Eastern Europe in particular) or exploit more efficiently the present export mar-
kets (mainly through price realisation). Moreover, w i th no major developments in 
the G A T T talks or the M u l t i Fibre Agreement (MFA) , Turkey is vulnerable to a 
growth of bilateral agreements and quotas. 
I t is believed that industries depending heavily on government subsidies (ex-
port tax rebates and others) such as fabricated metal products wi l l be negatively 
affected by the establishment of the Customs Union (which forbids any form of 
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support to local industries) w i t h the EC by 1996. However, industries that rely less 
on those incentives such as textiles are expected to increase their share in exports 
dramatically thus compensating for the loss in income f rom other manufacturing 
subsectors. 
Turkey needs to improve the quality (skill) of its labour to increase the pro-
duct iv i ty of that factor input . I n addition, Turkey needs to import adequate tech-
nology through advanced capital goods. Moreover, the export incentives should 
remain for the time being (at least unt i l the estabUshment of the Customs Union 
w i t h the EC) to keep the export drive thr iving bearing in mind that there are no 
distort ing factors (e.g., high wages, high import duties on raw materials, ...etc.) 
negatively affecting the process. 
Finally, Turkey has the potential to become an industrial country. However, 
the country st i l l has a long way to go on that path. This is due to the tough 
competition f rom other newly industrialised countries in export markets where the 
abil i ty to export industrial goods to the world markets is considered one of the 
best measures to test the level of industrial development of a country. 
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Chapter VI 
Turkish Agriculture in the 1980s 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite the fact that the overall importance of agriculture in GDP is decHning 
(17.5% of GDP in 1990 down f r o m 22% in 1979), this sector st i l l uses a major 
port ion of Turkey's resources. About 45% of the employed labour force is in the 
agricultural sector^, according to the 1990 census of population, and 280 thousand 
square kilometers (i.e., about 28 million hectares) or about one th i rd of the total 
land area is under cultivation, w i t h cereals being farmed on more than two thirds 
of that area. 
Agricultural products in Turkey may be classified into four categories (World 
Bank, 1982): 
1. Non-export or import-substi tution crops (mainly before 1980) which include 
wheat, sugarbeet, sunflower, and tea. These products received considerable 
encouragement f rom the government, especially before 1980, in the form of 
price support, the allocation of subsidised inputs, and the provision of exten-
sion services. Such incentives were aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in these 
products. 
^ It is worth mentioning that Turkish employment statistics in agriculture are often exaggerated by 
an error of about five per cent due to the way figures are calculated where any household member 
over 12 years old living in a village is assumed to be working in a farm. 
222 
2. Traditional export crops include nuts, dried frui ts , and tobacco. Turkish ex-
ports of these products constitute a sizeable share in world trade. 
3. Majo r exports crops such as cotton, pulses, roots, and olive oil. 
4. Fruit and vegetables, livestock and livestock products, and fish. 
The Turkish government supports the agricultural sector in various ways. 
Farmers are granted credit subsidies and subsidies to major agricultural inputs 
are allocated w i t h the aim of developing the sector. In addition, the SEEs pur-
chase agricultural products f rom farmers and engage in agro-industrial activities. 
Furthermore, the government is investing billions of dollars in a major agricultural 
project in the south east of the country (GAP project) which is expected to boost 
the sector and the industries related to i t substantially wi th a positive impact on 
the economy as a whole. 
Unt i l 1980, the government set support prices for 23 major agricultural prod-
ucts, the exception being f ru i t and vegetables. I t had a monopoly for sugarbeet, 
tobacco, and tea while the public sector agencies purchased varying amounts of 
output of other crops which were marketed by the SEEs and sales co-operatives at 
prices fixed below cost, w i t h the government absorbing the resulting losses. More-
over, the government invested in large irrigation projects, provided subsidies for 
inputs to machinery, granted preferential credits that encouraged capital-intensive 
activities, subsidised fertilisers, and set low water charges. These incentives which 
were aimed mainly at non-export crops led to several distortions such as inefficient 
use of water, the expansion of non-export crops at the expense of other crops, 
over-use of fertilisers, and in some cases over-mechanisation; especially in small 
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land holdings (World Bank, 1982). 
I n the January 1980 reforms, the government efforts to improve agricultural 
product ivi ty revolved around Hberalising the market for agricultural goods by al-
lowing imports and aboHshing the multiple exchange rate system which discrimi-
nated against agricultural exports, thus stimulating efficiency. However, the gov-
ernment st i l l sets the prices of 20 crops which are now more realistic and based 
on actual costs. This policy st i l l creates distortions in the market which prevents 
i t f rom being fu l ly free in terms of price determination, gives wrong signals to 
farmers as to what to cultivate the next season, and does not compensate for the 
expected rise i n inflat ion the following year. Farmers claim that this policy made 
growing some products uneconomic while the government argues that the pohcy 
ensured the cultivation of crops in which Turkey has a comparative advantage and 
that farmers ignore the level of subsidised assistance that they receive through the 
Agricul tural Bank. I n addition to the rationalisation of prices, subsidies on fer-
tilisers were reduced, and water charges were raised to cover the cost of operating 
and maintaining the irrigation schemes (World Bank, 1982). 
This chapter w i l l look at the state of the Turkish agricultural sector after 1980 
and assess the effects of the structural adjustment programme on the different 
subsectors and variables such as inputs, external trade, and prices. The increase 
in the volume of agricultural produce in comparison wi th 1979 wi l l be considered 
a sign of improvement. The main problem this chapter is attempting to address 
is whether the liberalisation measures had any positive impact (increase in the 
area of land cultivated, increase in production, ...etc.) on agriculture. In addition, 
the chapter w i l l t r y to highhght the disadvantages of the economic pohcies imple-
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mented before 1980 and whether the adjustment programme managed to ehminate 
them in order to accelerate the development of agriculture and utihse the available 
resources more efficiently. A section on the South Anatolia Project (GAP) wi l l 
also be included. 
6.2 Structure of the Public Sector in Agriculture 
The agricultural public sector consists mainly of intermediary estabhshments 
that either help in providing inputs for agricultural products or purchase the pro-
duction f rom farmers and market i t according to the policies set by the government. 
Af te r 1980, the public sector poUcy changed f rom one that provides cheap inputs 
(credit, fertilisers, water, ...etc.) and purchases products according to a price 
support scheme, which exacerbated budget deficits, to a sector that functions ac-
cording to market forces wi th in a general support strategy. The main pubhc sector 
institutions are (Bri t ish Agricultural Export Council, 1986): 
1. The Minis t ry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Affairs ( M A F R A ) : besides its 
own five directorates which deal w i th issues such as plants protection, project 
implementation, rural services, and agrarian reform, M A F R A has seven state 
economic enterprises which function under its auspices. These are T Z D K , 
State Farms, T M O , TSEK (for dairy products), E B K (for meat processing), 
Yem Sanayii Turk (for animal feed), and Orman Genel Mudurlugu (Forestry 
General Directorate) which is responsible for wood production and processing. 
2. State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su Isleri, DSI): this ministry is responsible for 
irrigation works. 
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3. The Turkish Agricul tural Supply Organisation (Turkiye Zirai Donatim K u -
rumu, T Z D K ) . This organisation is responsible for supplying farmers wi th agri-
cultural machinery, fertUisers, some agrochemicals, and some seeds. I t has 25 
branch offices, 385 sub-offices, 24 repair shops, 30 mobile service teams, and 
four seed processing plants located all over Turkey. I t also has eight farm 
machinery manufacturing plants and a fertihser factory. 
4. Co-operatives: there are two types of co-operatives in Turkey, credit co-operatives 
and marketing or sales co-operatives. The credit co-operatives deal wi th the 
supply of f a rm inputs while marketing co-operatives process and sell the output 
of certain crops. Credit co-operatives which have a total of about 1.5 milhon 
members in 2,300 co-operatives are the major suppHer of seeds and collabo-
rate w i t h the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) to provide credits to farmers. 
There are 11 major marketing co-operatives, some deal wi th individual prod-
ucts like hazelnuts and pistachios while others deal w i th crops such as cotton, 
figs, raisins, olives, and sunflower. Marketing co-operatives either seU the crops 
fresh or engage in agro-industrial processes where they dry raisins and figs, 
crush cotton seeds for oil to make margarine and soap, gin and spin cotton, 
and extract oil f rom sunflower seeds. 
5. State Farms: there are 39 state farms in Turkey wi th an aggregate land area of 
386,743 hectares i.e., about 1 per cent of the total agricultural land. Fifteen of 
these farms mainly specialise in livestock breeding and are quite small in terms 
of the tota l area covered. The main crops grown by the Farms are wheat, 
barley, cotton, and sunflower, w i t h soya increasing in importance. Over 9,000 
hectares are devoted to f ru i t production. The contribution of the livestock in 
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the state farms to the Uvestock sector in Turkey was minor in 1984 with 23,500 
head of cattle, 130,000 sheep, and 120,000 chicken out of a total of 12.4 million, 
40.4 miUion, and 60.5 million respectively. 
6. The Soil Products Office: this is a marketing agency for grains, pulses, and 
opium. It is the main grain drier operator in Turkey and a significant buyer of 
grain storage, drying, and handling equipment. 
Prom the above mentioned functions of the main public sector institutions, it is 
difficult to assess their weight in comparison with the private sector. More specific 
information and figures (presently unavailable) regarding the activities of both 
sectors is needed in order to prepare a more comprehensive comparative study. 
Meanwhile, i t is evident that the role of the pubUc sector in Turkey is confined to 
help and assistance rather than the engagement in actual production as is the case 
in the manufacturing sector. However, through its poUcies and institutions, the 
sector is capable of influencing the decision-makers in agriculture; hence, indirectly 
determining their strategies. 
6.3 Area Cultivated and Agricultural Production 
Partly because of the variety of climate between its regions (see table 6.1), 
Turkey's agriculture is greatly specialised. Cereals occupied about 70% of the 
total area sown in 1990 down from 82.9% in 1979 with wheat and barley being the 
major cereal produce (tables 6.2 and 6.3). The decline in the area cultivated with 
cereals may be due to the policies followed after the 1980 reforms when non-export 
crops were less supported. Moreover, although this area decUned in relative terms, 
i t remained almost the same in absolute terms. The rise in the total area sown 
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which resulted from the farming of more fallow lands was mainly devoted to the 
cultivation of pulses. The decUne in the area devoted for cereals did not lead to a 
decline in production (table 6.3), on the contrary, this suggests that agriculture in 
that area is getting more efficient due to the better use of agricultural machinery, 
fertilisers, and water (see section on agricultural inputs). 
Other agricultural products include industrial crops (tobacco, cotton, sugar-
beet, ...etc.), pulses, and oil seeds (mainly sunflower). Industrial crops seem to 
have a relatively slow response to the 1980 adjustment programme and the result-
ing new export drive. Production rose by about 50% from 9,485 thousand tons 
in 1979 to 14,291 thousand tons in 1990 compared to oil seeds production which 
jumped from 972 thousand tons in 1979 to 2,195 thousand tons in 1990. 
Table 6.1: Climate in Different Turkish Regions 
Region Av. Temp.'' Av. Precip.'' Av. Humidity'^ Snow (days) 
Central North 11 375 60 22 
Agean 16 800 65 -
Marmara 14 700 70 10 
Mediterranean 18 700 62 -
North East 7 400 60 100 
South East 8-9 450 50 1-80 
Black Sea 14 1500 75 10 
Central East 12 400 55 30 
Central South 11 350 60 22 
a = Average temperature in Celsius, 
b = Average precipitation in mm. 
c = Average humidity in per cent. 
Source: World Bank, 1982. 
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Sugar beet production had the highest increase among industrial crops rising 
from 8,760 thousand tons in 1979 to 13,985 thousand tons in 1990, while cotton was 
the second highest with 476 thousand tons in 1979 to 587 thousand tons in 1990. 
The rise in cotton production is considered relatively modest given the expected 
increase in demand for this commodity due to the rise in cotton manufactured 
exports. The rise in sugar beet production is not anticipated to be a result of the 
liberalisation measures implemented by the government, but simply due to the rise 
in domestic demand and the self-sufficiency strategy that the Turkish authorities 
still follow. On the other hand, there has been a tremendous increase in the 
production of pulses since 1980. The area sown rose from 677 thousand hectares 
in 1979 to 2.3 million hectares in 1990 i.e., from 4.1% of total area sown in 1979 
to 11.6% in 1990. The rise in the cultivated area was reflected in the aonount of 
pulses produced which rose from 762 thousand tons in 1979 to 2.2 million tons in 
1990. 
There has also been a great increase in the production of oil seeds although 
the area sown rose modestly to 8.7% of total area sown in 1990 compared to 7.2% 
in 1979 (table 6.2). On the whole, total production rose more than twofold with 
the bulk of that increase due to the boost from the sunflower harvest which rose 
from 59 thousand tons in 1979 to 860 thousand tons in 1990. 
6.3.1 Yields 
Table 6.3 shows that despite the fact that the area sown with cereals did not 
change substantially over the period 1979-1990 (see table 6.2), production rose from 
25.6 million tons (1979) to about 30.1 million tons (1990). The rise in the volume 
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of cereals produced was mainly due to the rise in yield from 1,812 kg/hectare 
in 1979 to 1,988 kg/hectare in 1990. Moreover, cotton and sugarbeet; especially 
the latter, also showed substantial increases in their yields. The yield for cotton 
rose from 778 kg/hectare in 1979 to 878 kg/hectare in 1989, while the yield for 
sugarbeet rose from 32,493 kg/hectare in 1979 to 36,819 kg/hectare in 1990. 
I t is clear that the products that enjoyed the highest increase in yields (ce-
reals and sugarbeet) are the ones that used to be non-export crops and received 
considerable encouragement before 1980. However, although government interven-
tion and the poUcies accompanying it (subsidised inputs, price support, extension 
services, ...etc.) has been reduced with economic liberalisation, the eff'ects still 
exist in terms of the relative development of these agricultural subsectors. This 
gave them the ability to survive easily and perform better than other subsectors 
although government support was lifted. 
I t is interesting that these results are contrary to the World Bank's simulation 
model predictions which expected that a poHcy of trade Uberalisation and realis-
tic exchange rates would cause production and exports of tobacco, cotton, fruits, 
vegetables, and livestock to grow in excess of historical rates. In turn, the produc-
tion of wheat, barley, and roots would not grow or grow at rates below historical 
rates. Finally, corn, rye, rice, sunflower, sugarbeet, and olive oil would experience 
a decline (World Bank, 1982). 
I t is clear from table 6.3 that the production of wheat and barley increased after 
the Uberalisation of trade and exchange rates in 1980. In addition, the production 
of sugarbeet and sunflower never registered any decUne after 1980 below the 1979 
level. Thus, the World Bank made a major miscalculation in relation to Turkey's 
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capabiHties and its agricultural potential which raises doubts about the validity of 
its model. 
The reasons for the increase in the yields of most agricultural products could 
be attributed to the more efficient use of fertilisers, the use of better quality seeds 
whether produced domestically or imported, the increasing use of machinery, and 
the increasing area of irrigated land. 
6.3.2 Fruit and Vegetables 
The fruit and vegetables subsector may be the only agricultural subsector 
that did not receive any major government support. The land under vegetable 
cultivation is relatively small if, for example, it is compared to cereals. Moreover, 
the expansion in the land devoted to the cultivation of the former product has 
been slowing down. During 1975-1979, the cultivated land increased from 490 
thousand hectares to 571 thousand hectares i.e., 81 thousand hectares, whereas 
during the whole decade (1979-1990) the cultivated land increased by only 64 
thousand hectares (from 571 thousand hectares to 635 thousand hectares) i.e., an 
average decUne in expansion of about 20%. However, over the same period the 
production of vegetables increased by about 30% due to the increase in yields. 
As regards fruit , orchards also had a slow-down in the rate of expansion of 
cultivated land which had the same trend as vegetables. The area devoted for 
orchards increased from about 1.2 million hectares to about 1.4 miUion hectares 
between 1975 and 1979, whereas the same increase occurred in double that period, 
1979-1990 (see table 6.4). The area devoted for vineyards decreased substantially 
(by more than 25%) after the 1980 reforms as the total area declined from 850 
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thousand hectares in 1979 to 580 thousand hectares in 1990. It is not known why 
there was a decUne in the rate of expansion of tree plantation, but one reason may 
be the decreasing number of available agricultural workers; many had migrated to 
the urban centres to work in industry where wages were higher. 
The production of hazelnuts rose by about 25% between 1979 and 1990 (table 
6.5) with exports of this product increasing from US$ 353 milUon in 1979 (15.6% 
of total Turkish exports) to US$ 456 milUon in 1990 (3.5%). 
Table 6.4: Distribution of Arable Land and Forest 
Area ('000 hectares) 
1979 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Crop area* 24,972 23,933 23,920 24,355 24,174 24,210 24,980 
Vegetables 571 662 638 609 612 610 635 
Vineyards 850 625 600 590 590 597 580 
Orchards 1,352 1,489 1,490 1,517 1,531 1,563 1,583 
Olives 812 821 835 856 856 857 867 
Forests 20,155 20,199 20,199 20,199 20,199 20,199 20,199 
(*) Includes sown and fallow lands. 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
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Table 6.5: Vegetables and Tree Production ('000 tons) 
1979 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Vegetables 12,576 15,258 14,838 15,223 15,446 15,282 16,457 
Fruits 3,502,452 6,865 6,808 6,692 7,327 7,322 7,360 
of which 
Apples 1,350 1,900 1,865 1,680 1,950 1,850 1,900 
Grapes 3,500 3,300 3,000 3,300 3,350 3,430 3,500 
Figs 200 340 370 355 350 279 300 
Nuts 543 422 550 543 660 728 630 
of which 
Hazelnuts 300 180 300 280 403 456 375 
Olives 4,300 600 1,010 600 1,100 500 1,100 
Citrus Fruits 1,147 983 1,396 1,343 1,445 1,443 1,474 
Tea 102 137 148 141 153 136 122 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
Data on grape production is curious with respect to the sudden rise in pro-
duction between 1977 and 1979. In 1976, grape production was about 3.1 miUion 
tons, but in 1977 this figure jumped to about 3,496 milUon tons and rose to 3,500 
miUion tons in 1978 and 1979 (State Institute of Statistics, 1980). These figures 
raise suspicions of a possible error in the data collection carried out by the State 
Institute of Statistics in Ankara (Turkey). Therefore, the grape production figure 
for 1979 was changed by the author from 3,500 million tons to 3,500 thousand 
tons which is in line with the general trend of grape production in Turkey. On the 
other hand, the fluctuation in the production of olives is normal and due to the 
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bi-annual nature of ohve trees*. 
6.4 Livestock and Fishery Products 
In 1978, both beef and mutton were discriminated against by the system of 
government incentives. Domestic prices were depressed not only because of the 
price support policy but due to the overvalued exchange rate. Thus, the exports 
of beef and mutton were Umited, according to the official figures, leading to less 
animals being slaughtered and a bigger number of live animals, as the latter was 
not allowed to be exported. 
The policy led to large quantities of meat and animals being smuggled through 
the Turkish borders in the form of exports which were not registered officially. 
These activities were part of the large black market that existed in Turkey before 
1980. This aggravated the economic problems that Turkey was suff'ering from 
during that period, as black market activity also involved unofficial exchange rates 
and capital transfers. 
However, with the changing export environment in the 1980s that included 
the devaluation of the exchange rate, the abolition of official producer prices, and 
the removal of consumer subsidies to beef and mutton, the number of slaughtered 
animals almost doubled between 1979 and 1990 (table 6.6). In 1979, the number 
of animals slaughtered reached about 8.7 million head (including cattle, sheep, 
and goats), and this number rose to about 15 milhon in 1990. Consequently, 
the amount of meat produced increased by the same rate. In 1979, the animals 
slaughtered produced 221 thousand tons of meat while in 1990, meat production 
* Olive trees produce an abundant harvest once every two years due to their botanic nature. 
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more than doubled to 544 thousand tons. 
Table 6.6 shows that the poultry industry has grown rapidly in Turkey in 
the last decade. The number of hens and roosters increased from about 53.7 
miUion birds in 1979 to about 96 miUion in 1990. The main stimulus for this 
expansion came from the World Bank's Uvestock development projects, the Turkish 
Development Foundation (TKV), and the Turkish private sector. Most of the 
major operators have hatcheries from which they export a significant amount of 
their production. Unfortunately, there are no available figures for the poultry 
export activities (British Agricultural Export CouncU, 1986). 
Fish farming is also a growing industry in Turkey; especiaUy fresh water fish 
which had almost doubled its production by 1990 in comparison to 1979. However, 
the fish industry is stiU limited with exports at an annual average of US$ 50 miUion 
with the supply lagging behind domestic demand. Meanwhile, it is expected that 
fresh water fish production will undergo more expansion due to the South AnatoUa 
Project (GAP) which wiU create a huge lake behind the Ataturk dam (the GAP 
project will be discussed in more detail in the last section of this chapter) which 
wUl provide a major boost for the industry. 
6.5 The Turkish Agro-industry 
UntU 1980, the private sector involvement in agro-industry did not go far 
beyond flour mUUng and baking, brewing, animal feed mUling, tomato canning, 
vegetable oU extraction, and dairy processing. Since then, it has expanded consid-
erably, mainly in red meat processing. The public sector dominated the livestock, 
sugar, animal feed, and tobacco industries. After the 1980 reforms and with the 
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Table 6.6: Livestock Figures in Turkey (thousand) 
1979 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
No. of Animals 83,886 68,522 70,866 72,431 72,048 73,240 70,040 64,992 
of which 
Sheep 46,026 40,391 42,500 43,758 43,796 45,384 43,647 40,553 
Cattle 15,567 12,410 12,466 12,713 12,713 12,562 12,173 11,377 
Goats 14,752 11,127 11,233 11,295 11,053 10,972 10,328 9,698 
No. of Slaghtered 
Animals 8,721 16,846 14,656 16,225 13,801 12,894 15,385 15,031 
of which 
Cattle - 1,447 1,317 1,764 1,362 1,379 1,696 1,806 
Sheep - 6,941 6,228 5,620 4,794 4,299 6,452 5,595 
Goats - 1,560 1,371 1,786 1,629 1,453 1,454 1,437 
Meat Production (tons) 221 363.9 310.4 357 294 272 544 544 
of which 
Cattle - 118.1 99.6 125.7 100.5 97 214 232 
Calf - 47 36 57.1 40.7 33 123 127 
Sheep - 116.7 105.2 92.2 77.9 70 119 103 
Lamb - 42.7 35.5 40.7 35.9 35 49 53 
Milk Production (tons) 5,411 4,380 4,520 4,629 4,589 4,655 - -
of which 
Cows 3,386 2,805 2,900 2,974 2,959 2,976 - -
Sheep 1,102 981 1,024 1,055 1,048 1,109 - -
Goats 571 410 413 417 404 402 - -
Hens & Roosters 53,709 60,472 61,046 58,039 58,045 58,790 64,078 96,676 
Turkeys 2,705 3,288 3,315 3,207 2,946 2,974 3,101 3,127 
Sea Fish(tons) 324.9 508.7 520 525.4 562.7 580.7 361.8 294 
Fresh water 
Fish(tons) 22.2 46.5 45.5 40.3 41.8 48.5 42.8 37.3 
Source: State Institute of Statistics 
expansion of the private sector, the public sector is stiU mainly in control of the 
tobacco and sugar industries while other fields experienced increasing penetration 
from Turkish, and sometimes foreign, private companies (British Agricultural Ex-
port Council, 1986). 
Despite the fact that the value of processed agricultural products exported 
reached about US$ 2.2 bUlion in 1990 (table 6.7) i.e., about 18% of total exports, 
the sector still has a big potential for development given Turkey's wealth in agri-
cultural raw materials. No part of the agro-industrial market is as yet saturated, 
with foreign investments stUl at low levels. The Turkish government beUeves that 
much of the investment should come from foreign companies, mainly because some 
of the operations are quite big. Meat exporters in Eastern Turkey, for example, 
wiU need to build stockyards, slaughter houses, packaging plants, and cold stores 
in an integrated chain (COMET, 1989). 
However, recently the Turkish government has chosen agro-industry as a lead-
ing sector and offered a package of incentives. Cattle-breeding is to be encouraged 
by the free allocation of state land. Entrepreneurs engaged in food production, 
processing, and manufacture will benefit from a 50% reduction in the tariflF of elec-
tricity and other sources of energy which they use. Their employees wUl be exempt 
from check-offs for compulsory savings and housings. In the three development ar-
eas (east, south-east, and Black sea regions), agro-industrialists wiU be exempt for 
five years from corporation tax, customs duties, and fund levies on their imported 
inputs, and VAT on their home-manufactured farming equipment. They wiU also 
obtain cheap credits for investments. In the south-east region, tax exemption wiU 
extend over 10 years, and the reduction in electricity charges wiU amount to 75% 
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in the first year. The Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) will have an additional 
T L 150 billion to dispense in credits. Furthermore, the implementation of two of 
the government's electoral promises (the exemption from taxes of the minimum 
wage and the introduction of unemployment benefit) is to begin in the eastern 
and south-eastern areas towards the end of the year. The latest two measures are 
expected to limit the growth in east-west migration (Turkey Confidential, 1992). 
6.6 Export Performance 
Prior to the January 1980 reforms, the external trade of most agricultural 
commodities was strictly controlled. Exports were limited through Ucensing and 
were often subsidised due to excessive support prices in comparison with world 
market prices, which was aggravated by an overvalued exchange rate. However, 
the share of agricultural exports reached 59% of total exports in 1979. In 1991, 
the success of Turkish manufacturing and its export drive reduced the share of 
agricultural and Uvestock products to about 18% of total exports (table 6.8) but 
it reached about 30% when processed agricultural goods are included. 
Table 6.7 demonstrates that the exports of Uvestock products decUned between 
1988 and 1990 due to the increasing domestic demand, while forestry logging and 
fishery products exports were marginal. However, it appears that the exports of 
processsed agricultural products are doing relatively well with rising revenues from 
canned and preserved fruits and vegetables exports, tobacco and cigarettes, and 
ginned cotton. 
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Table 6.7: Sectoral Breakdown of Agricultural 
Exports (US$ million) 
1988 1989 1990 
Crops 911 589.6 658.4 
Livestock 282.4 272.7 210.7 
Forestry 27 22.6 26.6 
Fishery 49.2 46.9 52.8 
Processed Agricultural 
Products (subtotal) 1,840.6 1,970.9 2,223.7 
Slaughtering Products 83.5 72.6 63.1 
Canned & Preserved 
Fruits & Vegetables 501.3 466.7 580.3 
Vegetable & Animal 
Oils & Fats 131.8 209.2 198.9 
Grain MiU Products 54.4 52.7 35.9 
Sugar 12.5 2.1 1.6 
Other Food Products 611.5 510.8 708.9 
AlcohoUc Beverages 22.8 22.7 16.3 
Soft Drinks and 
Carbonated water 2.1 6 3.6 
Tobacco & Cigarettes 269.2 479.8 440.4 
Ginned Cotton 151.3 148.3 174.7 
Total 3,110.2 2,902.4 3,172.2 
Source: Export Promotion Centre. 
On the other hand, revenues decUned from exports such as slaughtering prod-
ucts, grain miU, sugar, and alcohoUc beverages. The exports of these products 
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decUned mainly due to the increasing demand at honie and the slow growth in 
those industries. This applies mainly to sugar where exports declined sharply 
from US$ 112.5 miUion in 1988 to US$ 1.6 million in 1990. 
In tobacco, less than one third of production is used for domestic cigarette 
production and the rest is exported. The United States is the largest importer 
of tobacco with a share of 50% in Turkish exports (World Bank, 1982). There is 
not enough cigarette manufacturing capacity in the country to meet the domestic 
demand. However, in May 1991, the private sector was allowed to invest in the 
industry which was mainly a governmental monopoly (OECD, 1992). This devel-
opment is expected to increase competition in the market which would probably 
reduce prices and may lead to more exports if production exceeded demand and 
the quahty produced was competitive enough in the world markets. 
While Turkey has a large share in world trade of its traditional export com-
modities, it also faces a small number of large importers. World trade in tobacco is 
becoming increasingly dominated by a small number of international leaf merchants 
and large tobacco manufacturers. A similar situation exists in the hazelnuts mar-
ket, where, although Turkey enjoys a monopoly situation on the producers' side, 
i t is faced with a monopsonistic consumer market dominated mainly by Germany, 
USSR, and France. 
Table 6.8 shows the breakdown of the crops item in Table 6.7. On the whole, 
Turkish agricultural exports, with the exception of cotton, responded positively to 
the liberalisation of prices and the export-oriented environment that dominated 
after 1980. The share of cotton exports to total exports decHned substantially 
(from 10.1% of total exports to 1.5%) between 1979 and 1990. The same phe-
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Table 6.8: Exports and Imports of Agricultural Products (US$ million) 
1979 %• 1985 %* 1986 %* 1987 %* 1988 %* 1989 %* 1990 %* 
E X P O R T S 
Cereals 169 7.5 234 2.9 246 3.3 266 2.6 441 3.8 315 2.7 342 2.6 
Fruits & 
Vegetables 648 28.7 561 7 820 10.1 800 7.8 867 7.4 789 6.8 1,068 8.2 
Hazelnuts 353 15.6 255 3.2 378 5.1 391 3.8 359 3.07 266 2.3 456 3.5 
Dried Fruits 166 7.34 73 0.9 177 2.4 208 2 231 2 195 1.7 - -
Citrus Fruits 53 2.3 58 0.7 74 1 91 0.9 90 0.8 105 0.9 - -
Others 75 3.3 175 2.2 191 2.6 110 1.1 187 1.6 223 1.9 - -
Ind. Crops" 448 19.8 659 8.3 495 6.6 431 4.2 696 6 693 6 667 5.1 
Cotton 228 10.1 170 2.1 139 1.8 20 0.2 141 1.2 160 1.4 191 1.5 
Tobacco 177 7.8 330 4.1 270 3.6 314 3.1 266 2.3 479 4.1 418.5 3.3 
Others 43 1.9 159 2 86 1.1 97 0.9 289 2.5 54 0.5 - -
Live Animals 
& Sea Products 84 3.7 265 3.3 325 4.4 356 3.5 337 2.9 330 2.8 272 2.1 
Total 1,344 59.4 1,719 21.6 1,886 25.3 1,853 18.2 2,341 20 2,127 18.3 2,349 18.1 
I M P O R T S 36 - 375 - 457 - 782 - 499 - 1,041 - 1,319 -
- Any discrepancy in the aggregate figures is due to rounding. 
(*) Per cent of total exports, 
(a) Industrial crops. 
Source: O E C D , April 1980, 1992, and Turkiye Is Bankasi 1991 , 1992. 
nomenon occurred in the exports of hazelnuts which may be due to the rise in the 
share of manufactured products in total exports. Furthermore, exports of hazel-
nuts dropped by about 17% in 1992 due to the boost in demand in 1991 which 
reached US$ 366 million. This boost was due to stockpiling caused by fears associ-
ated with the Gulf crisis. In the cotton market, imports increased mainly from the 
newly established Turkish Republics in the former Soviet Union due to the rise in 
domestic prices of cotton whereas export prices remained at the same level. This 
led to a rise in the exportable stock (Turkiye Is Bankasi, 1992). 
On the import side, it is clear that agricultural imports increased tremendously 
during the 1980s due to trade liberalisation. The rise in imported agricultural 
products occurred mainly in crops and livestock. The crop item included goods 
such as pineapples and coconuts which are not produced in Turkey, thus the need 
to import them (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992-93). 
The expectations of the World Bank's simulation model were right with respect 
to the growth in the exports of tobacco, fruits, vegetables, and Uvestock after 
liberalisation. However, to compare the growth rates of these products with their 
historical rates, as the model suggests, is difficult and beyond the purpose of this 
study. 
6.7 Agricultural Exports and the E C Common Agricultural Policy 
When the common agricultural policy (CAP) was agreed in 1962, the primary 
objective of the EC Commission and the six member states then was to attain 
self-sufficiency in food production. They also had other priorities such as a fair 
standard of living for farmers, stabilised markets, secure supplies of food, and 
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reasonable prices for consumers. 
By 1992 and with the Community enlarged to 12 member states, the common 
agricultural pohcy was considered quite successful in ensuring sufficiency of food 
supply. This success was reflected in the increasing volume of stored food surpluses 
such as cereals, dairy products, and beef. 
The self-sufficiency in food production required imports into the Community 
to be controlled not only by tariffs but also, in the case of most products, by the 
system of variable levies established under CAP to protect domestic producers. 
The system of setting minimum prices for imports through variable levies, which 
had a much stronger impact than tariffs, prevented agricultural exporters to the 
EC from undercutting and so lowering Community prices. On the other hand, 
the Community was buying up output to reduce quantities in the market and so 
deliberately raised agricultural prices. This system covered a wide variety of goods; 
especially Mediterranean agricultural items, which were produced in the EC. The 
items included in this system were divided into two categories: the so called low 
vulnerability items and high vulnerability items. The former consists of goods that 
are produced in the EC in insufficient quantities while the latter consists of goods 
that are produced in the EC in sufficient quantities to meet the demand. 
The impact of CAP on Turkey's agricultural exports may be considered par-
tially negative. For on one hand, many of Turkey's major agricultural products 
are considered in the low vulnerability category and hence faced less protectionary 
policies by CAP. On the other hand, some agricultural products faced difficulties in 
penetrating the EC markets with Greece, Spain, and Portugal as major supphers 
of Mediterranean agricultural products to those markets, thus rendering Turkish 
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goods in the high vulnerabiUty category. 
The best example of Turkish low vulnerability items is hazelnuts which is 
produced in Umited quantities in the EC, in addition, Turkey exports under the 
same category sultanas, dried figs, and lentils. The high vulnerabihty category 
includes items such as melons, lemons, olive oil, and some vegetables. Turkey is 
fortunate that its traxlitional agricultural exports (hazelnuts, dried figs, ...etc.) are 
in the low vulnerabihty category. However, citrus fruits and some vegetables are 
facing protectionist policies by the EC under CAP which obhged Turkey to turn 
to other markets such as the Middle East to export its agricultural products. 
On the whole, Turkey is in a much better position with respect to its agricul-
tural trade with the EC under CAP in comparison with other countries such as 
Cyprus and Morocco who mainly export citrus fruits. But if the common agricul-
tural pohcy was not there, it is expected that Turkey would have a bigger trading 
share with the EC than it currently has. 
6.8 Changes in the Prices of Agricultural Products 
The Turkish government is stiU implementing its price support pohcy which 
it followed before 1980 despite the Uberalisation and rationalisation measures 
adopted. The government continues to set prices for major agricultural products 
such as wheat, tobacco, hazelnuts, tea, sugarbeet, ...etc. with the exception of fruit 
and vegetables. I t intervenes in the marketing of the former crops through its state 
economic enterprises: the Soil Products Office or TMO, for cereals and pulses, and 
the Sugar Factories Corporation (TSF) for sugarbeet, state monopohes for tea and 
tobacco, and it authorises the sales co-operatives to purchase on its behalf, at sup-
246 
port prices, other agricultural products (cotton, dried fruits, nuts, vegetable oil, 
...etc.). Other SEEs which also purchase at support prices include the Meat and 
Fish Organisation (EBK), and the Milk Industry Organisation (TSEK), but their 
support activities are limited to the small quantities they buy and process which 
reaches about 10% of total meat andmilk production (British Agricultural Export 
Council, 1986). 
The government exercises varying degrees of control over difl^erent crops and 
at different levels in the marketing chain. It has a complete monopoly over the 
manufacture and distribution of sugar, tea, and their products. More generally, 
however, the state control takes the form of partial market intervention by the 
state trading agencies. These agencies have the tasks of purchasing products from 
farmers (according to the prices set by the government), storage, sales, and the 
export of commodities under government control (World Bank, 1982). 
The selling prices of agricultural products were often set below cost, before 
1980, with the government absorbing the losses in order to Hmit the rise in con-
sumer prices. However, the pohcy caused increasing pressures on the budget and 
consequently the budget deficit which often led to an expansion in the money sup-
ply; thus increasing consumer prices (inflation) indirectly. Since 1980, authority 
has been granted to most SEEs to set sale prices according to actual costs which 
meant the abolition of subsidies on some agricultural products and their reduction 
on others. 
Table 6.9 shows that an upward trend in the prices of Turkish agricultural 
products was witnessed between 1985 and 1990. This trend is also clear in figures 
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Table 6.9: Prices of Turkish Agricultural Products Received by Farmers 
(TL/kg) 
1985 1986 1987 %^ 1988 1989 1990 
Cereals'' 87.8 - 125.2 42.6 172.9 38.1 231.5 33.9 - - - -
of which 
Wheat 61 - 77 26.2 92 19.5 151 64.1 320 112 497 55.3 
Barley 51 - 63 23.5 79 25.4 132 67 269 103 427 58.7 
Pulses* 192 - 282.6 47.2 357.77 26.6 422.3 18 - - - -
Vegetables* 121 - 173.6 43.5 231.3 33.2 333.8 44.3 675.3 102 1,058 56.7 
Ind.'= Crops* 227.7 - 414.5 82 659.6 59.1 959.9 45.5 - - - -
of which 
Tobacco 1,019 - 1,486 45.8 3,219 116.6 5,954 84.9 - - - -
Cotton*^ 234 - 355 51.7 572 61 718 25.5 1,324 84.4 1,921 45 
Sugarbeet 13 - 17 30.8 23 35.3 45 95.6 65 44.4 112 72.3 
Sunflower 148 - 181 22.3 220 21.5 347 57.7 804 131.7 1,301 61.8 
Fruits* 186.6 - 260.6 39.6 404.6 55.2 618.5 52.9 1,276 106 2,082 63 
of which 
Hazelnuts 493 - 668 35.5 1,065 59.4 1,648 54.7 2,190 32.9 2,885 31.7 
Pistachio 1,072 - 1,446 34.9 2,194 51.7 3,359 53.1 6,517 94 10,048 54.2 
Figs 123 - 195 58.5 321 64.6 480 49.5 835 74 1,359 62.7 
Ohve 93 - 389 318.3 786 102 1,416 80.1 2,643 86.6 5,915 123.8 
Grapes 122 - 140 14.7 263 87.8 351 33.5 876 150 1,309 49.4 
c p i {%Y 45 34.6 38.8 75.4 69.6 63.6 
a = Percentage change over previous year. 
b= Average price. 
c= Industrial. 
d= Aegean Std. I . 
e= Consumer price change over previous year. 
Source: Turkish Agricultural Bank and State Institute of Statistics. 
6.1 and 6.2^. Most agricultural prices in 1990 rose by more than fivefold compared 
to 1985 i.e., an average annual increase of about 100%. The products that had the 
sharpest increase were cereals, industrial crops, and fruits at the category level. At 
the commodity level, sugarbeet, sunflower, figs, and olives had the highest increase. 
The products that witnessed an increase in prices higher than the inflation rate 
were olives and sugarbeet only. It is noticed from table 6.9 that, in general, the 
prices of many agricultural products rose by less than the rate of inflation which 
leaves farmers worse off. However, the Turkish government compensate farmers 
through different subsidies granted mainly by the Agricultural Bank. 
In 1992, the cotton harvest is estimated to be around 606 thousand tons, 8% 
higher than the previous year owing to good weather conditions. The minimum 
purchase prices were announced as between TL 5,600 - 6,200 and TL 5,350 - 5,950 
per kilo for Aegean and Cukurova cotton respectively. Also, in 1992, the hazelnut 
harvest was higher than in 1991. The 1992/93 harvest is estimated at 530 - 540 
thousand tons compared to 460 thousand tons for 1991. The price of hazelnut was 
declared as TL 9,000 per kilo to be raised by TL 300 every month compared to 
about T L 5,600 per kilo in 1991 (Turkiye Is Bankasi, 1992). 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates a slow divergence from the 1985 price level of cereals, 
pulses, and vegetables. But in 1987, the price gap between cereals and vegetables 
widened due to the overall sharp increase in the prices of the latter. In figure 
6.2, the prices of fruits and industrial crops are clearly increasing at rates higher 
than any other agricultural product. The main reasons for the rise in Turkish 
agricultural products are inflation and the devaluation of the lira, with the latter 
^ The graphs show the changes in the price of agricultural products by category until 1988 only due 
to the lack of data after that period. 
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increasing the prices of imported inputs (seeds, fertihsers, machinery spare parts, 
...etc.) which raise the cost of production with inflation raising the cost of labour, 
transport, and packaging. The rise in the prices of agricultural products reduces 
the demand at home and although this makes more goods available for exportation, 
it is not necessary that exports will increase because the increasing costs erodes 
the competitiveness of Turkish agricultural products. 
6.9 Agricultural Inputs 
The main inputs used by Turkish farmers for their agricultural activities are 
fertiUsers, machinery, credits, and water. Seeds and labour are of secondary im-
portance and I will touch on them later in the chapter. In what follows, the four 
main agricultural inputs will be discussed in detail. 
6.9.1 Fertilisers 
Before 1980, fertiliser consumption increased rapidly because farmers pur-
chased this input at low subsidised prices. This created excess demand and a 
non-price allocation mechanism was used to distribute fertilisers to the farmers. 
There was an uneven distribution of available supply and some regions (Mediter-
ranean, Aegean, and Marmara) were more favoured than others (northern and 
southern areas). Also, import-substitution crops were benefiting from this system 
more than others. 
With the Uberalisation of prices and the removal of subsidies on fertihsers, 
it was expected that the demand would remain more or less the same but there 
would be more efficient use of this input. Table 5.10 shows the different amounts of 
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fertiUsers used in the 1980s, the area of fertilised land, and the amount of fertUisers 
used per thousand hectare. 
The total amount of fertilisers used increased by about 20% between 1982 and 
1990 with the area of land fertilised increasing by about 15% during the same 
period (this period was chosen for comparison due to the lack of data on the area 
to which fertilisers were applied after 1988). However, the amount of fertihsers 
used per 1,000 hectares decreased in the 1980s. Turkish farmers used 499 tons 
per 1,000 hectares in 1982 and were encouraged to reduce that amount to 475.4 
tons in 1988 as a result of the rationalisation of prices. The reduction in the 
amount of fertilisers used per 1,000 hectares and the rise in the yields (see table 
6.3) demonstrates that there was a more efficient use of fertihsers after 1980 and 
that there was over-use and waste during the subsidisation era or that the quahty 
of fertiUsers improved after 1980. 
Table 6.10: Fertiliser Use (1,000 tons) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
21 % Nitrogen 4,034 4,718 4,754 4,383 4,538 5,435 5,149 5,429 5,711 
16-18 % Phosphorous 3,350 3,635 3,380 2,800 3,056 3,440 2,881 3,523 3,671 
48-52 % Potash 66 49 62 67 94 101 83 116 126 
Total 7,451 8,402 8,197 7,251 7,690 8,977 8,114 9,069 9,508 
Area Fertilised" 14,922 15,948 16,220 15,159 15,570 16,595 17,067 - -
(1) 0.55 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.72 0.76 0.75 - -
(2) 499 526.8 505.4 478 493.9 540.8 475.4 - -
a = in thousand hectares. 
(1) Proportion of area fertilised to cultivated area. 
(2) Amount of fertilisers used (in tons) per 1,000 hectares. 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
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6.9.2 Machinery 
An important characteristic of Turkey's agricultural development has been the 
high capital intensity associated with the use of heavy farm machinery and large 
irrigation projects. Those three elements received generous government incentives 
in the form of direct subsidies to tractors, low interest rates on credits, and low 
water charges. The growth of farm machinery has been rapid as the total number 
of tractors increased from about 441 thousand in 1979 to 673 thousand in 1989, 
i.e., more than 50% increase. This rise in the number of tractors used may be 
attributed to the subsidised loans given by the government for their purchase and 
the increasing efficiency and productivity of the Turkish agricultural machinery 
industry. Moreover, the importance of equipment associated with labour-intensive 
techniques of farming like wooden ploughs, threshing sleds, fanning mills, and seed 
cleaners decUned at an annual rate of 10-15%. Hence, the ratio of capital to labour 
in the cereal producing areas, for example, increased from US$ 3 to more than US$ 
100 per man-year in the last three decades. 
6.9.3 Agricultural Credits 
In the last decade, agricultural credits rose sharply from about TL 194 billion 
(in 1979) to about TL 18,400 biUion in 1990 (see table 6.11). The share of those 
credits in the total volume of credits decUned during the seventies (23% in 1971, 
22.6% in 1975, and 20% in 1980). However, this share increased in the 1980s to 
reach more than one third of total credits. On the other hand, the share of agri-
culture in GDP was not affected by the increasing inflow of capital and continued 
to dechne, mainly due to the faster growth occurring in other sectors; especially 
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industry. This poses a question about the efficiency of capital used in the agri-
cultural sector in comparison to other sectors, whether there is waste, or whether 
capital in agriculture reached the stage of diminishing returns to scale. 
The agricultural credits comprise credits to pubhc enterprises which intervene 
in the market by guaranteeing agricultural support prices; credits granted by agri-
cultural sales co-operatives and financed by the Agricultural Bank; and other types 
of credits granted by credit co-operatives and financed mainly by the Agricultural 
Bank or commercial banks. In most cases, the credits financed by the Agricultural 
Bank and deposit money banks are refinanced by the Central Bank at very low 
rediscount rates. 
Table 6.11: Agricultural Credits (TL biUion) 
1979 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Agricultural Bank 42.5 741.8 1,248 2,235 2,763 4,144 5,986 
Credit Co-operatves* 27.8 387.5 632.5 1,055 1,625 2,424 4,128 
Sales Co-operatives 122.7 587.3 1,264 1,549 2,869 5,356 9,276 
Seed Credits 0.9 9.9 13.6 27.8 25.1 28.8 68 
Total 193.9 1,726.5 3,158 4,867 7,282 11,953 18,392 
(*) Credits given by the Agricultural Bank through Credit 
Co-operatives. 
Source: State Institute of Statistics (rounded figures). 
Table 6.12 demonstrates that the amount of the interest rate subsidy on agricul-
tural credits financed by the Central Bank through credit co-operatives diminished 
throughout the 1980s while this subsidy was, more or less, the same on credits fi-
nanced by the Turkish commercial banks in the last decade. However, in both 
cases, the subsidy was much higher compared to the end of the 1970s. The system 
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of subsidisation involves important negative consequences that create distortions 
in the Turkish money market. 
Table 6.12: Interest Rates on Agricultural Credits 
(% per annum) 
1979 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Central Bank 
Short-term Credits 
General 10.75 52 48 45 54 
Agricultural Credits 10.4-11.25 - - - -
Credit Co-operatives - 28 28 28 40 
Sales Co-operatives - 46.5 46.5 45 54 
Commercied Banks 
Short-term Credits 
General 16 62 60 66 87.9 
Agriculture 14 30 30 36 -
Medium-term Credits 
General 20 62 58 62 92.5 
Agriculture 16 30 30 30 -
Source: OECD, March 1981 and 1990/1991. 
First, the fact that it was based on cheap Central Bank credits meant that 
the demand for these credits may not be met by the available supply of savings. 
This created conflicts with the objectives of the monetary pohcy concerning the 
restriction on money supply expansion in the 1980s, which is part of the adjustment 
package. Second, borrowers will try to get more credit than they need for their 
agricultural operations leading to leakages into other uses. Third, the pressure 
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on credits from the agricultural sector would deprive other sectors of the capital 
they needed for their development which would obUge them to borrow from other 
sources such as unorganised markets or foreign banks at very high rates. 
For the reasons mentioned above, there is a need to eUminate the subsidy 
on agricultural credits in order for it to be used more efficiently by farmers and 
eliminate the distortions in the money market. 
6.9.4 Water Charges 
Users of water for irrigation in Turkey are expected to pay full capital costs 
(over 50 years with no interest) in addition to operation and maintenance costs 
of irrigation projects built by the government. The former are calculated after 
the completion of the project and the users are billed annually; the latter are 
estimated every year. However, the government does not cover all costs of the 
irrigation projects due to: (i) inflation which erodes the non-inflation adjusted real 
value of the collected charges, (ii) the maintenance charges are not well prepared to 
cover all operational and maintenance costs, and (iii) there is evasion from payment 
leading to collection rates lower than estimated (World Bank, 1982). 
However, with the rationalisation of prices after 1980, water charges have risen; 
but the problem of uncovered costs is still unsolved with its burden on the gov-
ernment's budget. Therefore, there is a need to change the existing system of 
payment which is based on charges per decar into a system based on volumetric 
charge proportional to the amount of water used by the farmer. This would hmit 
the waste in water use, increase the efficiency of irrigation, and may increase the 
area of land irrigated by diverting the surplus in water (formed under the new 
257 
system) to new lands (World Bank, 1982). 
6.10 Employment in Agriculture 
Table 6.13 shows that despite the increasing Turkish population, from about 40 
million in 1975 to about 60 million in 1990, the share of agricultural employment 
declined from 67.27% of total employment to 45%. This decline may be attributed 
to several reasons. 
Table 6.13: Agricultural Employment (thousand) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
Total Population 40,347 44,736 50,664 56,100 
Economically Active Population 17,383 18,522 20,556 23,063 
Total Economically Active 
Population in Agriculture* 11,694 11,104 12,118 10,283 
Agriculture and Livestock 11,650 10,993 12,037 -
Forestry and Logging 28 91 58 -
Fishing 14 19 22 -
Share of Agricultural Employment 
in Total Employment (%) 67.27 59.95 58.95 44.6 
(*) The discrepancies in the figures are the responsibility 
of the source. 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
First, despite the fact that the share of agriculture in GDP declined, the area of 
land sown increased, however, the increasing mechanisation of Turkish agriculture 
reduced the demand for labour. Second, the migration of Turkish workers to 
Europe, mainly Germany, had its adverse effects on the agricultural labour force 
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although i t had some positive effects on the rural community as a whole through 
the transfer of hard currency by the migrant workers to their home villages. Th i rd , 
rural migration reduced agricultural employment as better health and education 
services in urban areas attracted young Turkish farmers. This led to a decUne in 
the ratio of rural population to to ta l population f rom 47% in 1985 to 41% in 1990 
while the urban population share rose f rom 53% to 59% during the same period 
according to the 1990 census of population.^ Fourth, better wages in the cities 
and other non-agricultural sectors (see table 6.14) may be considered among the 
important factors leading to the decline in the share of agricultural employment. 
Table 6.14 demonstrates that the wage difference between the agricultural sector 
and other sectors, mainly industry, widened in the 1980s to the obvious disdvantage 
of agricultural workers. I n addition, although 46% of the labour force is engaged in 
agriculture, the income received is only 25% of the total . Thus, agricultural workers 
receive the lowest pay in the country according to the 1990 census of population. 
Finally, the lack of investment i n the agricultural sector and subsectors (see next 
section) compared to other sectors such as manufacturing and services contributed 
to the transfer of agricultural workers. 
® It must be mentioned that the definitions of urban centres and villages vary with each census due 
to the change in the administrative law, hence leading in some cases to misjudgements if one rehes 
completely on the census data. 
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Table 6.14: Changes of Daily Wages in Agriculture and Other Selected Sectors 
( T L ) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Agriculture 521.11 658.77 930.77 1,277 - - - 7,019 11,034 28,922 
Fishing 505.19 669.37 890.78 1,222 - - - 5,252 10,308 23,709 
Chemicals 614.96 773.55 1,071 1,479 - - - 11,971 24,422 46,728 
oil & Coal 652.22 828.44 1,165 1,591 - - - 16,325 35,829 51,742 
Non-metallic Products 561.58 714.27 960.58 1,318 - - - 9,038 18,237 35,769 
Trade 465.79 592.93 793.71 1,198 - - - 8,109 10,872 23,574 
Banks 569.4 773.84 990.53 1,304 - - - 10,397 20,423 43,502 
Rubber Products 559.58 704.45 930.13 1,323 - - - 10,774 7,905 35,329 
Source: State Insti tute of Statistics. 
6.11 Investment in Turkish Agriculture 
The growing importance given to non-agricultural sectors in the investment 
promotion policies is revealed by the sectoral distribution of investment certifi-
cates issued by the State Planning Organisation (SPO). Table 6.15 shows that the 
share of subsidised agricultural investment in tota l expenditure for investment aid 
given by the government increased f rom 0.72 per cent in 1986 to 1.5 per cent in 
1991. Other sectors such as services and manufacturing had the largest shares of 
investment certificates which allowed them to benefit f rom the government's in-
centives more than any other sector because the incentives were directed at them. 
On the other hand, i t is true that the Turkish Agricultural Bank offers subsidised 
credits to farmers, but those credits which increased substantially in the 1980s 
were not enough to boost agriculture and increase exports. 
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Table 6.15: Sectoral Distr ibution of the value of Investment Certificates ( T L 
billion) 
1986 %* 1987 %* 1988 %* 1989 %* 1990 %* 1991 %* 
Agrc. 37 0.72 164 2.4 126 1.1 509 2.6 2,399 10.6 575 1.5 
Mining 305 5.94 519 7.6 232 2 529 2.7 618 2.7 1,365 3.6 
Manuf. 1,986 38.7 2,755 40.3 5,739 49.2 9,361 48.3 15,578 68.8 23,858 62.6 
Energy 207 4.03 642 9.4 1,079 9.3 365 2 462 2 1,647 4.3 
Services 2,593 50.55 2,755 40.3 4,476 38.4 8,612 44.5 3,588 15.8 10,686 28 
Total 5,129 - 6,837 - 11,653 - 19,376 - 22,645 - 38,131 -
Source: Turkiye Is Bankasi. 
(*) Percentage share in to ta l value of investment certificates. 
Turkish agriculture needs more investment in the agricultural subsectors such 
as packaging and more export incentives (which may be based on cheaper seeds 
and fertihsers) to farmers who achieve a certain level of exports, and/or produc-
t ion per hectare. On the other hand, table 6.16 demonstrates that the private 
sector investment in agriculture ranked f i f t h in terms of its share in total invest-
ment i n 1990, while the public sector investment share ranked th i rd . Sectors that 
are attracting most of the private investment capital are housing, manufacturing, 
transportation, and tourism while the public sector's main investment areas are 
transportation and energy. 
Finally, Turkey has embarked on a huge agricultural investment, the South 
Anatoha Project (GAP) which is expected to boost agricultural production tremen-
dously and meet the domestic demand for these goods in addition to enhancing the 
potential to export. This project w i l l be dealt w i th in detail later in the chapter. 
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Table 6.16: Gross Fixed Investment by Sector 
1989 1990 Percentage Volume Change Over Previous Year 
T L billion Share(%) T L billion Share(%) 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991^  19922 
Private Sector 
Agriculture 822.7 3.9 1,768 4.8 - 12.2 20.5 - 12.3 - 25.7 46.1 - 6.7 20.4 
Mining 285.8 1.4 445 1.2 7.9 35.1 7.7 2.1 5 0.8 6.5 
Manufacturing 4,381 20.9 10,016 27.8 13.9 - 4.2 0.7 - 4.3 63.7 - 5.1 7.5 
Energy* 359.5 1.7 571 1.6 145 - 7.2 65.8 29.4 10.9 13.5 11.9 
Transportation 2,321 11.1 4,651 11.8 - 5.9 3.9 - 5.5 - 0.7 55 9 13.4 
Tourism 1,356 6.5 2,246 6.2 61.8 48.2 44.4 37.8 9.9 - 3.8 3.1 
Housing 10,412 49.7 15,008 41.6 36.7 44.6 29.2 6.3 - 8 - 8.1 1.5 
Education 113 0.5 210 0.6 35.1 27.5 5.5 27 24.6 11.7 9 
Health 132.8 0.6 317 0.9 44.5 20 - 17.6 51.3 58.9 62.9 31.6 
Other Services 767 3.7 1,251 3.5 8.6 8.5 3.9 4.5 12.5 1.6 5.2 
Subtotal 20,953 100 36,483 100 16.4 18.6 13.5 3.3 19.2 - 3.1 6.9 
(54.7=5) (56.53) 
Public Sector 
Agriculture 1,787 10.3 2,664 9.5 13.6 26.7 - 3.8 6.3 - 5 11.9 - 8.4 
Mining 550.5 3.2 948 3.4 - 27.5 - 44.2 - 7 - 33.2 12.6 - 1.3 11 
Manufacturing 788.2 4.5 1,257 4.5 - 19.8 - 40.3 - 25.7 - 27.6 5.8 16.9 3.3 
Energy* 5,177 29.8 6,008 21.4 14.2 - 8.7 - 2.1 4.2 - 21.9 - 10 - 0.8 
Transportation 5,189 29.9 9,595 34.1 13.9 10.4 - 23.4 - 3.6 22.1 7.5 - 12.1 
Tourism 184.6 1.1 362 1.3 141.6 - 10.1 - 17.6 - 33.3 26.2 19.3 13.6 
Housing 323.6 1.9 1,115 4 - 9.4 - 23.9 . 3.8 - 1.9 122.3 - 58.1 - 32.8 
Education 1,092 6.3 1,958 7 5.6 27.6 3.3 2.8 23 - 15.3 54.5 
Health 374.4 2.2 777 2.8 15 26.7 4.2 16.9 38.6 0.8 39.1 
Other Services 1,883 10.9 3,412 12 41 5.8 - 20.9 - 24.5 25.7 22.7 26.3 
Subtotal 17,351 100 28,096 100 7.5 - 3.7 - 13.7 - 5.8 7.9 1.9 2.9 
(45.3=*) (43.5^) 
Total 38,304 100 64,580 100 11 5.4 - 1.3 - 1 14.1 - 1 5.2 
(1) Provisional, 
water. 
Source: O E C D , 
(2) 1992 programme, (3) Share in total investment, (4) Electricity, gas, 
1990/1991 and 1992 (figures discrepancies are due to rounding). 
6.12 Land Ownership 
Turkey's agricultural land is characterised by the small size of holdings which 
range between 10-500 decars (1-50 hectares) as table 6.17 demonstrates. About 
70 per cent of the holdings is i n the range of 50 to 500 decars (5-50 hectares). 
The small sizes of land, which may be due to the inheritance laws in Islam or the 
low income of Turkish farmers, prevents the efficient use of machinery. However, 
the number of tractors used has increased enormously in the last three decades 
f r o m about 40 thousand tractors in 1960 to 673 thousand in 1989. This raises the 
question of whether this huge expansion in the machinery used is of any economic 
significance in terms of the capital-output relationship ( results of the production 
funct ion) . Since the sector is relatively suflBcient in resources (inputs) i t may be 
unwise to over-use capital (machinery) which wi l l deprive other sectors of this 
factor, which they may desperately need for development. 
Table 6.17 shows that the average size of the family farm is about 72 decars (to-
ta l area divided by the number of holdings) i.e., 7.2 hectares, considered quite small 
for efficient mechanised agriculture (World Bank, 1982). Certain measures should 
be taken by the government to change the existing situation. These measures may 
include cheaper seeds, cheaper fertilisers, and subsidised loans for machinery to 
farmers who merge their land holdings. These incentives may be applied starting 
f r o m a min imum land area and may be progressive according to the land size after 
merger. 
I t is not surprising that areas w i t h population over 5,000 have a lower number 
of land owners, compared to areas wi th population less than 5,000, due to the 
occupation of the area by other activities such as industrial plants, commercial 
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Table 6.17: Size of Land Holdings ('000 decars) 
Number of Holdings^ Total Area 
Places with popula-
tion less than 5,000 
Less than 5 174 437.3 
5 - 9 230 1,530 
10 - 19 484 6,531 
20 - 29 447 10,240 
30 - 39 381 12,312 
40 - 49 287 12,110 
50 - 99 722 47,338 
100 - 199 411 52,979 
200 - 499 186 49,924 
500 - 999 25 16,658 
Total 3,345 210,059 
Places with popula-
tion 5,000 and over 
Less than 5 44 114.5 
5 - 9 36 235.7 
10 - 19 43 565.3 
20 - 29 24 532.1 
30 - 39 13 417.3 
40 - 49 13 531 
50 - 99 17 1,054 
100 - 199 11 1,266 
200 - 499 7 1,792 
500 - 999 0.2 103.8 
Total 207 6,613 
(1) In thousands. 
* Hectare = 10 decars. 
- 1980 census of agriculture, rounded figures. 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
centres, and residential estates. On the other hand, the occupation of the area 
w i t h other non-agricultural activities may obUge farmers to give up their land and 
work on these new sites. 
6.13 Problems Facing Turkish Agriculture 
Agriculture i n Turkey has not been able to achieve its potential due to sev-
eral problems. There is a need to improve drainage in the irrigation systems, a 
problem that is now recognised and one that the government is t ry ing to solve. 
However, un t i l now the government has not put any efforts into land reclamation 
and erosion control in central Anatolia despite scattered projects to use trees and 
Avindbreaks to reduce soil losses. I n addition, much of central Turkey's arable land 
has the potential to become a dust bowl; thus there is an urgent need to solve 
this problem before i t is too late. On the other hand, the number of tractors 
and other agricultural machinery are quite large, the fact that most agricultural 
land holdings are small requires small size machinery and equipment for the use of 
small farmers. Moreover, farmers in Turkey require more technical and extension 
services (Bri t ish Agricultural Export Council, 1986). 
On the input side, Turkey has a shortage of seeds supply both in terms of qual-
i t y and quantity. Therefore, despite domestic efforts to establish a seed industry, 
the country continues to rely on imported products despite the increase in output 
and improving quality of local production. Thus, a rise in the quantity and quality 
of Turkish seeds w i l l lead to less reUance on imported inputs, which wUl reduce the 
pressure on the foreign exchange reserves. Moreover, Turkish farmers face difficul-
ties in building green houses due to high tariffs imposed on the inputs (plastics and 
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shade netting) of those projects. I t may be economically viable to Hft the tariffs 
on these inputs since the crops grown in these houses (such as tomatoes used by 
agro-industrial companies for the production of tomato paste) may be exported. 
Finally, a major problem that faces agricultural exports is the transport sector 
which is the obstacle to increases i n the production and exports of fresh fruits and 
vegetables particularly in the early season (Turkey has a comparative advantage in 
vegetable growing in the southern regions which border the Mediterranean) when 
the availability of adequate and timely transportation is crucial. More than half 
of the f r u i t and vegetable exports are transported by road to commercial centres 
in the Middle East and Europe (both East and West). Government regulations 
do not permit foreign transport companies to enter the Turkish market. Thus, 
protected Turkish transport companies enjoy a monopoly status and charge high 
rates. Another problem facing Turkish exporters is the high price and poor quality 
of packaging which erode their competitiveness in terms of higher costs and the 
quality of packaging that lags behind European standards (World Bank, 1982). 
6.14 Aid to Agriculture 
The main source of foreign aid to agriculture is the World Bank. Over the 
recent years there has been a whole series of projects supporting the livestock 
industry and its development. Other areas of support include cereal storage, hor-
t icul tura l production and export marketing, fertihser plant modernisation, and 
forestry production. Moreover, there are projects of a smaller scale, compared to 
the World Bank's projects, carried out by the FAO and include vaccine production 
plants for livestock and poultry. 
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6.15 The South Anatolia Project (GAP) 
The South Anatoha project or GAP (the Turkish acronym for the project) is 
the largest public investment ever realised by Turkey. I t started as an irrigation 
and energy project in the 1960s. Af te r 1984, i t was turned into a multipurpose 
development programme comprising dams, hydroelectric power plants, and irriga-
t ion facilities to be buil t on the Tigris and the Euphrates. In addition the project 
w i l l have an impact on the development of sectors such as health, education, trans-
portat ion, communication and others. 
GAP is a combination of 13 large projects on irrigation and energy in the 
south east of Turkey. I t includes 21 dams among which the largest is The Ataturk 
dam (the key feature of the project), and 17 hydroelectric power plants on the 
Tigris, Euphrates and their tributaries. The total cost of the project is estimated 
to reach US$ 21 bill ion and completion is envisaged for the year 2005. The project 
covers the provinces of Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Mardin, Bitlis, 
SanUurfa, and Sirnak. The combined surface area of these provinces is 75,958 sq. 
kilometers i.e., 9.4 % of the tota l surface area of Turkey. The population of the 
region, according to the 1985 census, is about 4.3 million and makes up 8.5% 
of Turkey's to ta l population. I t is expected that by year 2005, the population 
of the region w i l l reach nearly 8 mill ion comprising no less than 10% of total 
population. Meanwhile, i t is expected that the phenomenon of out migration wi l l 
be reversed and people l iving in the region's towns wi l l comprise 92% of the region's 
population. Agricul tural employment is expected to reach 3 million representing 
an 80% increase above the present figure (table 6.18). W i t h the completion of all 
the units in the project, the annual hydroelectrical production in the region wi l l 
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reach 27 bill ion kwh representing 22% of the total hydroelectrical power potential 
in Turkey. As a result, Turkey's dependence on imported oil for power generation 
wiU be substantially diminished reducing the import b i l l . 
The aims of GAP may be summarised as follows: 
• The improvement of the economic infrastructure of the region and the achieve-
ment of higher income levels. 
• Increasing production and employment opportunities in the agricultural sector. 
• Increasing employment opportunities in the urban areas of the south east; thus, 
reducing rural migration. 
• Better utilisation of resources, achievement of sustained economic growth, and 
an increase in the export potential of the region. 
Table 6.18: Present Situation and Targets of GAP 
1985 2005 
Gross Regional Product ( T L bilHon) 8,442 31,750 
Population (thousands) 4,304 7,809 
Employment (thousands) 1,528 2,796 
Per Capita Income (Regional) 
in thousand T L , 1990 prices 
1,962 4,061 
Source: G.A.P Regional Development Administration. 
When the South Anatolia project is completed in 2005, i t is estimated that 
more than 1.5 mil l ion hectares of land wi l l be irrigated, almost doubling agri-
cultural production and more than doubhng the agricultural value-added in the 
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region (table 6.19). The increase in production wi l l enable Turkey to feed 80 mil-
hon people and increase its national income by 12% higher than i t would have 
been without the project. 
As mentioned above, GAP is not l imited to energy production and irrigation 
alone. I t is expected that w i t h the cultivation of more land due to the increase 
in irrigated area, agricultural subsectors wi l l also flourish. Changes wi l l occur not 
only in agriculture but in the regional economy as a whole attracting investments 
in infrastructure, canned food, storage, integrated animal husbandry, textiles and 
textile machinery, fa rm equipment, chemicals, weaving, clothing, knitwear, and 
tourism. I t is expected that the agriculture-based industries in the region wi l l be 
producing four bill ion dollars exportable surplus in 2005. 
The two features (financing and construction) of the project being mainly Turk-
ish is one of the sources of pride that the government has about GAP. Financing 
of the project is mainly f rom domestic sources wi th only about 25% foreign. In 
addition, the main construction is also entrusted to ATA, a joint venture of three 
Turkish companies. On the other hand, the construction stages of the project did 
not run smoothly all the time. In June 1988, there were reports in the Turkish 
press of workers being laid-off because some contractors did not have the money to 
pay them. This was caused by the government's tight anti-inflationary monetary 
policy. There were also reports of bad construction and serious leaks in the tunnels 
system connected to the dams. Meanwhile, SPO and the GAP office are t rying 
to stimulate the interest of foreign agro-industrial investors by convening various 
conferences and seminars aimed at the agricultural and industrial development 
that should take place i n the second half of the 1990s. I n addition, studies are 
269 
Table 6.19 : Estimated Production and Value-added in Agriculture 
1985 2005 
Production^ Value-added^ Production''^  Value-added^ 
Crop Cultivation 
Wheat 1,749 63.5 3,270 151 
Barley 1,104 32 1,625 52 
Drybeans 2 2 53 45 
Lentils 465 231 705 309 
Cotton 161 46 478 193 
Seasame 18 20 70 89 
Tomatoes 193 55 1,024 260 
Potatoes 5 1 325 39 
Other vegetables 1,092 119 1,181 226 
Maize 8 1 150 12 
Rice 6 5 96 51 
Feed grains 6 2 265 22 
Soybeans - 0.1 158 32 
Groundnut - 0 85 59 
Sunflower 6 1 91 24 
Pistachios 33 122 125 -
Grapes 699 290 787 875 
Others - 78.5 -
Subtotal 5,552 1,069 10,488 2,439 
Livestock 
Milk 395 - 1,254 -
Meat 76 - 162 -
Subtotal 466 - 1,416 -
Fishery and Forestry - 33 - 100 
Total 6,018 1,102 11,904 2,539 
(-) Rounded figures. 
(1) Thousand tons. 
(2) T L billion in 1988 prices. 
Source: The General Directorate of Press and Information. 
being prepared in land utilisation, the marketing of products, and the training of 
Turkish farmers ( C O M E T , 1989). 
On the whole, i t is expected that GAP wi l l boost the Turkish economy in 
general and meet the anticipated rise in domestic demand in the future, as well 
as increase exports and reduce imports. This should narrow the trade deficit gap 
and perhaps even create a surplus which wi l l contribute to Turkey's economic 
development and strengthen its balance of payments and its pohtical status both 
regionally and internationally. Observers in Ankara tend to be either enthusiasts 
who are convinced that this is the greatest project Turkey has ever accomphshed, 
or pessimists. The latter point out that no realistic environmental impact studies 
have been done; that Syria opposes the project because i t adversely affects its 
water supply f rom the Euphrates and can therefore prevent any foreign aid from 
being allocated, and that the project has attained importance in Turkey that makes 
objective analysis impossible (Bri t ish Agricultural Export Council, 1986). 
6.16 Conclusion 
The chapter has described the structure of Turkish agriculture and the changes 
that occurred after 1980. I t is diff icult to say whether the structural adjustment 
programme had an absolute advantage or disadvantage. The distortions that ex-
isted before 1980 were eliminated substantially but not completely. Prices are stil l 
not completely determined by the market, although they are more rational now. 
Other distortions include: over-mechanisation in mainly small land holdings, and 
low interest rates on agricultural credits. 
The 1980 economic reforms improved the agricultural sector performance in 
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several respects. The devaluation of the Turkish Ura increased the incentive to 
export; reductions in consumption subsidies led to more rational pricing of food-
stuffs, and increases in the prices of fertilisers encouraged their more efficient use. 
However, the reforms had their negative side, the Uberalisation of trade increased 
agricultural imports by a much higher rate than the rate of increase of agricultural 
exports. Imports rose f r o m US$ 36 mill ion in 1979 to US$ 808 miUion in 1991 com-
pared to a rise in exports f rom US$ 1,344 milUon in 1979 to US$ 2,683 million in 
1991 (see table 6.8). But , the agricultural trade surplus that Turkey enjoyed before 
1980 remained during the decade of the 1980s. Hence, i t may be recommended 
that Turkey keeps its import protection measures on agricultural products and 
continues its export drive and the path of economic reforms to maximise the ben-
efit f rom its resources. A t the same time, Turkey needs to take measures aimed at 
improving agricultural research, extension and veterinary services, infrastructure, 
marketing information, and promotion systems including packaging. 
Trade liberalisation increased agricultural imports of goods that are not grown 
in Turkey. On the other hand, hberalisation has reduced the size of the black 
market in livestock, which had a positive impact on the Turkish economy as a 
whole. This may be considered one of the advantages of structural adjustment in 
Turkey. As regards the EC common agricultural poUcy, this was found to have 
negatively affected some of Turkey's agricultural exports to the Community such 
as citrus f rui ts but, its tradit ional exports of hazelnuts and dried fruits were not 
affected. 
On the whole, Turkey has a big agricultural potential which should not be 
underestimated. Agriculture can contribute to the economy quite substantially 
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and w i t h its development other sectors w i l l be positively affected, mainly industry. 
I t appears that the Turkish government reahsed this fact and thus embarked on 
the GAP project which may contribute substantially to its economic development 
by the begining of the next century. 
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Chapter VII 
The Turkish Tourism Sector in the 1980s 
7.1 Introduction 
The tourism industry was one of the sectors that was positively affected by the 
1980 economic reform. With its outward-oriented policies aimed at increasing its 
foreign exchange receipts, tourism was an important source of hard currency that 
could support Turkey's balance of payments. In addition, tourism was expected 
to increase employment opportunities, income, and tax revenues and reduce the 
current account deficit and foreign debts. 
Before 1980, tourism was relatively less important in the government's eco-
nomic development plans. Sectors such as industry and agriculture had higher 
priority and consequently received more investment funds. However, with the Ub-
eralisation programme in the 1980s and the orientation towards foreign exchange 
generating industries, more financial resources were allocated to the tourism sector 
for the development of its infrastructure and superstructure. Another factor that 
accelerated the pace of growth in the sector was the more liberal foreign invest-
ment policies which were introduced by the Turkish government and led almost to 
a doubling of the foreign capital inflow between 1982 and 1986. 
Other factors contributing to the growth in the sector include the devaluation 
in the Turkish lira, which made the country cheaper to stay in compared to other 
tourist resorts, and the increasing pohtical stabihty after 1980 which encouraged 
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both tourists and foreign investors at the same time. However, as in any other 
country, tourism is very sensitive to political developments whether internal or 
external. Internally, the increasing democratisation of Turkey and its improving 
record of human rights help improve the image of the country and thus increase 
the number of tourists. On the other hand, security problems in the south east or 
political upheavels in the country which may lead to a mihtary coup could reduce 
the number of visitors going to Turkey. Externally, two developments had a clear 
impact on Turkish tourism. On the one hand, the pohtical and economic changes 
in eastern European states increased the flow of citizens from those countries into 
Turkey who go mainly on shopping expeditions. On the other hand, the 1990-91 
Gulf crisis left a negative impact on Turkish tourism both in the form of revenues 
and number of tourists. The impact of the external factor will be assessed later in 
the chapter. 
The impact of the changes occurring in the tourism sector whether in legis-
lation or economic planning led to a fourfold increase in the number of tourists 
visiting Turkey between 1979 and 1989. However, although the development of 
the sector has had its economic benefits, tourism in general has social and phys-
ical (environmental) costs, which are difficult to measure, and may outweigh the 
benefits. 
This chapter will analyse Turkey's potential for tourism, domestic and foreign 
investments in the sector, the current trends in Turkish tourism, and the economic 
impact (costs and revenues) of the industry. Finally, a conclusion with recommen-
dations for the development of the sector will be considered. 
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7.2 Turkey's Tourism Potential 
Turkey has untapped resources for tourism. It combines tourism assets, that 
would satisfy most tourists, at competitive prices. Turkey is the geographical 
bridge between Asia and Europe which makes it easily accessible from both con-
tinents, thus the crossroad of many civilisations. Part of the country is in Europe 
and called "Thrace", while the remaining larger part of the country is in Asia and 
called "Anatolia" or "Asia Minor". The sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, and the 
Dardanelles seperate Europe from Asia. Its strategic geographic position makes it 
easy to enter by any means of transport (air, sea, land). 
Turkey is endowed with an attractive physical environment with the Taurus 
Range parallel to the Mediterranean sea in the south and the Pontic mountains 
along the coast of the Black sea in the north. In addition, Turkey has numer-
ous other mountain peaks in the east which in summer months experience the 
sub-tropical climate of the Mediterranean. The southern Anatohan coast has the 
warmest climate in Turkey and is referred to as the "Turkish Riviera". The ex-
cellent climate with outstanding sightseeing and varied scenery is combined with 
extensive and diverse antiquities of the Hittite, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and Ot-
toman civilisations. Moreover, Turkey has beach resorts that stretch along 7,000 
km of coastline, and particularly along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts where 
the climate permits a seven-month season. It is also in this area where many of the 
antiquities are located. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the Turkish author-
ities realise these advantages and subsequently concentrate most of their projects 
on the southern coast (Turkish Riviera). 
From the above review of Turkey's tourism assets, it is clear that the country 
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has the potential for many kinds of tourism, whether "wanderlust" or "sunlust" 
(terms used by Lea, J., 1988). Moreover, Turkey does not only have tourism 
potential for the summer holiday but for winter too, as its high mountains have 
skiing resorts such as Uludag in Bursa which would guarantee the flow of foreign 
exchange for the country during the off season and thus alleviate the fluctuation 
in tourism earnings from one season to the other. 
The potential for tourism in Turkey requires much capital and planning to be 
fully exploited and with a sector that does not require relatively high labour skills, 
the authorities should stress the importance of development in this sector in their 
economic plans. 
7.3 Investment in the Tourism Sector 
There are several institutions in Turkey that are involved in the promotion of 
tourism, the training of labour, and the granting of loans and credits to investors 
during the initial investment and operational stages. These are: The Promotion 
Foundation of Turkey (TUTAV), the Tourism Development and Training Founda-
tion (TUGEV), and the Tourism Bank (Turizm Bankasi) which has the major role 
in most investments in the tourism sector (OECD, 1987). 
The government's role in the development of tourism is mainly confined to 
infrastructural investments in areas of high potential. The actual physical de-
velopment of the area is left to the private investors, both domestic and foreign, 
who may benefit from a package of incentives off'ered by the government. In what 
follows, there will be a brief review of these incentives in addition to a study of 
domestic and foreign investments in the Turkish tourism sector. 
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7.3.1 Investment Incentives in Tourism 
The Turkish government does not differentiate between domestic and foreign 
investors in the terms and conditions of its tourism investment certificate. This 
means that foreign investors enjoy the same incentives granted to Turkish en-
trepreneurs with the same rights and obligations. 
In order to be eligible to receive an encouragement certificate i.e., benefit from 
the incentives, the project's total fixed capital must be worth TL 250 miUion 
or more in priority development regions (located mostly in central and eastern 
Turkey) and over TL 5 billion elsewhere. The latter consists of two classes of 
regions: "normal", which are in central and western Turkey, and "developed", 
which include the areas in and around major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, 
Izmir, Kocaeli, and Bursa (Alacakhoglu, A. S., 1990). 
In addition to the condition on capital value, other conditions related to the 
nature of the tourist facility exist. These include: accommodation facihties (min-
imum 100 bed capacity), restaurants (minimum chain of three with minimum 30 
persons capacity each), yachting establishments with minimum 45 bed capacity 
fleet, and expansion or modernisation investments related to the ejcisting facihties. 
After meeting the above mentioned conditions, the investor is eligible for the 
following incentives: 
• Allocation of state owned lands in tourist areas where infrastructure is provided. 
Normally, the land is rented to the private investor on a long-term basis. 
• Long-term low interest loans from the Tourism Bank or the Tourism Develop-
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ment Fund. 
• Reduced rates for electricity, water, and gas. 
• Licence to employ foreign personnel up to 20 of total personnel. 
• Property tax exemption for 5 years amounting to 0.4 of the value of fixed 
property. 
t Customs tax exemption of raw material and intermediate goods. 
• Postponement of value-added tax. 
• Cash grant made to investors which is equal to a certain percentage of the 
project's equity finance. 
Other incentives are also included in the government's package such as the free 
transfer of profits and capital to the country of origin. 
7.3.2 Domestic and Foreign Investments in Tourism 
The Tourism Bank in Turkey is the major financial institution involved in the 
tourism industry. Its role is mainly to provide credits to investors in the sector, 
these credits increased substantially between 1981 and 1990 thus reflecting the 
success of the government incentives and the growth in the tourism sector. Table 
7.1 shows that credits granted by different banks for investment in the tourism 
sector increased from about TL 2 billion in 1981 to TL 2,000 biUion in 1990, which 
is an impressive growth even in real terms. 
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Table 7.1: Credits to the Tourism Sector 
(TL biUion) 
Credit Credits 
1981 2.1 1986 61.8 
1982 7.5 1987 206.4 
1983 13.7 1988 764 
1984 24 1989 1,244 
1985 34.5 1990 1,999 
Source: State Institute of 
Statistics. 
The multiplier effect, of the increase in tourism credits, on other sectors in the 
economy would be of great interest for this study, but unfortunately it is impossible 
to be precise in this respect given the data limitation. It is believed that the sector 
that benefited most from the increase in tourism investments is the construction 
sector with a positive eflfect on employment caused by the growth occurring in 
both sectors. 
Turkey's tourism potential combined with the investment incentives off'ered and 
the liberalisation of the economy attracted foreign investors with their hard cur-
rency that the country desperately needs. The tourism sector ranked first among 
other economic sectors in terms of foreign capital invested until 1990 with the 
United Kingdom the largest foreign investor (ICOC, 1990). The total amount of 
foreign capital invested in tourism reached about TL 419 billion i.e., about US$ 163 
miUion. In addition to the foreign exchange flow into Turkey, these investments 
have a positive impact on the flow of tourists into the country given the fact that 
those foreign investors have the experience to cater for what the tourists reaUy 
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need. 
Table 7.2 shows the increase in the number of foreign projects in Turkey since 
1982. Those projects which increased by nearly fourfold by 1986 reflect the high 
profitability of those investments although the capital involved per project (foreign 
investment/project) declined over the period. 
Table 7.2: Foreign Investment in Tourism 
(US$ million) 
Projects F.Invest.'' T.F.Ivest.'' % share*^  
1982 7 19.9 167 11.92 
1983 9 1.8 103 1.75 
1984 13 2.9 271 1.07 
1985 16 14.9 234 6.37 
1986 26 37.1 232 15.99 
(a) Foreign investment. 
(b) Total foreign investment. 
(c) Percentage share of tourism in total foreign 
investment. 
Source: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. 
The decreasing capital per project reflects the diversity of the tourist industry 
in Turkey and the large number of resorts compared to the number of tourists. 
This has meant that entrepreneurs have invested in smaller projects. This has 
decreased costs and maximised the number of facihties so as to cater for as many 
tourists as possible; therefore, increasing the returns on investment. 
7.4 Foreign Tour Operators and the Turkish Travel Trade Sector 
With the growth of the tourism sector in Turkey and the increase in organised 
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international travel, the Turkish travel trade sector developed substantially and 
began to play an important role in the tourism industry. The Turkish local tour 
operators developed from their traditional "travel agency" role into handhng in-
coming tourists and providing all kinds of ground arrangements, operating outgoing 
tour packages for Turkish tourists, and dealing with domestic travel arrangements. 
Istanbul is the centre of Turkish travel trade with the largest number of tourist 
arrivals and tour operators. 
The Turkish travel trade sector faces competition from international tour op-
erators who arrange tourism packages and off'er it to their customers abroad. Since 
the bulk of arrivals are handled by those international operators, the local opera-
tors in Turkey have less power over the inputs of their tour packages and; hence, 
compete in the markets abroad through the price of their product rather than its 
quality. 
Due to the increasing competition among tour operators, Turkish operators 
are diversifying their activities and merging with other fields of tour operations. 
This strategy wiU ensure their continuity in the market in the long-run, increase 
their profits, improve the quality of their service, decrease costs, and improve 
their ability to compete against foreign tour operators. The diversification of 
activities include: hotel management and investment, vacation village investments, 
restaurants, transport, and marina operation. 
Some Turkish observers (Manisali, E. and Yarcan, S., 1987) beHeve that the 
existance of foreign tour operators is beneficial in the short-run in order to attract 
foreign tourists. However, in the long-run, the Turkish foreign tourist market 
should be dominated by Turkish operators through their integrated operations 
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approach and the increase in the number of local operators in the industry. 
Many foreign tour operators (mainly from Germany) arrange management con-
tracts with the owners of a hotel or a vacation village. In this contract, the owner 
of the establishment leases his asset to the tour operator in return for a certain 
percentage of the profits (about 10%) made by the operator in addition to a "basic 
fee" which amounts to 5% of the turnover. The reason for such an arrangement 
is the higher profitability for the foreign operators and their preference to manage 
their accommodation facHities themselves. This arrangement enables them to have 
a good standard of service, design, and layout without engaging in any risks or 
extra costs related to having a fixed asset in Turkey all year round. 
7.5 Trend in the Tourism Sector 
The general trend of the tourism sector in Turkey has been going upward since 
the liberalisation measures in 1980. The growth in the tourism revenues, num-
ber of arrivals, and accommodation capacity was mainly due to the devaluation 
in the Turkish lira which made the country cheaper and increasingly competitive 
in comparison to other countries on the Mediterranean. Moreover, the hberah-
sation policies whether in trade or the movement of capital encouraged foreign 
entrepreneurs to invest in the profitable tourism sector. Finally, probably an im-
portant factor leading to the growth in the tourism sector is the political stabihty 
of Turkey since 1980. 
This section will examine the changes that occurred in the tourism sector with 
respect to indicators such as the number of tourists arriving in the country, the 
country of origin of tourists, accommodation capacity, occupancy rates in hotels, 
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and the average expenditure and nights spent by each tourist. 
7.5.1 Tourist Arrivals in Turkey 
The increasing pubHc investments in infrastructure is one of the main factors 
that encouraged many tourists to visit Turkey, as there are few travel problems. 
Table 7.3 shows that the number of foreigners arriving at Turkish frontiers in-
creased about fivefold within eleven years (1979-1990). Moreover, the two main 
means of transport used by the tourists are the plane and car, those two means 
were used by about half those visiting Turkey in 1979. 
Table 7.3: Foreigners Arriving by Means of Transport 
1979 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Vessel 480,052 548,756 445,922 575,456 725,502 764,237 756,534 
Train 63,109 49,528 53,857 65,086 68,490 77,155 144,753 
Plane 355,289 863,153 966,424 1,419,413 2,142,975 2,347,283 2,563,516 
Car 206,656 728,780 931,079 846,101 1,328,230 1,327,402 1,928,032 
Total 1,105,106 2,190,217 2,397,282 2,906,065 4,265,197 4,516,077 5,392,835 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
However, by 1990, the number of foreigners arriving in Turkey using plane or 
car increased to about 80% of the total number of tourists arriving with a relative 
decUne in arrivals by ship. This fact reflects the increasing capacity and efficiency 
of Turkish infrastructure; especially airports and roads. Therefore, there is a need 
to invest more in these two means of transport by expanding the road network 
and the number of local airports which would facilitate the movement of a larger 
number of tourists from, into, and within Turkey. In fact the Turkish government 
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has been recently investing in buUding new airports and roads to keep the country's 
infrastructure less congested with the increasing number of tourists. In addition, 
increasing the number of charter flights and tour packages may further increase 
the number of tourists. It is believed that direct charter flights from Europe to 
Turkish provincial airports leads to the increasing growth in tourist arrivals by 
plane. Those arriving by cars come mainly from neighbouring eastern European 
countries with shopping purchases loaded into the cars. 
7.5.2 Country of Origin of Tourists 
It is clear from table 7.4 that the bulk of tourists visiting Turkey untU 1989 
came from western Europe and Asia. Those two regions represented about 73% of 
the total number of tourists, western Europe alone represented about 60%. Within 
Europe, German tourists were about one third of total European visitors. The 
United Kingdom was the second most important "exporter" of tourists to Turkey, 
together with Germany they represent about half the European tourists. Greece 
was ranked third; most Greeks go mainly to Istanbul. However, with the poUtical 
developments in eastern Europe, and the resulting deterioration in the economic 
situation of that region, tourists from eastern European countries increased sub-
stantially. The total number of tourists going to Turkey reached about 5.3 milhon 
in 1990 of which 971,000 were Germans, 326,000 Romanians (13,000 only in 1989), 
and 311,000 Yugoslavs. Moreover, visitors from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the 
USSR increased in number by 300-400%. Most eastern European visitors come 
as shoppers rather than hohday makers (Turkey Confidential, 1991). In 1991, the 
number of tourists dechned by about 17.7% (lower than expected) to about 4.7 
million due to the Gulf crisis. About half the tourists came from eastern Europe 
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Table 7.4: Arrivals of Foreign Travellers at Frontiers 
Country 1988 % Share 1989 % Share % Change'' 
France 246,784 5.9 283,545 6.4 14.9 
Germany 767,905 18.4 896,989 20.1 16.8 
Greece 430,331 10.3 277,333 6.2 - 35.6 
Italy 144,322 3.5 154,083 3.5 6.8 
Spain 44,283 1.1 56,176 1.3 26.9 
Switzerland 67,662 1.6 77,945 1.7 15.2 
U.K. 465,142 11.1 405,943 9.1 - 12.7 
Other countries 405,649 9.6 537,816 12.1 32.6 
Total Europe 2,572,078 61.6 2,689,830 60.3 4.6 
Canada 29,220 0.7 31,587 0.7 8.1 
U.S.A 165,401 4.0 204,502 4.6 23.6 
Toted N . America 194,621 4.7 236,089 5.3 21.3 
Austral ia & Japan 66,652 1.6 75,510 1.7 13.3 
Yugoslavia 290,498 7.0 217,266 4.9 - 25.2 
Other E . Europe 285,426 6.8 481,178 10.8 68.6 
Lat in America 21,471 0.5 27,158 0.6 26.5 
As ia 536,171 12.8 591,049 13.3 10.2 
of which 
Iran 233,838 5.6 240,972 5.4 3.1 
Saudi Arabia 32,708 0.8 27,338 0.6 - 16.4 
Afr ica 202,008 4.8 133,912 3.0 - 33.7 
of which 
Algeria 36,027 0.9 17,575 0.4 - 51.2 
Egypt 15,729 0.4 15,452 0.3 - 1.8 
Morocco 4,472 0.1 6,074 0.1 35.8 
Others'" 3,802 0.1 7,159 0.2 88.3 
Total 4,172,727 100 4,459,151 100 6.9 
(a) Percentage change between 1988 and 1989. 
(b) Includes other North America and stateless persons. 
Source: O E C D , 1990. 
which partly compensated the decUne in visitors from other parts of the world 
mainly western Europe (Turkey Confidential, 1992). 
Among Middle Eastern countries, Iran has the highest share of tourists. The 
number of Iranian tourists reached about 240 thousand in 1989 representing 5.4% 
of the total number of tourists visiting Turkey and more than one third of Middle 
Eastern tourists. 
In general, the growth in the number of foreigners visiting Turkey between 
1988 and 1989 reached 6.9%. However, in 1990, the growth in visitors reached 
about 25% but decUned in 1991 by 17.7% due to the Gulf crisis (Turkey Confi-
dential, 1992). These figures are a positive sign concerning the Turkish tourism 
industry; especially when compared with the growth figures of other traditional 
Mediterranean countries such as Greece (3.9%), Italy (- 1.0%), Spain(-0.2%), and 
France (3.6%). 
On the whole, the Turkish authorities should be aware of their competitive edge 
and maintain their competitiveness in terms of the flight fares, tourist packages, 
accommodation prices, and, of course, the quality of service in order to increase 
their share of international tourism. 
7.5.3 Accommodation Capacity 
Table 7.5 shows that there is a considerable growth in accommodation capacity 
to be expected in the next decade. The number of faciUties is expected to more 
than double if we assume that the projects planned and under construction will be 
ready within ten years. The number of beds is expected to be triple the existing 
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Table 7.5: Tourist Accommodation in Turkey (as of 31/12/89) 
Planned Under Construction Operating 
A B C A B C A B C 
Hotels 
5. Star 36 11,108 23,377 23 7,367 15,694 28 7,615 15,473 
4. Star 82 15,045 27,323 33 6,454 13,330 49 8,092 16,533 
3. Star 315 30,321 62,449 148 12,388 25,304 154 12,262 24,744 
2. Star 274 12,262 25,043 199 9,297 18,627 316 16,112 30,996 
1. Star 43 1,418 2,834 76 2,666 5,010 256 9,426 18,040 
Motels 
1st Class 6 146 295 14 734 1,466 16 912 1,832 
2nd Class 28 690 1,364 31 784 1,522 31 658 1,320 
Holiday Villages 
1st Class 51 14,418 30,964 14 3,867 8,215 27 8,421 17,907 
2nd Class 15 3,780 7,608 3 865 1,856 6 533 1,225 
Guest Houses 160 2,741 5,348 77 1,598 3,138 139 2,205 4,364 
Camp Sites 15 1,104 3,204 6 780 2,205 27 2,453 2,745 
Inns 1 56 150 - - - 13 712 2,369 
Hot Springs - - - - - - 1 20 40 
Apart Hotels - - - - 4 7 3 141 496 
Special 3 1,258 1,858 9 346 705 30 1,041 2,002 
Total 1,029 92,347 191,817 633 47,150 97,079 1,102 70,603 146,086 
A is number of facilities. 
B is number of rooms. 
C is number beds. 
Source: Ministry of Tourism. 
capacity by the time the projects are finished. 
The bulk of Turkish tourist accommodation capacity exists in hotels and hol-
iday villages. However, the fact that more than half the hotels' capacity (55,740 
beds out of 105,786 beds) is in 2 star and 3 star hotels shows that most of those 
visiting Turkey prefer to pay as little as possible on accommodation. However, 
given the high spending propensity of tourists in Turkey (see table 7.8) one can 
say that those tourists spend less on accommodation and more on commodities 
such as food, transport, ...etc. 
The growth in the accommodation capacity in the tourism sector has beneficial 
backward and forward linkages for the Turkish economy. The hmited amount 
of data restricts any detailed study of the impact of such growth, but one can 
say that the activities in the accommodation subsector of tourism have positive 
backward linkages with the construction sector; thus leading to its growth with 
all the multiplier effect that this might have on employment, banking, increasing 
experience, consumption, and GNP growth. On the other hand, some negative 
side effects might occur in terms of higher inflation, and increasing pressure on 
the exchange rate. The latter effect depends on the elasticity to import of the 
construction sector. The forward linkages are expected to occur mainly in terms 
of higher employment and the rise in foreign exchange revenues. These Unkages 
may have their inflationary pressures on the economy with a positive impact on 
the exchange rate. 
7.5.4 Occupancy Rates in Turkish Tourist Accommodation 
Turkey seems to be behind other European tourist resorts with respect to the 
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occupancy rates of its tourist accommodation facilities (table 7.6). Countries like 
the United Kingdom, Spain, and Portugal have higher annual average occupancy 
rates. However, Turkey's accommodation sector is more busy over the whole year 
if compared to countries like Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. 
Although the occupancy rates for Turkey in the peak month (August) is rela-
tively high (66.4%), other countries like Italy, Spain, and Portugal have a higher 
rate (more than 70%). This raises questions about under-use of capacity and 
inefficiency in the Turkish acommodation sector. Maniscdi, E. and Yarcan, S., 
(1987) showed in their survey that the occupancy rates in foreign-managed hotels 
in Turkey is 83.3%, while it was 67.5% in locally-managed hotels. Assuming that 
most foreign managed hotels have direct arrangements with foreign tour operators, 
it is still the responsibility of the management in Turkish hotels to be more efficient 
and competitive if they want to stay in the business. They should have their ar-
rangements with foreign tour operators and offer better quality service and lower 
prices. The latter policy could easily be implemented if there was an incentive 
package from the government which would increaise the occupancy rates and solve 
the problem of unutilised capacity. Turkey has more than 30% of its tourist ac-
commodation capacity unutilised during the peak season. This unutihsed capacity 
goes as low as 76.3% in January, the lowest rate among all countries under study 
in the table. 
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Table 7.6: Monthly Hotel Occupancy Rates of Beds in 1989 (%) 
Germany Italy* Portugal* Spain Switzerland* Turkey U.K. 
January 27.0 24.2 34.3 43.0 27.3 23.7 26.0 
February 33.0 31.3 41.3 48.5 39.7 27.9 33.0 
March 34.9 32.1 49.7 53.5 39.3 34.0 40.0 
April 34.5 35.9 54.0 48.2 30.0 39.2 40.0 
May 43.4 32.7 57.5 52.7 25.6 56.0 45.0 
June 46.0 42.8 56.8 53.6 34.5 54.0 53.0 
July 53.5 60.5 64.3 62.8 45.8 58.7 56.0 
August 54.0 71.0 76.9 74.8 49.1 66.4 60.0 
September 51.8 47.2 65.1 60.7 43.9 61.7 59.0 
October 44.2 35.6 56.2 51.8 30.3 51.3 51.0 
November 30.3 22.8 40.5 44.1 16.7 32.5 40.0 
December 27.2 26.2 34.0 38.4 20.4 28.5 36.0 
Annual Average 40.0 38.5 52.5 52.7 33.5 44.5 44.9 
(*) Rates for 1988. 
Source: OECD, 1990. 
The fluctuation in occupancy rates is directly related to the seasonality of 
tourism which creates dilemmas for both policy-makers and investors at the same 
time. I t is difficult to say whether Turkey should invest more in accommodation 
when this extra capacity will be used for a Umited number of months only. The 
issue of seasonality will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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7.6 The Economic Impact of Tourism 
7.6.1 Nights Spent in Tourist Accommodation and Tourist Expenditure 
Table 7.7 shows that the average length of stay for tourists in Turkey is less 
than the average stay of tourists in the countries under study. 
Table 7.7: Average Nights Spent 
in Tourist Accommodation. 
1987 1988 1989 
Austria 5.4 5.3 5.2 
Germany 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Italy 4.6 4.5 -
Netherlands 2.1 2.6 2.8 
Portugal 4.5 4.5 4.4 
Spain 6.5 6.5 5.9 
Switzerland 3.7 3.7 3.6 
Turkey 3.1 3.4 3.1 
Yugoslavia 5.9 5.8 5.7 
Average 4.2 4.3 4.125 
Source: OECD, 1990. 
Although the average stay in Turkey is higher than the average for countries 
like Germany and Portugal, the average nights spent in Turkey is low if compared 
to other countries on the Mediterranean such as Italy (6.3 nights), Spain (4.5 
nights), and Yugoslavia (5.7 nights). 
On the other hand, the big inflow of tourists to Spain, Italy, and Switzerland 
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(table 7.9) and the higher average of nights spent there in comparison to Turkey 
was not reflected in higher receipts per tourist (table 7.8). On the contrary, the 
average receipt per tourist in Turkey reached US$ 573 in 1989 compared to figures 
of US$ 301 for Spain, US$ 217 for Italy, and US$ 556 for Switzerland. The high 
receipt per tourist in Turkey could be attributed to the large numbers of "tourists" 
from Eastern Europe who visit the country on shopping expeditions. Some Eastern 
European "tourists" go to Turkey with goods which they sell in informal markets 
in Istanbul and buy other items such as clothing which are in short supply at 
home, others come with their hard currency. This sort of business tourism or 
"suitcase trade" increases the revenues from tourism with a minor pressure on 
tourism sites (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992) thus rendering the comparison 
with other countries that have a large tourism sector, such as Spain, some what 
inaccurate. 
Overall, Turkey's receipts per tourist are the highest among the main Euro-
pean countries with the exception of the United Kingdom and Germany. In 1990, 
Turkey's net revenues (receipts minus expenditure) from tourism increased to US$ 
2,705 million but decUned in 1991 to US$ 2,062 million. Receipt per tourist de-
cKned in 1990 and 1991 to US$ 562 and US$ 553 respectively. The dechne in 
receipts in 1991 was mainly due to the Gulf crisis. 
The relatively smaller number of nights spent by tourists in Turkey and the 
fact that the receipts per tourist are among the highest in Europe may again be 
attributed to the large number of visitors who go to Turkey on shopping expedi-
tions. Moreover, the low expenditure of Turkish tourists abroad (US$ 565 million 
in 1989) allows Turkey to retain most of the foreign exchange earnings (which 
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reached almost US$ 2 billion in 1989) from this industry. 
Table 7.8: Tourist Receipts and Expenditure (US$ million) 
Receipts Expenditure Balance" Receipt/Tourist* 
1988 1989 1988 1989 1988 1989 1988 1989 
France 13,784 16,500 9,713 10,292 4,071 6,208 360 -
Germany 8,478 8,658 24,945 24,129 - 16,467 - 15,471 646 590.9 
Greece 2,393 1,998 738 818 1,655 1,180 308 247 
Italy 12,398 11,987 6,053 6,773 6,345 5,214 223 217 
Portugal 2,425 2,587 534 557 1,891 2,030 366 364 
Spain 16,691 16,252 2,457 3,080 14,234 13,172 308 301 
Switzerland 5,738 5,619 5,034 4,953 704 666 613 556 
Turkey 2,355 2,556 358 565 1,997 1,991 564 573 
U.K. 11,000 11,248 14,614 15,195 - 3,614 - 3,947 696 654 
U.S.A 28,935 34,432 33,098 34,977 - 4,163 - 545 917 977 
(a) Balance of receipts and expenditure (own calculation). 
(b) Receipt per tourist = Receipts divided by total number of tourists (own 
calculation). 
Source: OECD, 1990. 
The success of Turkey in attracting a large number of tourists whether for 
holiday making or shopping is an important asset for Turkey in this industry. 
Hence, policy-makers should do whatever possible to preserve this asset which is 
an important source of desperately needed hard currency at a relatively "cheap" 
cost. 
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Table 7.9: Number of Tourists 
in Some OECD Countries 
1988 1989 
France 38,288,000 -
Germany 13,113,017 14,653,201 
Greece 7,778,000 8,081,851 
Italy 55,690,434 55,131,098 
Portugal 6,623,867 7,115,900 
Spain 54,178,147 54,057,562 
Switzerland 9,352,900 10,103,400 
Turkey 4,172,727 4,459,151 
U.K. 15,795,200 17,203,900 
U.S.A 31,556,890 35,249,046 
Source OECD, 1990. 
The below average nights spent by tourists in Turkey may have an adverse 
effect on the tourist accommodation sector and; hence, the development of the 
tourism sector in general. Low occupancy rates with a short length of stay may 
force some tourist accommodation facilities out of business, consequently threaten-
ing the smooth growth in the industry that occurred in the last decade. Therefore, 
in addition to the investment incentives offered by the Turkish government to 
investors in the sector, a package of incentives (mainly in the form of tax exemp-
tions on income and profits) for accommodation facilities may be very helpful in 
improving those facilities. On the other hand, any form of subsidy or incentives 
package which may lead to more pressure on the government's budget will cul-
minate in higher foreign exchange revenues. Finally, the package will not only 
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lead to support for those facilities facing financial difficulties, but it will increase 
their competitive edge through their ability to offer lower rates compared to other 
European accommodation sectors. 
7.6.2 Employment in the Tourism Sector 
Perhaps one of the most positive effects of tourism on the economy, apart from 
the increase in foreign exchange revenues, is the rise in employment. In a country 
like Turkey with a population growth of about 2.2%, any economic activity that 
would employ more people is welcomed, as long as it does not take them from other 
sectors. Employees working in the tourism sector are not required (in general) to 
be highly skilled, thus there are no major training costs or conditions apart from 
the ability to communicate. 
The number of people employed in the Turkish tourism sector has been in-
creasing but not proportionately with the increase in the number of tourists. The 
number of employees in tourism in 1987 was about 110 thousand (table 7.10) and 
increased to about 134 thousand in 1989 (about 20% rise). On the other hand, the 
tourists visiting Turkey increased from about 3 million in 1987 to about 4.7 miUion 
in 1991 (5.3 million in 1990) i.e., about 50% increase. Furthermore, if we divide 
the number of tourists (table 7.9) by the number of employees (see table 7.10, no 
data is available on the number of employees in tourism after 1989) we wUl have 
the following result: in Turkey there was one employee for every 32.4 tourists in 
1988 and 33.3 tourists in 1989, in the United Kingdom there were one employee for 
every 29.6 tourists in 1988 and 30.9 tourists in 1989, while in Germany there was 
one employee for every 19.2 tourists in 1988. These results show that the Turkish 
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tourism sector lacks human resources in comparison to other European countries; 
especially Germany. This lack of personnel will be reflected in the quality of service 
and thus the future growth of the sector. However, two important points that may 
undermine that conclusion should be taken into consideration. First, the fact that 
most eastern European tourists, who represented about 50% of total tourists in 
Turkey in 1991, go on shopping expeditions means that those tourists do not cause 
any major pressure on tourism facilities and resources. Hence, to include them in 
the counting is an act of over-counting for "genuine" tourists who go to Turkey 
for their hoHdays only. Second, an increasing number of Turks take seaside holi-
days thus competing with foreign tourists for the same resources. However, there 
is no sign of a strain on those people working in the tourism sector (Economist 
IntelUgence Unit, 1992-93). 
Table 7.10: Staflf Employed in 
Hotels and Restaurants 
1987 1988 1989 
Germany 671,000 683,000 -
Turkey 110,336 128,796 134,034 
U.K. 505,800 533,800 556,300 
Source: OECD, 1990. 
One of the problems facing the employers and the employees in tourism is 
seasonality. I t is difficult to keep the employees all year round as this will result 
in extra costs at times of low revenues and low demand for tourist facilities. On 
the other hand, i t will be difficult to find all the personnel needed to run a tourist 
facility at peak months if those were layed off earlier. Therefore, this presents a 
dilemma for employers who should be able to find the optimum solution as they 
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gain more experience and learn more about the market; especially in the holiday 
villages type of accommodation which is a relatively new innovation in tourism for 
Turkey (Manisali, E. and Yarcan, S., 1987). 
7.6.3 The Share of Tourism Revenue in Exports, Trade Deficit, and GNP 
Table 7.11 demonstrates the impressive increase in the role of tourism in the 
Turkish economy since 1980. Despite the growth in GNP and the drastic growth in 
exports during the last decade, tourism revenues were growing at an unprecedented 
pace; faster than exports in relative terms. 
The share of tourism in GNP rose from 0.6% in 1980 to 3.3% in 1990 (2.3% 
in 1991 but this year was exceptional due to the Gulf crisis), while the share in 
exports rose from 11.23% in 1980 to 19.5% in 1991 despite the rise in exported 
goods by more than threefold. The rise in tourism revenues helped to almost close 
the gap between exports and imports. The revenues covered about 88% of the 
trade deficit in 1988 compared to a 6.53% in 1980. However, since 1989 the gap 
widened again due to the substantial increase in the trade deficit. 
I t is clear from the table that the major impact of the adjustment programme 
adopted in 1980, occurred starting from 1984 onwards when by that time confidence 
in the economy started to grow after three years of relatively low inflation (an 
average of about 33.3% annually) and the liberalisation poHcies started to bear 
fruit . 
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Table 7.11: Exports, Trade Deficit, GNP, and Tourism Revenues (US$ 
million) 
Exports TR'* % TR/Exp.^ Imports % TR/TD'^ GNP % GNP^ 
1980 2,910 326.7 11.23 7,909.4 - 4,999 6.53 58,480 0.6 
1981 4,702 381.3 8.11 8,933 - 4,230 9.01 59,502 0.6 
1982 5,746 370.3 6.44 8,842 - 3,096 11.96 54,308 0.7 
1983 5,727 411.1 7.18 9,235 - 3,507 11.72 51,570 0.8 
1984 7,133 840 11.78 10,756 - 3,623 23.18 50,362 1.7 
1985 7,958 1,482 18.62 11,343 - 3,385 43.78 53,612 2.8 
1986 7,456 1,215 16.29 11,104 - 3,648 33.31 58,724 2.1 
1987 10,190 1,721 16.89 14,163 - 3,973 43.32 64,428 2.7 
1988 11,662 2,355 20.20 14,339 - 2,677 87.96 70,700 3.3 
1989 11,627 2,557 22 15,753 - 4,126 62 73,800 3.46 
1990 13,026 3,225 24.8 22,580 - 9,554 33.8 98,000 3.3 
1991 13,598 2,654 19.5 21,038 - 7,440 35.7 113,000 2.3 
(a) Tourism revenues. 
(b) Percentage of tourism revenues to exports. 
(c) Trade deficit. 
(d) Percentage of tourism revenues to the trade deficit. 
(e) Percentage share of tourism revenues in GNP. 
Source: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ICOC), 1989. 
7.7 The Impact of Changes in the Exchange Rate on Tourism Revenues 
I t may be said that the UberaUsation of the exchange rate and the movement of 
capital were the main elements that positively affected Turkish tourism after 1980. 
The latter encouraged foreign investment which increased the flow of desperately 
needed foreign capital while the former rendered Turkey cheaper than many other 
Mediterranean resorts. To try measure the impact of changes in the exchange rate 
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(devaluation) on tourism revenues, a regression equation was formed. Table 7.12 
shows that any devaluation in the Turkish lira positively affects tourism revenues 
in the following year. 
Table 7.12: Impact of a Devaluation on Tourism Revenues 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
In(TR) A 1.89 0.50 
ln(Exch_i) 0.85 0.1 
= 0.95, DW-statistic = 2.01 
Chi-square for serial correlation = 0.12 
Critical value = 3.84 at the 5% significance level, 
n = 11 observations from 1981 to 1991. 
TR = Tourism revenues. 
Exch_i = Exchange rate lagged by one period. 
A = Intercept. 
A one per cent depreciation in the TL leads to a 0.85 per cent increase in 
tourism revenues in the following year, which is a substantial improvement. Thus, 
one can conclude that structural adjustment measures drastically improved the 
performance of the tourism sector and increased the flow of foreign exchange which 
would support the Turkish balance of payments. 
7.8 Tourism Revenues and Investment 
Having tested the impact of the depreciation in the Turkish Lira on tourism 
revenues, i t is interesting to see how the later affects investment in the sector. I t is 
expected, according to the theory of internal investment, that profits or revenues 
of any economic activity are used to finance future investment in order to increase 
productivity and hence, future income. The sector in other words becomes self 
302 
sustaining. In the case of Turkey, with the increase in tourism revenues, the theory 
proved true with investment in the tourism industry being dependent on the income 
in that sector (see table 7.13 below). 
Table 7.13: Tourism Revenues and Investment 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
In(RInv) A - 1.20 0.52 
ln(RTR_i) 1.19 0.19 
= 0.91, DW-statistic = 1.40 
Chi-square for serial correlation = 0.011 
Critical value = 3.84 at the 5% significance level, 
n = 11 observations from 1981 to 1991. 
RInv = Real investment in tourism. 
RTR_i = lagged real tourism revenues. 
A = intercept. 
Table 7.13 shows that any one per cent increase in real revenues in the tourism 
sector in the previous year positively affects real investment in the sector the fol-
lowing year by 1.19 per cent. The higher than unity relationship between revenues 
and investment may be due to the relatively young Turkish tourism industry which 
is in need of substantial amounts of capital to be invested in the sector for its de-
velopment. This result may be a source of comfort for pohcy-makers in Turkey 
as investment in tourism would, accordingly, create less financial burden on their 
budget than if it would have been otherwise. It is expected that when the sector 
is sufficiently developed to meet the increase in the demand on its resources, the 
extra revenues generated will be diverted into other sectors. 
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7.9 Economic Costs of Tourism 
Tourism, which has benefits such as the increase in income and employment, 
improvement in infrastructure, and the encouragement of entrepreneurial activi-
ties, has its economic costs. These costs (which are mainly theoretical) include: 
opportunity cost, increased inflation and higher land values, increased propensity 
to import, seasonality of revenues and the creation of other external, physical and 
social costs (Mathieson, A. and Wall, G., 1982). In what follows the above men-
tioned costs (which might not necessarily occur in Turkey) will be discussed in 
detail. 
7.9.1 Opportunity Costs 
I t is difficult to measure opportunity costs in general. In tourism, the main 
factor of production is capital. In a country like Turkey where capital is scarce, 
the use of such a factor should be preceded by careful studies and cost-benefit 
analysis. Obviously, the huge increase in credits granted by the Tourism Bank 
(table 7.1) since 1980 could have been used to finance other productive projects 
which might generate the same amount of foreign exchange that tourism generated 
if those projects were to produce for the export market. Moreover, labour in the 
tourism sector is another factor of production that should be considered in the 
opportunity costs studies since labour could also be used in other economic sectors 
generating foreign exchange. 
This analysis could not be carried further, given the difficulty of having any 
quantitative analysis. However, it is important that the Turkish government take 
into consideration such costs and not be carried away by the obvious direct benefits 
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of tourism. 
7.9.2 Increased Inflation and Land Values 
The increasing flow of tourists to Turkey in the last decade is expected to have 
exerted some inflationary pressures on the economy; especially that those tourists 
are of the high spending category. The fact that about 4.5 milHon tourists (about 
one tenth of the population) visited Turkey in 1989 should not be taken Ughtly in 
terms of their inflationary impact. 
On the other hand, investors in the tourism sector are expected to have pushed 
prices further up. The increasing demand on land, labour, and construction inputs 
would all contribute to inflation in Turkey. However, the rise in land prices is 
expected to be minor as a result of the government's land allocation scheme (see 
tourism incentives). 
Moreover, the expanding investments, with the resulting expansion in credits, 
which offered more jobs and incomes to those employed in the tourism sector would 
be another factor which would fuel inflation in Turkey. 
7.9.3 Seasoncdity 
Table 7.6 demonstrated the fluctuation in occupancy rates of tourist accommo-
dation in Turkey. This fluctuation varied from a low of 23.7% in January 1989 to 
66.4% in August which clearly reflects the fluctuation in the revenues not only for 
the owners of accommodation but to all those working in the tourism sector and its 
subsectors. Seasonality may be considered a major argument against a dependence 
on tourism. This phenomenon leads to seasonal unemployment, underemployment, 
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and the closure of many tourist faciHties during the off-season. 
7.9.4 Increased Propensity to Import 
I t is unknown to what extent the tourists visiting Turkey consume Turkish 
products. But, it is almost certain that many of them consume imported goods 
or products made from imported inputs. This fact increases the pressure on the 
Turkish lira and the trade balance which leads to a leakage of foreign exchange 
earned from tourism in order to purchase these imports. 
7.9.5 External, Social, and Physical Costs 
Tourism causes extra costs on the residents of the area being visited. These 
costs may include increased congestion and the provision of such services as garbage 
collection and disposal. This may lead to higher taxes in the long-run. On the 
other hand, tourism through its external economies may benefit the residents of 
the area visited through better infrastructure (roads, communication, sewerage, 
...etc.), higher prices for their land and more job opportunities. 
Physical or environmental damage to tourist attractions, in general, may occur 
due to over-use which may entail extra costs for maintenance. Recently, the Turkish 
government has shown some concern over ecological problems caused by massive 
construction activity in major tourism areas (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992-
93). Finally, social costs could be suffered by the residents of the visited area 
due to their contact with other foreign cultures that may threaten their own social 
standards and beUefs. This is more Hkely in the more conservative areas of Turkey, 
mainly the south east. 
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I t is extremely difficult to measure these costs, either due to their intangible 
value (e.g., social and cultural costs) or being part of other variables such as 
inflation and the propensity to import. Meanwhile, the only reUable cost-benefit 
analysis of tourism would be the revenue-expenditure analysis and thus the net 
inflow of foreign currency into Turkey. 
7.10 Conclusion 
From what preceded, there is no doubt about Turkey's tourism potential and 
the success, so far, in exploiting this potential. However, there are certain aspects 
that should be considered by the Turkish authorities in order to, at least, maintain 
the growth in the sector at its current rate. 
The fact that more tourists are expected to visit Turkey in the coming years 
requires more investment in tourist accommodation. But since the profitability of 
hotels in Turkey is modest, the existing investment incentives related to projects 
in accommodation facilities should remain. Foreign investors are, in general, reluc-
tant to invest in hotels in developing countries since it locks in fixed capital with 
relatively long pay-back periods. Therefore, they prefer minority participation in 
new hotel enterprises as it enables them to obtain lucrative management contracts. 
These contracts may benefit Turkey in terms of expertise, but would keep the risk 
burden upon the shoulders of the Turkish investor. On the other hand, if foreign 
investors were obliged to participate, at least partially, in the actual physical in-
vestment, this would ensure the long-term continuity of foreign tourist flows in 
Turkey. 
The competition from foreign tour operators who mainly dominate the "sun-
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lust" market force local operators to work with decreasing profit maxgins. This 
leads to loss of income through the leakage of profits to foreign operators. There-
fore, there is a need to integrate the marketing activities among local operators 
in the tourism field in order to reduce the leakages to outside the local tourism 
economy. On the other hand, Turkish tour operators should have branches abroad 
which would ensure the flow of foreign tourists in the long-run, reduce the depen-
dence on foreign tour operators to bring in tourists, and increase the market share 
of local operators. 
The increasing number of "sunlust" tourists requires the preparation of com-
petitive tour packages by Turkish operators. This demands frequent and compet-
itive air charters. Currently, there are a number of charter airUnes operating from 
tourist generating countries to Turkey, but it would be a unique opportunity for 
Turkish airlines if they could benefit from this situation and get a larger share of 
the market by increasing their charter flights. 
The success of the Turkish tourism sector is mainly due to investment and TL 
depreciation. Without those two factors it can be said that tourism in Turkey 
would not have achieved this remarkable growth in the 1980s. The depreciation in 
the Turkish lira proved to be responsible for most of the increase in tourism rev-
enues which are an important source of capital for investors in the sector. There-
fore, the improvement in the balance of payments could be mainly attributed to 
the devaluation in the lira occuring through out the 1980s. 
Furthermore, there is a need to increase the budget of Turkish tourism bureaus 
overseas in order to enable them to have a better promotion policy, based on market 
research, that would help increase demand. Co-operation between Turkish tour 
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operators and the Turkish Tourism Board may help to achieve this objective. 
Finally, expanding the existing infrastructure (mainly road network and air-
ports, the two main means of transport for tourists) should continue as the number 
of tourists visiting Turkey is expected to increase. 
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusions and Findings 
This research sheds some light on the effects of structural adjustment pro-
grammes in general, and in Turkey after 1980 in particular. A three sided study 
composed of the theoretical, macro-econometric, and sectoral sections was neces-
sary to provide a comprehensive overall evaluation of the structural adjustment 
process in a developing country such as Turkey. Each of the previous chapters 
provides an analysis of one aspect of Turkey's post-1980 Uberahsation experience. 
When examined together, they provide the relations and linkages necessary for any 
overall assessment of the policy implications of structural adjustment. 
The next section covers the general research conclusions. Major research find-
ings will be detailed in the third section while major poUcy implications will be 
considered in the fourth section. Finally, recommendations and points for future 
research will be outlined in the last two sections. 
8.1 Summary of Conclusions 
Although it was very difficult to investigate every theoretical aspect of struc-
tural adjustment programmes and their relevance to the Turkish experience, it was 
possible to come up with conclusions related to the general poUcies of hberalisa-
tion and their impact on the Turkish economy. Turkey's recent economic reforms 
included a package for the general Hberalisation of the trade regime by reduc-
ing tariffs on imports, the promotion of exports (mainly manufactured products) 
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through a system of export incentives, nominal depreciation of the Turkish Hra, re-
stricting money supply expansion, liberalisation of interest rates, and a relaxation 
of foreign exchange restrictions and capital transfers. The main objectives of the 
adjustment programme were to achieve low rates of inflation, attract domestic and 
foreign investment, increase savings, and attain a favourable growth rate with a 
balanced budget and balance of payments. 
While not all the objectives have been achieved and other problems loom on the 
horizon (foreign debts, sluggish investment), the general view with respect to the 
hberaiisation experience is of cautious optimism for the future due to the Hmited 
success until now. The frequent devaluations of the period seemed to improve the 
trade deficit but at a cost of higher inflation. 
Light industries such as textUes and agro-industries represent the largest sin-
gle category of Turkish exports. These face tough competition from other semi-
industrialised countries which raises the need for diversification in Turkish exports; 
hence, the need to increase fixed capital formation. I t is clear that Turkey has been 
relying on continuous depreciation in the value of the Turkish Ura and on an export 
incentives scheme (especially in the early 1980s) to keep its export drive (AricanH, 
T. and Rodrik, D., 1990). However, these two policies are counterproductive in the 
long-run with an inflationary eflFect as a result of the first poUcy, and the financial 
strain placed on the budget and a possible retaliatory action from Turkey's main 
export markets (the OECD countries) if i t continues its second policy. Both strate-
gies reflect Turkey's reliance on the price competitiveness of its products rather 
than their quality, a strategy that might have serious drawbacks at home. Thus, 
there is a need to embark on an investment strategy involving both the pubHc and 
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the private sectors to increase the industrial base of the country before most of 
the existing capacity, which was built in the 1970s, becomes obsolete. Moreover, 
this strategy would increase productivity and exports with a transformation in the 
structure of these goods if the investment plans were to take into consideration the 
diversification of these products. However, the economic instabiUty in the country 
reflected by the continuing depreciations, inflation, and rises in interest rates, in 
addition to the crowding out of domestic capital by the government to finance its 
budget deficit, render the investment atmosphere gloomy; especially for foreign 
and domestic private investors. On the other hand, nominal devaluations in the 
Ura, high interest rates, and export subsidies increase the financial burden on the 
budget; hence, limiting the government's abiUty to invest. The latter obviously 
increases the leakages from the treasury while the former two factors increase the 
burden of debt servicing. 
Moreover, Baysan and Blitzer (Aricanli, T. and Rodrik, D., 1990) beheved 
that one of the major contributors to the success of the Turkish exports drive 
after 1980 was its unutilised industrial capacity formed in the 1970s. In addition, 
the Iran-Iraq war helped boost Turkish exports at a time of sluggish international 
demand elsewhere due to the recession in the industrial countries in the early 
1980s. However, with the export boom that Turkey witnessed after 1980, the 
unutilised capacity in the manufacturing sector was exploited by the mid 1980s. 
This fact reflects once again the need to expand the productive capacity of the 
country, otherwise a reversal of events may occur not long before the end of the 
century which might bring Turkey to a crisis similar to the one experienced in the 
late 1970s. I f Turkey wants to be the "Japan of the Middle East", to use Ozal's 
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words, then it has to follow the example of the south east Asian countries and 
their export-led growth based on investment in productive projects which would 
feed more exports. 
To summarise, there seem to be many problems ahead which need to be dealt 
with before it is too late since any delay would jeopardise the chances of finding 
solutions and increase the costs. The first and most important step is the need 
for a structural transformation in Turkish exports through increasing investments 
in export capacity and diversifying production to pre-empt any loss in exports in 
the future due to increasing competition from other traditional textiles exporters. 
Other problems of no less importance are increasing inflation, high interest rates 
(which will decline as inflation decreases), high pubUc sector borrowing require-
ment, rising foreign debts, and continuing depreciation. The last two problems 
present a critical challenge to policy-makers in the coming years as the latter is 
difficult to stabilise without considerable foreign exchange reserves, while the for-
mer would require better tax collection and strict government spending with its 
drawbacks on economic growth. In the final analysis, an increase in exports in the 
future would increase Turkey's financial resources to stabilise the exchange rate, 
decrease the public deficit due to rising revenues from the exports activity, reduce 
inflation due to a stable exchange rate, and reduce interest rates as a result of the 
lower demand on financial resources from the government, due to decreasing pubhc 
deficit, which would stimulate private investment. It is these unsolved problems 
that mean there must be some reservations which prevent considering the 1980 
structural adjustment programme an outright economic success. 
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8.2 Major Research Findings 
This study, which aimed at testing the validity of the theoretical concepts 
of structural adjustment programmes in Turkey came up with quite surprising 
results. The exchange rate, which is widely believed to have the major impact on 
the volume of exports and consequently the trade deficit, appeared to have played 
a moderate role. Furthermore, on the internal front, interest rates in Turkey had 
a minor role in the determination of deposits and credits. 
The argument that a devaluation in the exchange rate wiU increase exports 
and decrease imports could not be proved in the case of Turkey. Although the 
above mentioned targets were achieved, the main factor was the rise in industrial 
production rather than the depreciation of the Turkish Ura. However, the latter 
was found to have a weak relation with industrial output. 
These results cast doubts as to the need for devaluation and its painful con-
sequences represented mainly by infiation and the deterioration of real per capita 
income. But does that mean that Turkish trade would have been better under the 
pre-1980 economic system? And if so why should this be the case? 
The overvaluation of the Turkish Hra before 1980 encouraged capital outflows 
and increased imports to the extent where in 1977 Turkey started to have chronic 
shortages of foreign exchange. The econometric tests showed that the high negative 
elasticity of exports in case of a devaluation presumably led to an increase in the 
trade deficit in the 1970s. This impact can be justified mainly due to the inward-
oriented pohcies which made Turkish exports limited and less competitive abroad. 
Meanwhile, any devaluation under the pohcies of the time (high import tariffs) 
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would result in higher prices for imported products, thus, increasing the demand 
for domestic goods leaving less products to export. This situation, with the need 
to import industrial inputs for domestic production, may be the cause behind the 
deterioration in the trade balance and the decline in the share of Turkish exports 
in world markets in the 1970s. 
As to the post-1980 period, the above argument partially applies; because the 
period witnessed the liberalisation of trade, export-oriented poUcies and contin-
uous depreciation in the Turkish Ura. These factors, mainly export incentives, 
guaranteed the competitiveness of Turkish exporters (or those manufacturers who 
have the potential to export) abroad. Thus, the main determinant of the volume 
of exports became the capacity of industrial production to meet foreign demand 
rather than the value of the Turkish lira against other currencies. 
With regard to the preceding points, one can say that the devalued exchange 
rate was not the direct incentive for investors to export their products. Exports 
depended on the availability of industrial capacity. The fact that Turkey aimed at 
increasing its industrial base before 1980, through its five-year development plans, 
prompted a rapid increase in Turkish exports which were stimulated by the export 
incentives offered by the government, depressed domestic demand, the availability 
of unutilised industrial capacity (the latter two factors existed mainly until the mid 
1980s), and devaluation. Assuming that the industrial capacity did not exist, it 
would have been very difllcult to see how Turkey would improve its trade balance 
at the time, a result that coincides with the findings of Krueger and Aktan (1992). 
On the whole, the devaluation in the Turkish hra proved to have a weak eflFect 
on industrial production and a moderate impact on exports. The main impact on 
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Turkish trade was the change in the economic system as a whole, in particular 
export policies, which stimulated industrial output. These findings (related to 
the marginal impact of the exchange rate in increasing Turkish exports and the 
importance of export incentives) coincide with the findings of the questionnaire 
carried out by Milanovic (1986) where a sample of Turkish industrial exporters 
considered the export incentives package to be more important for them than the 
exchange rate in determining their export activity. However, it is worth mentioning 
that Milanovic's questionnaire is limited by the number of industrialists covered 
by the research, while this study is more broadly based. 
In the literature of structural adjustment programmes, there are conflicting 
views as to whether the adjustment measures lead to an expansion or contraction 
in the economic activity in the short-run. In the case of Turkey, the country 
witnessed an average annual growth of about 5.9% in the decade of the 1970s with 
a negative growth (- 1.1%) in 1980. On the other hand, the GNP grew by more 
than 4% in 1981 and continued its growth throughout the decade of the 1980s, with 
an average annual growth of about 5.3% (OECD Economic Surveys, 1990/1991). 
Therefore, one can say that the direct effect of the programme (in the first year) 
was expansionary; but on the whole it had a small contractionary effect which 
should be ignored as minor given the high increase in nominal and real interest 
rates in Turkey since 1982. 
As far as inflation is concerned, Fischer (Dornbusch, R. and Helmers, F., 1988) 
emphasises that a devaluation increases the domestic price level through the rise 
in the prices of imports. This view proved to be the case in Turkey. On the one 
hand, the devaluation in the exchange rate was found to exert an upward pres-
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sure on prices which is another result that coincides with the findings of Krueger 
and Aktan (1992). On the other hand, Turkey witnessed a dramatic decline in 
the inflation rate after 1980 which remained relatively low (at an annual average 
of about 37%) until 1988 when it shot up to 75%. The developments could be 
explained on the basis that Turkey suflfered from a chronic shortage of industrial 
inputs in the late 1970s due to the lack of hard currency. The lack of industrial 
inputs negatively affected output and led to a negative growth which resulted in 
a surplus of unutilised industrial capacity and high inflation as domestic demand 
could not be met by domestic output and imports were restricted. Meanwhile, 
the devaluation of the Turkish lira and the hberaiisation of trade provided Turkish 
producers with the inputs and price competitiveness (mainly at home) they needed 
to resume their industrial production. Therefore, with supply rising and demand 
dechning due to lower real income after devaluation, inflation went down; but only 
for few years before rising once again in 1988. The recent rise in inflation could be 
attributed to the continuous expansion in credits, rising real income as wages rose 
under pressure from the unions, and last but not least, the continuing dechne in 
the value of the Turkish hra, and the "full" utilisation of industrial capacity (by 
Turkish standards the capacity is fuUy used given the less developed techniques 
used compared to those used in Europe). 
With respect to the hberaiisation of the interest rates, the theory proved to be 
inapplicable according to this study. Lending and deposit interest rates; especially 
the latter, had a minor effect on savings and credits. The results related to the 
relation between deposits and interest rates, in the last decade, coincide with the 
findings of Rittenberg (Nas, T. and Odekon, M., 1988) who concluded that while 
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negative interest rates discouraged savings in the 1970s, positive real interest rates 
in the 1980s had a much milder effect in terms of encouraging savings. 
However, the propensity to save in Turkey decreased after 1980, in comparison 
with the 1970s, due to the dechne in real wages. One reason for the slow response 
of savers (in real terms) after the liberalisation of interest rates could be the lack 
of confidence in the Turkish banking system after the 1982 banks' crash. On the 
other hand, the liberalisation of the foreign exchange controls helped increase the 
inflow of capital in remittances. 
As to credits, lending interest rates were found to be completely irrelevant in 
the decision-making of Turkish investors in the 1980s. This is not surprising if we 
consider that, first the main borrower from the Turkish financial markets is the 
government to finance its budget deficit. The state borrowed regardless of what 
the market interest rate was. Second, despite the rise in interest rates in Turkey, 
the financial costs for Turkish manufacturers are still relatively low compared to 
their European couterparts in Spain, Portugal, Germany, and Italy (see chapter 
5). 
The increase in real wages; especially in the late 1980s, helped reduce the 
income distribution gap in Turkey. According to the 1987 income distribution 
survey, it was found that the Gini coefficient was reduced from 0.53 in 1983 to 
0.43. Also, there was a redistribution of wealth from the highest quintile to the 
lowest quintile. 
At the sectoral level, the study proved to be very useful in terms of determining 
the potential of each sector and its response to structural adjustment which has 
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shed some light on the measures needed in the future. An increase in the irrigated 
area and more market determined agricultural prices seem necessary to increase 
productivity and give better signals to farmers. In this respect, the GAP project 
seems promising with respect to the increase in the area of irrigated land. It could 
affect many other sectors (manufacturing, services, construction, banking, ...etc.) 
which could enhance Turkey's ability to export. An increase in the facihties to ex-
port slaughtered animals would improve Turkey's trade balance given the regional 
comparative advantage that Turkey has in that subsector. In addition, there is 
a big potential in the Turkish agro-industries which the authorities started to ex-
ploit recently. Another positive step that was taken recently is the hberaJisation of 
the tobacco industry which would increase investment, thus, productivity leading 
to less imports and consequently a lower trade deficit. There is also a need for 
more liberalisation of agricultural prices, an increase in the quality and quantity 
of seeds produced in Turkey, and the need for land reform (given the small size 
of holdings) which would facilitate economies of scale. It may also be beneficial 
to allow foreign transport companies to operate in Turkey which would increase 
competition and the availability of vehicles to transport agricultural produce to 
foreign markets. The EC common agricultural policy (CAP) was found to have a 
minor impact on Turkish agricultural exports although it negatively affected the 
share of Turkish trade with the Community. Moreover, the hberaiisation of trade 
reduced the size of the black market in trade including livestock. Overall, it may 
be said that agriculture in Turkey improved after 1980. 
In manufacturing, there is a need to update existing machinery; especially in 
the textiles sector in order to preserve Turkish competitiveness in the world market. 
321 
Moreover, an increase in capacity utilisation and incentives for machinery and 
transport equipment producers seems necessary to increase their competitiveness. 
This would help diversify Turkish exports and reduce the dependence on imports of 
those goods. In addition, Turkish industry lacks investment in R&D and its labour 
needs to be more skilled; especially in some small firms. On the other hand, the 
privatisation of the pubhc corporations should continue at a faster pace in order 
to increase efficiency and capacity utilisation, which would increase productivity, 
mainly in the cotton weaving, cotton spinning, fabric processing, and knitting 
subsectors. Turkey faces problems in its major textiles export markets represented 
by EC quotas on Turkish products and tough competition mainly from south east 
Asian producers. Thus, the irony is that at the time when Turkey is asked to 
open its markets for foreign exporters, its own products are facing trade barriers 
in their export markets. However, Turkey may overcome this obstacle by 1996 
when the customs union with the EC is estabUshed. Meanwhile, Turkey may 
benefit by adopting a lower-cost higher-quality strategy which would maximise its 
returns from textiles exports despite the quotas imposed. I t can be said that the 
manufacturing sector in Turkey had the major benefit from hberahsation which 
allowed it to increase its share in exports compared to agriculture. Finally, with 
the existing policies and adopting the above suggestions, Turkey can make the 
most of its structural adjustment programme. 
The tourism sector was considered of increasing importance for the Turkish 
economy given the continuous rise in revenues from this sector. The devalua-
tion in the Turkish lira after 1980 may be the major economic pohcy that had 
a substantial effect on revenues from this sector as the country became relatively 
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cheaper for foreigners. The revenues proved to be important to increase invest-
ment in the sector and thus attract more tourists. Turkey has a promising tourism 
potential which could be exploited to the full with immense benefits in terms of 
foreign exchange returns given the "high spending" per tourist in the country and 
the increasing number of east European shoppers. Economic hberaUsation had a 
positive effect on foreign investment in this industry where the sector needs both 
capital and managerial expertise. In addition, there is a need to increase charter 
flights, accommodation faciUties, occupancy rates in Turkish managed hotels, pro-
motion abroad, and infrastructure so that domestic tour operators can compete 
with foreign ones. 
Which economic system is better for Turkey? It is difficult to say since the 
policies adopted before and after 1980 had their own distinctive blessings and 
evUs. However, one can say that Turkey, despite the current threats to its relative 
economic success, is on the right track in terms of demand and supply determined 
prices which would enable the country to be a regional economic power given 
its potential and assuming that existing problems are solved. The GAP project 
may make an important contribution to the Turkish economy by the turn of the 
century, but the existing economic instabiltiy of the country may undermine that 
achievement. The fact that Turkey is now more integrated in the world economy 
means that it is more vulnerable to global peaks and troughs being reflected back 
home more than ever before. Moreover, since the demise of the Soviet Union 
and its related inward-oriented economic ideologies, it is clear that Turkey has 
reached the point of no return. Turkey has now to make the best of its new 
economic system. The Declaration of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation could 
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be a positive step forward opening new markets for Turkey to increase its exports 
which would contribute to economic growth. Also, the new treaty is expected to 
intensify the transfer of western technology and capital through Turkey. This may 
be a factor that would raise the per capita income in Turkey and hence facUitate 
its accession to the EC i f the pohtical barriers (disputes with Greece, human 
rights record, ...etc.) were overcome. Also, the establishment of the customs 
union with the EC by 1996 is considered an important step forward which would 
prepare Turkey for full membership; especially now that most of its industries are 
competitive in Europe. 
8.3 The Policy Implications of Liberalisation 
The post-1980 liberalisation policies were analysed on the basis of the effects 
of changes in a set of economic variables (trade, inflation, exchange rate, indus-
trial production, ...etc.). However, three important factors have not so far been 
discussed although they have been directly affected by the 1980 economic reforms. 
This section will briefly look at the implications of Hberalisation on Turkey's ex-
ternal debts and foreign investment. 
8.3.1 Foreign Debts 
There is no doubt that the inflow of foreign funds whether from oflBcial (gov-
ernments and international organisations) or private (banks) sources was an im-
portant factor in Turkey's economic recovery in the past decade. However, the 
cost was high with a tripling of external debts from about US$ 13 biUion in 1979 
to about US$ 46 biUion in 1992, with consequences in terms of the financial drain 
on Turkey's foreign exchange revenues to service these debts. In this respect, a 
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question that may be raised here is the cause of economic recovery. Was it the 
inflow of foreign funds or the change in the economic system or both? Another 
question is what would have happened if the same injection of foreign exchange 
had taken place in 1979? On the whole, although the increase in foreign debts may 
be considered one of the negative consequences of hberalisation, one may say that 
Turkey under the new system is well placed to service that debt. Under the old 
economic system capital flows may have merely postponed the crisis, not solved it 
given the distortions in the market due to economic mismanagement at the time. 
8.3.2 Foreign Investment 
I t was expected that the Uberalisation of the Turkish economy would, as a re-
sult, attract foreign investment into the country providing Turkey with the foreign 
capital and managerial expertise. However, despite the increase in foreign capital 
flows from about US$ 300 million in 1981 to about US$ 1.5 billion in 1991, the 
performance of foreign investors in Turkey in terms of total capital invested is still 
unsatisfactory. This may be largely due to the economic instabihty (mainly con-
tinuing inflation and depreciation in the Turkish lira) and high interest rates which 
are critical issues in the decision-making of investors. Another factor may be the 
internal dispute regarding the desirabUity of the involvement of foreign capital in 
the privatisation process. Most of the foreign capital (about 60%) is invested in 
the manufacturing sector (OECD Economic Surveys, 1990/1991) which is the kind 
of investment that Turkey desperately needs. Hence, an increase in the inflow of 
foreign capital would definitely help Turkey's economic development, eventually 
reducing both the current account deficit and the unemployment problem. In that 
respect, the estabUshment of the customs union with the EC may substantially 
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help increase the inflow of capital as foreign investors (such as Japan) would take 
the opportunity of cheap labour in Turkey and the ability to market their products 
in Europe at the same time. 
8.4 Research Recommendations 
From what preceded it is clear that the Turkish economy is stUl in an un-
balanced position. Accordingly, the following suggestions may help increase the 
advantage of structural adjustment, stabihse variables such as inflation and the 
exchange rate, and increase the growth of the economy: 
• Increase domestic and foreign investment in most sectors; especially manufac-
turing and tourism by relaxing bureaucratic measures. 
• Adoption of a realistic and stable exchange rate and monetary poUcy which 
would reduce inflation and increase investment and growth. 
• Intensification of the pace of reform of the SEEs by more privatisation and 
rationalisation of costs (even at a short-run cost of unemployment) and prices 
to increase efficiency. 
• Development of the domestic capital markets to increase the financial resources 
available to finance the public sector borrowing requirement and to meet the de-
mand for loans from domestic investors (especially industrialists) which would 
reduce interest rates. 
• Reduction of the PSBR by reducing expenditure (mainly on the SEEs) and in-
creasing revenues by more efficient management of tax collection and tightning 
the screws on tax evasion. 
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• Increase industrial production by increasing the industrial base and more ef-
ficient utilisation of the still untapped resources of difi'erent sectors and sub-
sectors such as forestry, livestock, tourism, transport, and transit and depot 
facUities. 
• More investment in open-end (rotor) cotton spinning and shuttless looms due 
to better quality and less costs involved which would maintain Turkey's market 
share in Europe. 
• Reducing the use of labour in agriculture and more investment in agricultural 
subsectors such as packaging and agro-industries. 
• Update the machinery used in manufacturing and using modern techniques 
in fabric processing; especially for dying and colouring which would raise the 
quality and the export value of the product. 
• Development of a retail network distribution for Turkish exports abroad by 
opening branches for main exporters in major export markets. 
• Increase promotion for tourism in addition to charter flights and the number 
and occupancy rates of accommodation facilities. 
• Increase exports with an emphasis on diversifying the composition of the prod-
ucts exported. This combined with a reduction in imports by having a carefully 
prepared tariffs poUcy; especially on consumption and agricultural products, 
would reduce the current account deficit. 
• Greater incentives for research and development (R&D) mainly in industry. 
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• Labour training in industry, increasing the number and improve the quality of 
training of employees in the tourism sector, and more technical and extension 
services for farmers. 
• More liberalisation of agricultural prices, increasing the quality and quantity of 
seeds produced, land reform, and allowing foreign transport companies access 
to the Turkish market. 
• More security in the south east of the country to maximise the benefit from 
the GAP project. 
8.5 Topics for Future Research 
Several issues remain of great importance to give an overall picture of the 
impact of liberalisation on the Turkish economy, these are mainly: 
• An extrapolation of the impact of the inflow of capital (that occurred after 
1980) on the Turkish economy before 1980 and without structural adjustment. 
• An up-to-date study of the social and distributional impact of adjustment. 
• The impact of the government's crowding-out eflfect on investment decisions 
and the resulting financial strain on the domestic capital markets. 
• The optimal interest rate, exchange rate, and tariff's necessary for the maximi-
sation of economic growth. 
• An extrapolation of real output, employment, and inflation with and without 
devaluation (with consumption-reducing measures instead) to determine the 
effect on the balance of payments. 
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Finally, although this study was prepared for Turkey specifically, there are 
many aspects of its economy which are found in other developing countries. Thus, 
the above recommendations and topics for future research may be useful for many 
countries that have already started or about to embark on a structural adjustment 
programme. 
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